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This study examined associations between therapist mentalization and patient outcomes 
in the first year of psychotherapy. Mentalization is the implicit and explicit consideration of 
mental states—one’s own as well as others’—and how such states mediate a person’s 
experiences in the world. It is conceptualized as existing on a scale of increasing complexity. 
This study sought to extend developmental research that has illustrated the positive influence of a 
parent’s mentalization on a child’s emotional well-being. Specifically, it was proposed that 
psychotherapy cases with high levels of therapist mentalization would have better patient 
outcomes than those with low levels of therapist mentalization. 
To test this hypothesis, 17 therapy cases at a community clinic were followed for one 
year. In each case, the therapist completed the Patient-Therapist Adult Attachment Interview—
Revised (PT-AAI-R) four months into treatment. From these interviews, each therapist’s level of 
mentalization was obtained via the Reflective Functioning (RF) Scale, which is a method for 
assessing the quality of mentalization in a narrative. This yielded a Therapist RF score for each 
case. Patient outcomes were assessed at baseline and 12 months. The patient outcomes assessed 




dysregulation, personality pathology, and attachment insecurity. Changes in these symptoms 
were expected to relate to Therapist RF scores. 
Results indicated that Therapist RF was not related to symptom changes in the full 
sample. However, for patients with high levels of emotion dysregulation at baseline, high 
Therapist RF was associated with better outcomes in this symptom area. This was not the case 
for patients with low levels of emotion dysregulation at baseline. This finding suggests that 
Therapist RF might be particularly important in therapy with patients who have high levels of 
emotion dysregulation. Additionally, Therapist RF was elevated in the context of elevated 
personality pathology in patients, which suggests that high levels of personality pathology might 
be a catalyst for high Therapist RF, though Therapist RF was not associated with better outcomes 
for this symptom. A qualitative analysis of the PT-AAI-Rs of two therapists who each completed 
two interviews was performed. This analysis illustrated that Therapist RF scores were influenced 
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 
While psychotherapy research supports the efficacy of a variety of treatment approaches 
(American Psychological Association, 2013), the evidence for how therapy works is less robust. 
Many clinical trials do not provide direct evidence for the mechanisms assumed to be responsible 
for patient improvements (Kazdin, 2007; Mander et al., 2015). This is notable, as knowledge of 
the mechanisms responsible for therapeutic change has implications for therapist training and 
clinical practice. 
A construct that has the potential to expand the existing knowledge of therapeutic change 
mechanisms is mentalization (Bateman & Fonagy, 2006). Mentalization refers to the implicit and 
explicit consideration of mental states—one’s own as well as others’—and how such states 
mediate a person’s experiences in the world (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, Moran, & Higgitt, 1991). It 
is conceptualized as existing on a scale of increasing complexity, and higher levels of 
mentalization include qualities such as the following: an awareness that mental states can be 
opaque and that our understanding of others and even ourselves is incomplete; an understanding 
that there is value in developing plausible mental-state-oriented explanations for behavior, even 
though such explanations might be incorrect; and an understanding that thoughts and feelings 
about a certain person or situation can change over time, even if that person or situation has not 
noticeably changed (Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele, 1998). Preliminary findings suggest that 
one’s level of mentalization is influenced by context and by the subject of one’s mentalizing 
(Diamond, Stovall-McClough, Clarkin, & Levy, 2003; Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele, 1998). 
Moderate to high levels of mentalization have been associated with a number of interrelated 
benefits, such as effective emotion regulation, integration of one’s self-representation, effective 




Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002; Fonagy, Luyten, Allison, & Campbell, 2017a; Fonagy, Luyten, 
Allison, & Campbell, 2017b). Conversely, low levels of mentalization have been linked with 
many forms of psychopathology—e.g., externalizing symptoms, emotion dysregulation, 
personality pathology, and attachment insecurity (Bouchard et al., 2008; Fonagy et al., 1998; 
Fonagy et al., 1996; Lecours, Briand-Malenfant, & Descheneaux, 2013; Levy et al., 2006b; 
Stover & Kiselica, 2014). 
Increasing patients’ capacity for mentalization is currently hypothesized to be a 
mechanism of change in a variety of psychotherapeutic interventions, including several that have 
had success in reducing the forms of psychopathology mentioned above (e.g., Bales et al., 2014; 
Bateman & Fonagy, 2006; Diamond et al., 2013; Goodman, 2013; Lecours et al., 2013; Levy et 
al., 2006b; Petersen et al., 2010). Notably, a recent study by De Meulemeester, Vansteelandt, 
Luyten, and Lowyck (2018) found that increases in patients’ levels of mentalization during a 
treatment for borderline personality disorder accounted for a large proportion of the reductions in 
symptoms observed, a finding that provides support for this being a mechanism of change. 
Overall, the mentalization construct has already advanced the field’s understanding of 
psychotherapy processes and outcomes, and it is a construct with considerable promise for future 
research. 
However, while patient mentalization has been studied as a marker and mechanism of 
therapeutic change across different types of psychotherapies, relatively few studies of 
mentalization in clinical settings have investigated the role of therapist mentalization. This 
omission is notable given the central role that therapist mentalization likely occupies in a variety 
of approaches to psychotherapy (Allen, Fonagy, & Bateman, 2018; Jurist, 2018). It is possible 




types of therapies—even those that do not view improvements in patient mentalization as a 
putative mechanism of change. 
Indirect evidence for the relevance of therapist mentalization for patient outcomes can be 
found in the developmental literature, which gives mentalization an important role in the 
relationship between a caregiver and a child. In studies of mother-child dyads, levels of maternal 
mentalization have been positively related to children’s attachment security (Fonagy et al., 1991; 
Slade, Grienenberger, Bernbach, Levy, & Locker, 2005). Conversely, levels of maternal 
mentalization have been inversely related to the incidence of hostile and intrusive parenting 
behaviors (e.g., Ensink, Rousseau, Biberdzic, Bégin, & Normandin, 2017; Grienenberger, Kelly, 
& Slade, 2005; Stacks et al., 2014). Synthesizing a range of theory and empirical research, 
Gergely and Unoka (2008) have drawn a direct line from caregiver mentalization to early forms 
of mentalization in infants. Specifically, they assert a caregiver’s marked mirroring of their 
infant’s affect states—an activity that requires the caregiver’s mentalization—leads to the 
creation of secondary representations of affect states for the infant. They argue that this is the 
foundation of the infant’s future mentalizing as well as their sense of agency and efficacy in the 
world. Along these lines, studies have found associations between levels of mentalization in 
caregivers and children at later stages of childhood—e.g., preadolescence and adolescence 
(Benbassat & Priel, 2012; Ensink, Bégin, Normandin & Fonagy, 2016; Ensink et al., 2015; 
Rosso, Viterbori, & Scopesi, 2015). Additionally, multiple writers have argued that interactions 
in which “being mentalized about (by others) spurs the evolution of mentalizing (by the self)” 
(Jurist, 2018, p. 45) are not limited to childhood attachment relationships but also occur later in 
life—and in an individual’s broader social world (Fonagy, Luyten, Allison, & Campbell, 2017a; 




it is also believed that early attachment relationships are critical in the development of the 
capacity for mentalization; specifically, dysfunctional parental behaviors in early attachments 
(i.e., those that are intrusive, unpredictable, dissociative, abusive, or neglectful) adversely affect 
a young child’s ability to mentalize later in life (Gergely & Unoka, 2008; Jurist, 2018). The 
adverse effect of these behaviors would be, at least in part, through damaging the young child’s 
epistemic trust—i.e., their openness to receiving new information from others, undergirded by a 
sense that such information might be generalizable to the self (Jurist, 2018). 
Extending the empirical findings and theory presented above to the patient-therapist 
relationship, and viewing the therapist as operating within a caregiving role, a therapist’s 
mentalization might have bearing on a patient’s capacity for mentalization. However, some 
caution should be exercised when extrapolating from the relationship between a parent and a 
young child to the relationship between a therapist and an adult patient. The latter relationship 
differs from the former in several important ways, including its scope and its reliance on verbal 
versus nonverbal communication (Holmes & Slade, 2018). At the same time, Parish and Eagle 
(2003) have found evidence suggesting that therapists assume many of the qualities that 
attachment figures do (e.g., “stronger and wiser,” “available and responsive”), and that a 
therapist can be an attachment figure for a patient. Holmes and Slade (2018) assert that the 
therapist’s role as an attachment figure is responsible for the therapy relationship’s ability to 
open a “sensitive period” in a patient’s life—i.e., a period in which substantial personal changes 
become possible. Stated another way, the therapy relationship is evocative of a relationship 
template that also underlies childhood attachments, and it utilizes that template’s ability to prime 
the patient for new learning. This priming might happen via the rekindling of the patient’s 




mentalizing (Jurist, 2018). Overall, the literature suggests that therapist mentalization should 
have a role in developing patient mentalization, which, as stated above, is inversely associated 
with many types of psychopathology. 
To build on the theory and research above, the present study sought empirical evidence 
on the relation between a therapist’s capacity to mentalize about a patient and patient symptom 
improvement. As mentioned above, mentalization is believed to be influenced by the context in 
which it occurs (Diamond et al., 2003; Fonagy et al, 1998); as such, therapist mentalization 
should be viewed as a feature of the particular dyad in which it occurs—and one indicator of the 
therapeutic process in that dyad. The present study also sought evidence on the types of patient 
symptoms that might be related to therapist mentalization as well as evidence on whether 
symptom severity plays a role in the relations between therapist mentalization and patient 
outcomes. Based on the research cited above, it was expected that therapist mentalization would 
be related to reductions in symptoms that have been linked with low mentalization in patients. 
Specifically, it was expected that, for these symptoms, higher levels of therapist mentalization 
would be associated with better outcomes by facilitating improvements in patient mentalization. 
It also was expected that higher levels of therapist mentalization would be more beneficial for 
patients with higher symptom levels. This expectation was based on clinical research in which 
impairments in mentalization have been more pronounced in the context of greater symptom 
severity (e.g., Fischer-Kern et al., 2013; Taubner, Kessler, Buchheim, Kachele, & Staun, 2011). 
It also was based on developmental theory and research suggesting that caregiver mentalization 
is more important in the context of a child’s heightened distress or in the context of current or 





 The present study sought to address the questions above via a study of 17 psychotherapy 
cases over one year of treatment. The cases included in this study were treated at The 
Psychological Center, an outpatient clinic in an urban setting in the northeastern United States. 
The Psychological Center provides low-cost treatment to a population composed primarily of 
persons living in the surrounding community. The treatment offered at The Psychological Center 
is predominantly psychodynamic in orientation and typically includes a combination of 
expressive and supportive elements tailored to the patient (see Dewald, 1994 for a review of 
supportive and expressive elements of therapy). Some cases at The Psychological Center are 
conducted as manualized treatments, but most are not manualized. In light of the non-
standardized nature of the treatments in this study, it should be noted that Fonagy and colleagues 
have argued that mentalizing is “the most fundamental common factor among psychotherapeutic 
treatments” whether or not it is an explicit focus of the therapist (Allen, Fonagy, & Batemen, 
2008, p. 1). In this view, therapist mentalization need not be a mechanism of change consciously 
employed by the therapist for it to have bearing on the treatment. 
To assess therapist mentalization, the therapist of each case in the study completed the 
Patient-Therapist Adult Attachment Interview—Revised (PT-AAI-R; Diamond et al., 2016; 
George at al., 1984, 1988, 1996) four months into the treatment. The PT-AAI-R is a semi-
structured interview that elicits descriptions of the other member of the therapeutic dyad and of 
the therapeutic relationship. PT-AAI-Rs were rated for mentalization according to the Reflective-
Functioning Scale (RF Scale; Fonagy et al., 1998). RF is a narrative-based measure of an 
individual’s level of mentalization, and higher RF scores are derived from statements that 
communicate either explicitly or implicitly the qualities of mentalization. RF scores range from  




PT-AAI-Rs with therapists in this study were referred to as Therapist RF scores as they were 
specific to a therapeutic relationship. Patient outcome measures were administered at baseline 
and at 12 months of treatment as part of a larger programmatic evaluation study at The 
Psychological Center. The outcomes used in this study were the following: externalizing 
symptoms from the hostility and paranoid ideation subscales of the Brief Symptom Inventory 
(BSI; Boulet & Boss, 1991); emotion dysregulation from the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation 
Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004); personality pathology from the primitive defenses and 
identity diffusion subscales of the Inventory of Personality Organization (IPO; Lenzenweger et 
al., 2001); and attachment insecurity from the Experiences in Close Relationships—Relationship 
Structures questionnaire (ECR-RS; Fraley et al., 2011). 
 The present study tested two specific hypotheses. First, that high levels of Therapist RF 
would be associated with greater reductions in patients’ externalizing symptoms, emotion 
dysregulation, personality pathology, and attachment insecurity scores over one year of 
treatment. Second, that the relation between Therapist RF and patient outcomes for each of the 
symptoms mentioned above would be moderated by the symptom’s level at baseline; 
specifically, Therapist RF would be associated with better outcomes for patients with high levels 
of the symptom at baseline, but it would not be associated with better outcomes for patients with 
low levels of the symptom at baseline. Additionally, this study included a qualitative analysis of 
PT-AAI-R responses to illustrate the ways in which the Therapist RF scores obtained in this 
study were influenced by both the patient and the therapist in each dyad. 
This study’s results contribute to its overarching goal: to obtain empirical evidence for a 
potential mechanism of therapeutic change that may be associated with improvement in specific 




potential to generate hypotheses for further research. Also of note, a recent study found that a 30-
hour mentalization training program for therapists increased levels of therapist mentalization 
with regard to hypothetical patients (Ensink et al., 2013). As such, the present study’s results 




CHAPTER TWO: Literature Review 
This study investigated the relation between therapist mentalization and patient outcomes 
in psychotherapy. While, to date, this specific research topic has received little attention, it is 
supported by a large body of theoretical and empirical work. This literature review seeks to 
summarize the findings with relevance for the current study. It is presented in eight sections and 
concludes with a statement of this study’s hypotheses. It begins with a section that defines 
mentalization and its wide-ranging implications. This section also outlines a variety of personal 
and interpersonal problems associated with difficulties in mentalization, which highlights the 
importance of therapeutic interventions that would seek to redress such difficulties. The second 
section presents the RF Scale (Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele, 1998), the way mentalization is 
most often assessed in research paradigms, which lays the groundwork for the references to 
empirical research throughout this literature review. The third section concerns the development 
of the capacity for mentalization, which begins in a child’s earliest interactions with a caregiver. 
It describes the way a caregiver’s effort to regulate a young child affect states typically entails 
the caregiver communicating their mentalizing about the child’s affect states, which, for the 
child, creates higher-order representations of those states and stimulates the mechanisms that 
underly independent mentalization. The fourth section outlines the ways in which the attachment 
system is linked to mentalization—as well as the ways in which the capacity for mentalization is 
influenced by the broader social milieu and develops independently of attachment relationships. 
The fifth section builds on the prior section but focuses on the caregiving system, which exists in 
a reciprocal relationship with the attachment system and organizes a caregiver’s role in 
attachment relationships. This section details some ways in which the functioning of the 




presents empirical findings associated with caregiver mentalization. The sixth section introduces 
clinical research on mentalization, which shows that low RF is an important marker of 
psychopathology, and that increasing RF is hypothesized to be a mechanism of change in several 
treatments—particularly those for personality pathology. The seventh section concerns 
mentalization specifically within the patient-therapist relationship, and the ways in which it 
interacts with the attachment and caregiving systems of the patient and therapist. It describes the 
ways in which a therapist’s caregiving differs from the caregiving provided in other types of 
attachment relationships. It also describes some factors that contribute to a therapist’s state of 
mind with respect to their role as therapist—factors that are unique to the therapist role. Finally, 
it presents preliminary findings on Therapist RF (i.e., a therapist’s ability to mentalize about a 
particular patient) for the mentalization and attachment security of patients. The eighth and final 
section considers, in light of the theory and research in this chapter, psychotherapy outcomes that 
should be related to Therapist RF. 
 
Mentalization and its importance in everyday life 
The construct of mentalization was elaborated by Fonagy and colleagues (Fonagy, Steele, 
Steele, Moran, & Higgit, 1991), who defined it as mental activity informed by the knowledge 
that we—and others—have a variety of mental states, and that mental states mediate a person’s 
experiences of the world and behaviors within it. Subsumed within the activity of mentalization 
is a recognition of intentional mental states in self and other—i.e., that behaviors are extensions 
of underlying thoughts and feelings, not simply reactions to precipitating events in the physical 
world (Fonagy et al., 1991; Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002). Mentalization also entails 




these representations are separate from, and more amenable to revision, than the initial 
impressions left by the experiences that they represent (see Fonagy, Luyten, Allison, & 
Campbell, 2017a). Further, the activity of mentalization entails the creation of links between 
various higher-order representations within the mind—and between one’s own mental activity 
and the hypothesized mental states of others (Fonagy, Target, Steel, & Steel, 1998). An 
implication of this is that the mentalizing mind incorporates, in its views of its own mental states, 
relevant thoughts or feelings that others might be having with regard to the self (Fonagy et al., 
1991). 
The definition of mentalization provided above draws from several bodies of knowledge 
and traditions of thought (Fonagy et al., 1998). The term was first used in the 1950s within the 
French school of psychosomatics (see Jurist, 2018 for a review). Members of this school, such as 
Pierre Marty, provided descriptions of patients who were poor mentalizers; such patients 
produced tangential speech that contained few higher-order representations—and few indicators 
of individuality or fantasy life (Marty & M’Uzan, 1963). Mentalization also has roots in 
psychoanalytic concepts such as Freud’s “Bindung” (i.e., linking; Freud, 1911) and Bion’s 
“alpha function” (Bion, 1962) as well as the more recent literature on theory of mind (e.g., 
Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 1993; Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, & Cooke, 
1989; Morton & Frith, 1995) and metacognition in the context of attachment (see Main, 1991). 
While the present-day construct of mentalization has clear relationships with other bodies 
of knowledge, including its original definition within the French school of psychosomatics, 
recent authors on mentalization have greatly extended prior thinking in this area. Specifically, 
present-day theory and research on mentalization suggest that it carries interrelated benefits in a 




communication, and mental flexibility and resilience (e.g., Allison & Fonagy, 2016; Fonagy et 
al., 2002; Fonagy et al., 2017a; Fonagy, Luyten, Allison, & Campbell, 2017b; Jurist, 2018). The 
remainder of this section discusses these benefits in greater detail. However, it should be noted 
that this is not a complete list of the benefits of mentalization. It also should be noted that these 
benefits share many of the same underlying mechanisms, and they exist in reciprocal 
relationships with each other. However, they are discussed separately for the sake of clarity. 
 
Affect regulation 
Fonagy and colleagues (see Fonagy et al., 2002; Fonagy et al., 2017a; Fonagy et al., 
1995; Fonagy & Target, 2006) have suggested that some affect regulation is needed for an 
individual to employ more than rudimentary mentalization—an individual in a state of intense 
dysregulation experiences imperatives that supersede the work of thinking about thoughts and 
feelings. However, they argue that mentalization, in its more realized forms, transforms affect 
regulation. Specifically, they link mentalization to a variety of mindsets and skills that facilitate 
affect regulation, including the following: an awareness that emotions are mental states and 
therefore transient; an ability to generate higher-order representations for emotions, which 
expands one’s repertoire for their management and increases the degree to which they are 
amenable to control; and, related to the prior, an expectation that one’s mental states will be 
understandable and controllable, which promotes a sense of agency both with regard to one’s 
mental life and to external circumstances. 
Jurist (2018) has asserted that a large part of the regulation of affect states through 
mentalization concerns an individual’s autobiographical memory. Citing research that general 




2006), Jurist argues that “the ability to recall a specific past memory in order to place a current 
emotion in an autobiographic context may help to reduce arousal level, making it more tolerable, 
reducing the pressure to act on it, and modulating it through the use of strategies such as those 
detailed in the process model” (p. 107)—for example, cognitive reappraisal. As an example of 
this, one could view a distress-causing event as similar to a prior hardship, which might reduce 
the gravity of the more-recent event and increase one’s sense that it—and the corresponding 
emotion—can be coped with. It should be noted that relatively sophisticated affect-regulation 
strategies such as this allow the individual to eschew more drastic mental maneuvers (e.g., 
primitive defenses such as splitting and projection) that provide relief from distress at the cost of 
fragmentation of the self and compromised functioning. 
 
Integrated self-representation 
As mentioned above, mentalization allows one to regulate oneself without the use of 
mental maneuvers that entail the defensive exclusion of information or the fragmentation of the 
self. It also entails an awareness that emotions are transient events and do not fully define the 
self. As such, it allows one to “stand in the spaces” between different self-states (see Bromberg, 
1996) and contributes to a sense of self that has depth beyond one’s current mental state. 
It also regards behavior as stemming from underlying intentions, even if those intentions 
might be irrational or unconscious (Fonagy et al., 1998). This perspective, referred to as the 
intentional stance, links a person’s various behaviors by viewing them as emanating from the 
same actor. Thus, it has a special role in the development of a coherent representation of the 




individuals with qualities related to self-cohesion, such as autonomy and responsibility (Fonagy 
et al., 1998). 
An individual’s sense of his or her separateness from others is closely related to the 
cohesion of his or her self-representation; as such, self-other differentiation is also expected to be 
impaired in the context of low mentalization. Fonagy et al. (2017a) argued that, among 
individuals who do not have reliable access to ordinary mentalization abilities, ways of 
understanding the world and others tend to focus on external states and on affect over cognition. 
As such, these individuals often experience emotional contagion in social situations. This, in 
conjunction with a fragmented sense of self, influences their relationships with others in that they 
“can feel forced to be rigid and highly controlling in order to maintain a subjective sense of 
coherence and integrity” (Fonagy et al., 2017a, p. 7). 
 
Social communication 
Recent writing on mentalization (e.g., Allison & Fonagy, 2016; Fonagy, Luyten, Allison, 
& Campbell, 2017a, 2017b) has emphasized its role in social communication, and in the 
processes by which individuals gain insight into the social world. Indeed, the centrality of 
mentalization in social communication is one reason Gergely and Unoka (2008) argued that 
humans have a hard-wired “mind-reading” mechanism that, in most individuals, is largely 
functional except in situations of heightened dysregulation. By seeing intentional mental states 
underneath others’—and one’s own—behaviors, these behaviors become more predictable and 
have additional layers of meaning; the world “makes sense” in ways it otherwise would not 
(Fonagy et al., 1998). This reduces the total amount of anxiety a person experiences, and, as 




locate behavior within understandable mental states, has less distress and less need for the drastic 
defensive maneuvers mentioned above (e.g., splitting, projection) to manage distress. 
Mentalization directed toward identifying the intentions underlying others’ behavior is 
also important in developing a sense of who to listen to and trust for information. This is crucial 
for flourishing within the social world. However, a certain amount of trust is a prerequisite for 
mentalization within the social world. Writers on mentalization (e.g., Allison & Fonagy, 2016; 
Fonagy, Luyten, Allison, & Campbell, 2017a, 2017b) have used the term epistemic trust to refer 
to an openness to receiving new information from others, undergirded by a sense that such 
information might be personally relevant (i.e., generalizable from the speaker to the self). Note 
that this term does not imply an indiscriminate trust in others but rather an openness to 
evaluating information from the social world on its merits. Fonagy et al. (2017b) argued that 
some mentalization is required for epistemic trust—one must have come to know enough 
(relatively benign) information about one’s social environment, and the individuals in it, to feel 
safe enough to open oneself to new information. However, Fonagy et al. also argue that some 
epistemic trust is needed for one to proceed to mentalize about one’s social world. This 
conundrum is typical resolved early in life, within a child’s relationship with his or her caregiver, 
who initially performs mentalizing functions for the child (Fonagy et al., 1995). (Note: this 
process is described in a later section in this chapter.) The child subsequently comes to view the 
caregiver as a trusted source of information that often has personal relevance for the child. 
Epistemic trust and mentalization are then applied to new contexts as a child’s social world 
expands. However, in situations in which a child’s “early environment is heavily populated by 
unreliable communicators,” Fonagy et al. (2017b) argue that “the opening of epistemic trust 




about, or even closed off to, the communication of social knowledge. In the face of an abusive 
and hostile caregiver, whose intentions towards the infant or child are not benign, epistemic 
mistrust becomes entrenched as an appropriate adaptation that has been prepared by natural 
selection” (p. 2). 
It should be noted that the influence of mentalization on one’s movements through the 
social world is not limited to more instrumental goals such as gaining important information. 
Mentalization also influences the quality of one’s relationships. Slade (2005) summarized this 
influence in the following way: 
The more that human beings are able to envision mental states in the self and the other 
(and thus what is internal to the self and particular to the other) the more likely they are to 
engage in productive, intimate, and sustaining relationships, to feel connected to others at 
a subjective level, but also to feel autonomous and of separate minds (p. 271). 
Similarly, Wallin (2007) emphasized that mentalization “is intimately related to our capacities 
for insight and empathy” (p.44) and adds a depth to relationships beyond behavior. 
 
Mental flexibility and resilience 
Subsumed within mentalization is metacognition—i.e., thinking about thinking (Fonagy 
et al., 2017a). As such, it includes the processes by which one monitors the relative efficacy of 
different mental activities, selects the ones most efficient in achieving expected or desired 
outcomes, and adjusts the actions used in the context of changing situational demands. As such, 
mentalization has a clear connection with mental flexibility and resilience. Fonagy et al. (2017a) 
further elaborated this connection by identifying three specific mentalization-dependent 




threat, and inhibition of retraumatizing triggers” (p. 1). They also elucidated the ways in which 
each one is impaired by difficulties in mentalization. The first mechanism they identified, 
positive situation classification, pertains to the ability to view nonthreatening situations 
correctly—i.e., as nonthreatening. As low or impaired mentalization makes it harder to 
understand the meanings of others’ actions, it often results in mistaken appraisals of threat. The 
second mechanism, the retrospective reappraisal of a threat or adverse experience, pertains to the 
ability to shift from negative appraisals to more positive appraisals—e.g., of how one has been 
able to adapt or cope—and then maintain focus on more positive appraisals. Low or impaired 
mentalization disrupts this process in a couple of ways. First, in order to retrospectively change 
one’s appraisal of a given situation or event, one must generate higher-order representations of 
the mental states surrounding it; these are the mental states that are modified. This process is 
dependent on mentalization. Second, retrospective reappraisal often entails mentalizing about 
others’ internal states, whether to create a more positive appraisal of the intentions or 
motivations of someone who has caused harm, or to decide whether a person offering a new 
perspective about the situation or event is trustworthy—i.e., whether their perspective should be 
factored into future appraisals. However, in situations of low or impaired mentalization, one is 
unable to achieve insight into the mind of an aggressor, and more broadly one is relatively closed 
to new information from others. The third mechanism, the inhibition of retraumatizing triggers, 
pertains to the ability to minimize threat-associated sensations surrounding memories of the 
adverse experience, which “serve to reinforce, perpetuate and generalize the sense of threat” 
(Fonagy et al., 2017a, p. 6). This mechanism, too, requires the generation of higher-order, 
cognitive representations, which make possible the top-down disarmament or suppression of 




triggers, lead to affect dysregulation and the impairment of the mentalization required for the 
mechanisms above. Like most of the benefits of mentalization, these mechanisms are understood 
to be in cyclical relationships with each other. 
In normal development, the mechanisms above allow one to function in the context of a 
normal array of setbacks, and to move forward from such situations without undue alterations in 
functioning or the development of psychopathology. According to Fonagy et al. (2017a), 
borderline personality disorder can be thought of as a marked deficit in these resilience-
promoting capacities, which are dependent on mentalization to be effective. 
 
Section summary 
The benefits above exist in reciprocal relationships with one another, with each one 
supporting each of the others. Similarly, impairments in one would have repercussions for the 
others. Fonagy et al. (2017b) offered the following depiction of the way mentalization 
difficulties might expand across multiple domains of functioning: 
Mentalizing difficulties lead to affect dysregulation, which in turn further disrupts 
mentalizing. Wherever this cycle starts, mentalizing problems lead to interpersonal 
conflict and social difficulties, which generate intense (social) affect such as shame, 
which is inadequately contextualized because of the failure of social cognition. This 
affect further undermines the capacity to mentalize, which can then create further social 
challenges, generating interpersonal conflict that will inevitably lead to higher emotional 
arousal. The emotional arousal is poorly modulated and causes further disruptions of 




lacking the higher-order cognitive capacity necessary to withstand even everyday social 
adversity (p. 5). 
This model implicates mentalization difficulties in a range of personal and interpersonal 
problems. As such, it suggests a need for effective strategies to ameliorate these difficulties. 
Fortunately, evidence supporting the validity of mentalization has already indicated some 
potential avenues for redressing difficulties in this area. Subsequent sections in this chapter 
report research findings on mentalization as well as current thinking on the way mentalization 
typically develops in early childhood—and on the relationship between mentalization and 
attachment-related constructs. However, before this research and theory is presented, the 
following section details the way mentalization is typically assessed in research paradigms. 
 
Assessing mentalization: The RF Scale 
Fonagy and colleagues did not see mentalization as something that would be either 
present or absent; rather, they saw it as existing on a continuum of increasing sophistication 
(Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele, 1998). They developed a method for assessing the quality of 
an individual’s mentalization called the Reflective-Functioning Scale (RF Scale; Fonagy et al., 
1991; Fonagy et al., 1998), with “reflective functions” being an umbrella term for the various 
mental capacities that make mentalization possible. The RF Scale assesses mentalization in a 
narrative, usually a transcript of an interview or conversation, on an 11-point scale from -1 
(negative RF) to 9 (exceptional RF). According to Fonagy et al. (1998), a person might explicitly 
mentalize at times (e.g., say, “I know one’s mood can color one’s opinion of things, so, even 
though I didn’t like the movie, that might have been due to how I was feeling when I saw it”), 




that communicate either explicitly or implicitly any of the following qualities of mentalization: 
an awareness of the nature of mental states (e.g., that mental states are often opaque and our 
understanding of others and even of ourselves is incomplete); efforts to identify mental states 
underlying behavior (e.g., that, despite the above, we see the value in coming up with plausible 
mental-state-oriented explanations for behavior, even though we understand that such 
explanations might be incorrect); a recognition of the developmental aspects of mental states 
(e.g., that thoughts and feelings about a certain subject can change over time, even if the subject 
itself has not changed); and an awareness of mental states in relation to the person or persons 
with whom we are interacting (e.g., that another person might not know everything we know 
about a particular topic and, even if they did, they might not have the same thoughts about it). 
While the RF scale might be used in different contexts, it was designed to be applied to the 
transcript of a structured interview that assesses attachment- and caregiving-related concerns. It 
was normed on the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI; Fonagy et al., 1998; George, Kaplan, & 
Main, 1984, 1988, 1996), a semi-structured interview in which an adult interviewee describes the 
caregiving they experienced in childhood, their current perceptions of those experiences, and 
how those experiences relate to their present functioning—all of which is designed to elicit the 
interviewee’s mental representations of relationships. Since then, the RF Scale has most 
frequently been applied to the AAI, but it has been applied to other interviews as well. Notably, 
it has been revised for use with the Parent Development Interview (PDI; Aber, Slade, Berger, 
Bresgi, & Kaplan, 1985) and the Patient-Therapist Adult Attachment Interview (PT-AAI; 
Diamond, Clarkin, Levy, Levine, & Kotov, 1999; George, Kaplan, & Main, 1984, 1988, 1996). 
The PDI can be used to assess a parent’s state of mind with respect to a child of theirs and their 




with respect to the other member of the therapeutic dyad and the treatment relationship. Each 
interview is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. Further details regarding the RF Scale 
are provided in Chapter III. 
 
The development of mentalization abilities 
Multiple authors have asserted that the development of a strong capacity for 
mentalization—or, alternately, the development of deficits in mentalization—starts early in life 
(e.g., Fonagy et al., 2002; Fonagy et al., 1995; Fonagy et al., 1991; Gergely & Unoka, 2008). 
Synthesizing a range of theory and empirical research, Gergely and Unoka (2008) argued that a 
caregiver’s marked mirroring of their infant’s affect states leads to the creation of secondary 
representations of those affect states for the infant. They asserted that this is the foundation of the 
infant’s future mentalizing as well as their sense of agency in the world. Fonagy and colleagues 
similarly located the earliest origins of mentalization abilities in a child’s interactions with their 
primary caregiver in the first months of life (Fonagy et al., 1995; Fonagy et al., 1991). They 
focused on what they hypothesized was the affect-regulating function of many of those 
interactions (Fonagy et al., 1995). According to Fonagy et al. (1995), infants and young children 
lack robust mechanisms for regulating emotions on their own. As such, they tend to experience 
their emotions as overwhelming events. At the earliest stages of development, a caregiver is 
needed for affect regulation. Caregivers typically serve this function while the child becomes 
able to do an increasing amount of it themselves. According to Fonagy et al. (1995), a parent 
contains their child’s intense affects though verbally and nonverbally communicating to the child 
notions such as the following: 




• That the feeling can be contained and coped with. 
• That they see intentionality in the child’s gestures and communications to them, and that 
the child sees intentionality in the parent’s gestures and communications. 
In such situations, the caregiver “sees” an inchoate mental state underlying their child’s distress 
(a mental state that is perhaps very rudimentary or even nonexistent at the outset of the 
interaction). In subsequent interactions with the child, the caregiver identifies and elaborates this 
mental state in a way that communicates that the associated affect can be coped with. The child 
then internalizes the caregiver’s communications, along with regulation they provided. 
Fonagy and colleagues (e.g., Fonagy et al., 2002), as well as Gergely and Unoka (2008), 
have argued that the communications from a caregiver that are likely to ameliorate an infant’s 
negative affect—and form the building blocks of independent mentalization—will feature 
mentalizing that is both contingent and marked. In other words, it will both contain an accurate 
reflection of the child’s feeling-state and be modified in some way. The accuracy of the 
reflection is important, they argued, because within the first year of life infants can perceive 
discrepancies between their own affective states and those re-presented back to them by another 
face (Fonagy et al., 2002; Gergely & Unoka, 2008). As such, noncontingent responses are 
experienced by the infant as “not me” intrusions; they are unconnected to the infant’s current 
self-state, and they carry little potential for affect regulation (Fonagy et al., 2002; Gergely & 
Unoka, 2008). However, if a response is only contingent, and it is not visibly altered by the 
caregiver’s perspective, the infant or young child is likely to perceive the caregiver as 
experiencing the same dysregulating emotion as the child is; such a response would “return” to 
the child their affect without lessening its dysregulating quality, and it would be likely to amplify 




Notably, both a caregiver’s ability to accurately infer the mental state underlying a child’s 
visible behavior—as well as their ability to present a modified version of that mental state in 
their response—require mentalization on their part (Fonagy et al., 1995; Fonagy et al., 1991). 
Similarly, a caregiver’s communications about intentionality, which Fonagy et al. (1995) argued 
were particularly formative with regard to a child’s mentalizing abilities, also require 
mentalization. This points to the importance of a caregiver’s ability to mentalize. In this vein, 
Fonagy et al. (1991) wrote that caregivers differ in their “capacity to think about behavior in 
terms of psychological rather than physical determinants. The caregiver who manifests this 
capacity at its maximum will be the most likely to be able to respect the child’s vulnerable 
emerging psychological world” (p. 208). They added that “the caregiver who has a well-
established capacity to see her own and others’ actions in terms of mental states will be able to 
perceive the causes of defensive behavior in her child,” whereas “the parent with more limited 
reflective ability may fail accurately to identify that her own behavior is the primary cause of the 
infant’s distress, thus, inadvertently, reinforcing the infant’s felt need for such behavioral 
strategies” (Fonagy et al., 1991, p. 208). 
A caregiver’s ability to mentalize depends on their state of mind with respect to their role 
as caregiver for a particular child, which has many determinants. This is discussed in greater 
detail later in this chapter. However, in light of Fonagy et al.’s (1991) assertions above, it should 
be noted that research indeed suggests that parents differ in their level of mentalization, and that 
their level of mentalization is associated with their child’s level of mentalization (Benbassat & 
Priel, 2012; Ensink, Bégin, Normandin & Fonagy, 2016; Ensink et al., 2015; Rosso, Viterbori, & 
Scopesi, 2015). Parents’ mentalization also has been positively associated with the security of 




Conversely, it has been negatively associated with hostile and intrusive parenting behaviors (e.g., 
Ensink, Rousseau, Biberdzic, Bégin, & Normandin, 2017; Grienenberger, Kelly, & Slade, 2005; 
Stacks et al., 2014). As an example of these latter findings, Ensink et al. (2017) assessed RF and 
personality organization in a sample of new mothers. The former was assessed via the AAI, and 
the latter was assessed via the Inventory of Personality Organization (IPO; Lenzenweger, 
Clarkin, Kernberg, & Foelsch, 2001). Maternal caregiving behavior was assessed via an 
observational method when the child was 15–18 months old. Ensink et al. (2017) found that 
reduced RF and impaired reality testing (and, to a lesser extent, primitive defenses and identity 
diffusion) on the IPO were associated with the increased incidence of intrusive-aggressive 
maternal behaviors—i.e., they seemed to interfere with a mother’s ability to modulate her 
aggression with her child. Following the thinking by Fonagy et al. (2002) and Gergely and 
Unoka (2008) outlined above, intrusive and aggressive behaviors from a caregiver would be 
failures in contingency and markedness; as such they would be unlikely to attenuate a child’s 
distress and would require the child to implement primitive psychological defenses for the 
management of intense affect. Further, these exchanges would not build the child’s own capacity 
for mentalization; rather, they might inhibit it. While mentalization is believed to stem from a 
hard-wired mind-reading mechanism that, in most individuals, is largely functional except in 
situations of heightened dysregulation, this mechanism can be inhibited, and early attachment 
relationships are believed to be critical in this regard (e.g., Gergely & Unoka, 2008; Jurist, 2018). 
Specifically, if parental behaviors in early attachments are intrusive, unpredictable, dissociative, 
abusive, or neglectful, this would damage a child’s epistemic trust—i.e., their openness to 
receiving new information from others, undergirded by a sense that such information might be 




adversely affect the child’s propensity to mentalize—and the level at which they do so—in future 
interactions. 
While the descriptions of caregiver-child interactions given thus far have focused on 
early-childhood interactions, a child’s mentalization capacities might be developed in other ways 
at subsequent stages of childhood. In an older child, for example, the way a caregiver sets limits 
in response to the child’s transgressions can have considerable importance for mentalization 
(Fonagy et al., 1998). Limit setting ideally suggests a way the child might cope independently 
with the distress they are experiencing. In this process, as in the interactions described above, the 
caregiver presents the contents of the child’s mind back to the child in a way that is contingent 
(i.e., reflective of what the child is thinking and feeling) but at the same time different in that it 
also features contents of the caregiver’s mind (Fonagy et al., 1998). A somewhat different way in 
which a caregiver might promote the development of mentalization abilities in a child is through 
pretend play with the child (Fonagy et al., 1998). Pretend play promotes the development of 
mentalization in that it links fantasy—an aspect of mental life—with the tangible world. It 
demonstrates that fantasy and the tangible world are related but different from each other, as 
opposed to unrelated or equivalent. As such, it develops a mental stance that facilitates the work 
of mentalization (Fonagy et al., 1998). It also should be noted that, as a child grows and 
increases their range of social connections, it is not just the relationships with his or her primary 
caregivers that are important in the development of his or her capacity for mentalization; his or 
her relationships with individuals in the larger caregiving environment (composed of other 





A final point with regard to the development of mentalization abilities is that the existing 
evidence suggests mentalization is not an all-or-nothing achievement. Rather, it develops in 
increments, with the ability to discern others’ intentions appearing around 9–12 months of age 
and more sophisticated mentalizing appearing around 3–4 years of age with the maturation of 
language (Gergely & Unoka, 2008; Jurist, 2018). 
 
Mentalization and the attachment system 
The mentalization that occurs in the relationship between a parent and a young child has 
been closely tied to the functioning of the attachment system (e.g., Fonagy et al., 1995; Fonagy 
et al., 1991). The attachment system encompasses the collection of behaviors a child regularly 
uses to gain access to a parent in times of distress—and to the sense of security that that access 
provides (Bowlby, 1969/1982, 1973; Sroufe & Fleeson, 1986). Notably, Ainsworth and 
colleagues found connections between the nature of a child’s security-seeking behaviors and the 
nature of the caregiving he or she had received from his or her mother in the home (Ainsworth, 
Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978); these findings were replicated in subsequent studies (see 
Bretherton, 1992 for a review). Ainsworth et al. (1978) also found that a child’s security-seeking 
behaviors typically demonstrated a coherent strategy for obtaining the most functional 
attachment possible to his or her mother, with her particular strengths and weaknesses as a 
caregiver. To evaluate the quality of a child’s security-seeking behaviors with a primary 
caregiver—and, more generally, the quality of the child’s attachment to that caregiver—they 
developed a laboratory procedure called the Strange Situation (Ainsworth et al., 1978). In the 
Strange Situation, a child, aged one year, is separated from his or her primary caregiver in an 




unfamiliar adult (Ainsworth et al., 1978).1 Both the separation and the unfamiliarity of the setting 
are designed to engage the child’s attachment system. The results of studies with the Strange 
Situation led Ainsworth and colleagues to observe—and elucidate—three different types of 
attachments that a child might have with a primary caregiver in early childhood: secure, 
avoidant, and ambivalent (Ainsworth et al., 1978). Later, Main and Solomon (1986) identified a 
fourth type: disorganized. See the first two columns of Table 1 for descriptions of each of these 
attachments as well as the parental caregiving behaviors associated with each one. 
Notably, the initial development of the capacity for mentalization also takes place within 
a child’s early-life relationships with primary caregivers (see Fonagy et al., 2002; Fonagy et al., 
1995); as such, it shares this domain with the attachment-related processes described above. 
Additionally, specific features of the attachment system overlap with the capacity for 
mentalization. For example, evidence suggests that the attachment system, in addition to 
encompassing observable behaviors, has a representational dimension (see Main, Kaplan, & 
Cassidy, 1985). This notion began with Bowlby (1973), who proposed that a child is able to 
adjust to his or her primary caregiver, and act in accordance with those adjustments in a wide 
variety of situations, because he or she has an “internal working model” of the relationship. He 
proposed that this model contains mental representations of “self” and “other” formed in early 
interactions with the primary caregiver. Subsequently, Main and colleagues (Main et al., 1985) 
found that a child’s behavior on the Strange Situation was related the language he or she used 
when talking about attachment-related situations (e.g., separations) five years later. In discussing 
these findings, Main et al. argued that internal working models include expectations for 
behavior; as such, they influence the nature of future interactions and provide consistency to an 
 
1The Strange Situation has subsequently been administered at different timepoints in a child’s first two 




Table 1. Caregiving behaviors and related Strange Situation and AAI classifications 
Parent’s caregiving 
in the home 
Young child’s behavior on 
Strange Situation 
Adult’s state of mind with respect to 
attachment on AAI 






Easily soothed when reunited 
with the caregiver. 
Coherently discusses information with 
a range of affect and does not 
contradict self in the process. Appears 
to value the importance of attachment-
related experiences. Is mindful of the 
interviewer’s perspective throughout. 
 Avoidant Dismissing 
Rebuffs the child’s 
bids for attention 
and displays an 
aversion to his or her 
negative emotions. 
Many have limited 
physical contact 
with the child. 
Displays an apparent 
indifference to the 
caregiver’s coming and 
going. 
Provides brief, constricted responses 
regarding the nature of attachment-
related experiences—or devalues the 
importance of such experiences. 
Provides few supporting details. Given 
details are weak or contradict 
information provided elsewhere in the 
interview. 
 Ambivalent Preoccupied 
Only intermittently 
available and often 
handles the child in 
an inept way. Tends 
to discourage the 
child’s autonomy. 
Preoccupied with the 
caregiver’s whereabouts and 
unable to explore freely at 
any point. Not soothed by the 
caregiver upon his or her 
return. Some oscillate 
between displays of anger 
and bids for connection with 
the caregiver. Others make 
only weak bids for comfort. 
Appears preoccupied with past 
attachment-related experiences—
particularly negative ones. Speech 
lacks coherence in terms of subject 
matter (e.g., it contains clear 
contradictions) as well as form (e.g., it 
contains confusing, rambling 
sentences). Does not consistently 
maintain the interviewer’s perspective 
and provides an overly long narrative. 
 Disorganized* Unresolved/Disorganized** 
Frightened or 
frightening. More 
likely than parents in 
the other categories 
to maltreat or abuse 
their child. 
Exhibits bizarre behavior. 
Upon the caregiver’s return, 
some freeze, fall to the floor, 
or appear dazed. May cover 
mouth in what appears to be 
an effort to stifle a scream. 
Loses some connection with reality or 
orientation to the interview situation 
when discussing loss, abuse, or other 
trauma. 
 Unclassifiable Cannot Classify/Unorganized 
 Behavior includes both 
avoidant and ambivalent 
elements. 
Interview includes both dismissing and 
preoccupied elements. Or it includes 
neither but fails to be coherent enough 
to be rated secure/autonomous. 
*Children classified as disorganized are given a second classification (i.e., secure, avoidant, ambivalent, 
or unclassifiable) for their attachment-related behaviors outside of the ones that yield this classification. 
**An interview in this category is also assigned to one of the other categories, which would speak to the 




individual’s attachments. In this vein, subsequent research has suggested that attachment security 
is consistent across settings in early childhood (e.g., Vaughn & Waters, 1990) and over time in 
the absence of changes in the family environment (e.g., Waters, Weinfield, & Hamilton, 2003). It 
also should be noted that the representational dimension of attachment has a role in facilitating 
the attachment system’s goal of a sense of security (Sroufe & Fleeson, 1986). Specifically, if 
access to a caregiver is reliably obtained when sought, there will be a mental representation of 
the sense of security that that access provides, and physical proximity to the caregiver will not 
have to be maintained in order for that security to be felt. 
The representational dimension of attachment, which includes mental models of “self” 
and “other”—and expectations for the caregiver’s behaviors—overlaps considerably with the 
capacity for mentalization. One aspect of this overlap is that an individual’s representations of 
“self” and “other” will accumulate more sophisticated markers of mentalization as the capacity 
for mentalization matures. In this vein, it should be noted that the attachment system is not just a 
childhood phenomenon. Bowlby (1973, 1980), Ainsworth (1989), and others (e.g., Holmes & 
Slade, 2018; Parish & Eagle, 2003) have cited evidence that the attachment system, while an 
imperative for physical survival in early life, is a behavioral system that is active throughout the 
life span. Specifically, Ainsworth (1989) noted that the parent-child relationship continues to be 
an attachment even after the child becomes an adult; the parent remains a safe haven for his or 
her adult child. Additionally, adults have other relationships (e.g., with a therapist or a romantic 
partner) that bear many of the features of early childhood attachment relationships, such as 
specificity (i.e., the other person is not interchangeable with anyone else) and distress 
surrounding prolonged separations (Parish & Eagle, 2003). In this vein, Holmes and Slade 




regulating” (p. 29)—a definition that covers a range of relationships beyond early childhood. 
Research on states of mind with respect to attachment in adults has demonstrated a link between 
the security of such states of mind and mentalization, the latter typically assessed via the RF 
Scale (e.g., Bizzi, Ensink, Borelli, Mora, & Cavanna, 2009; Bouchard et al., 2008; Fonagy et al., 
1991). Such findings are in line with expectations that mentalization would increase the 
sophistication of the mental representations underlying attachment relationships, and that that 
would have bearing on the security of such relationships—for example, by making the other’s 
behavior more meaningful and predictable.  
Another way in which attachment security is related to mentalization is the way in which 
the former affects not just the contents of one’s mental life but also one’s characteristic ways of 
thinking. Main and colleagues (e.g., Main et al., 1985; Main, 1991) found evidence suggesting 
that attachment security shapes the way an individual processes information and emotions—and 
influences what types of mental events are excluded from awareness. In the case of an insecure 
state of mind with respect to attachment, which entails less-positive semantic information and 
less-positive affects for “self,” “other,” and “relationship,” information and affects concerning 
important relationships are managed via mental processes that make a larger-than-usual amount 
of mental content inaccessible to the individual at any given time (George & Solomon, 1996). 
Additionally, deficits in metacognition maintain these defensive mental processes by reducing 
awareness of them (George & Solomon, 1996; Main, 1991). Given that the ability to gain insight 
into one’s own mind and others’ minds is synonymous with mentalization (Wallin, 2007), the 
mental processes mentioned above—and the deficits in metacognition that maintain them—




According to Main (1991), these mental processes are carried forward from an 
individual’s earliest attachments to subsequent stages of childhood and to adulthood. To assess 
attachment security and insecurity in adults, Main and colleagues developed the Adult 
Attachment Interview (AAI; George, Kaplan, & Main, 1984, 1988, 1996), which asks an adult 
interviewee to recall early childhood experiences with caregivers—moments of comfort seeking, 
separation, and rejection as well as possible trauma or loss. The questions are designed to evoke 
the individual’s current state of mind with respect to early attachment relationships. However, 
this state of mind is not about a particular relationship as the Strange Situation is; rather, it is 
about an adult’s current mental models for attachment relationships. And while Main and 
colleagues viewed the content of an adult’s representations of his or her early attachment 
relationships as important—and designed the AAI to elicit such content—they argued that the 
way a person thinks and speaks about past relationships would be more critical in determining 
his or her state of mind with respect to attachments (Main, 1991; Main et al., 1985). They 
developed a classification system for AAI transcripts that initially included four states of mind 
with respect to attachment: secure/autonomous, dismissing, preoccupied, and 
unresolved/disorganized (Main et al., 1985). Each one speaks to a particular quality of thought 
regarding attachment relationships. And each has been linked with a particular type of 
attachment in a child for whom the individual would be a primary caregiver. These states of 
mind, along with the Strange Situation attachments with which they have been linked, appear in 
Table 1. Notably, Hesse (1996) subsequently introduced a fifth state of mind with respect to 
attachment that has been seen in AAI transcripts: cannot classify (alternately: unorganized). This 




unclassifiable as well those that are classified as disorganized (Behrens, Hesse, & Main, 2007; 
Hesse, 1996; Main, 2000; Shah, Fonagy, & Strathearn, 2010). See Table 1 for a description. 
To elaborate further the link between attachment security and mentalization: an insecure 
attachment in childhood—or an insecure state of mind with respect to attachment as an adult—
can be seen as a affect-regulation strategy; it minimizes scenarios in which one’s poor affect-
regulation skills, underscored by weak mentalization abilities, become too problematic. In the 
case of avoidant/dismissing attachment, the individual minimizes his or her reliance on 
attachment figures who fail to alleviate distress—and thus limits exposure to the unsatisfying and 
dysregulating elements of these relationships. This strategy is supported via the individual 
minimizing the importance of attachment relationships (George & Solomon, 1996). In the case 
of ambivalent/preoccupied attachment, the individual maximizes his or her exposure to 
attachment figures who are unreliable in their ability to alleviate distress yet are still counted 
upon to do so; this reduces the probability that the needed-but-unreliable attachment figure will 
be inaccessible. The individual maintains proximity to the attachment figure via disavowing his 
or her anger for him or her (George & Solomon, 1996). However, while each of these forms of 
organized attachment insecurity comes with a coherent strategy for attachment relationships, it 
still is associated with relatively little felt security.2 This is the case to an even greater degree for 
disorganized and unorganized attachment insecurity, which grow out of a sense of the 
attachment figure as frightened or frightening (Main & Solomon, 1986). The low amount of felt 
security in insecure attachment relationships is associated with dysregulation and, consequently, 
 
2It is important to note that, even among infants with avoidant attachment who exhibit few overt 
attachment-related behaviors, there is evidence of increased heart rate and cortisol levels during Strange 
Situation procedures when compared with secure infants (Spangler & Grossman, 1993; Sroufe & Waters, 
1977). This suggests that the procedure was more stressful for them than it was for secure infants, and 
their lack of overt attachment (i.e., proximity-seeking) behaviors can be seen as due to an effort to 




constraints on mentalization. As Fonagy et al. (2017b) succinctly put it, “attachment stress 
derails mentalizing” (p. 5). In secure attachments, an individual experiences the timely regulation 
of affect via an available, mentalizing attachment figure (more on this below), and his or her 
attachment system is deactivated—and mentalizing restored—in an expeditious way. Individuals 
who are insecurely attached expend greater mental resources than do those who are securely 
attached in trying to adapt to a dismissing, inconsistent, or frightening attachment figure; as such, 
they regularly lack the mental space to explore their own mind or others’ minds (Fonagy & 
Target, 2005). Overall, there is a reciprocal relationship between insecure attachment and 
frequent or prolonged impairments in the capacity for mentalization (Fonagy & Target, 2006). 
The way in which a caregiver facilitates his or her child’s attachment security also 
highlights mentalization. As mentioned above, Ainsworth originally emphasized the role of the 
caregiver’s actual behavior in determining a child’s attachment security (e.g., Ainsworth et al., 
1978). However, van IJzendoorn (1995), in a meta-analysis of attachment studies, found that the 
influence of the caregiver’s overt behavior on the attachment status of her child, while 
substantial, was not as large as the influence of other, undetermined factors. In this vein, Fonagy 
et al. (1991) found that RF scores on AAIs conducted with expectant parents prior to their child’s 
birth had strong predictive value for the security of their child during Strange Situation 
procedures conducted at one year of age—among parents with strong RF, children were three to 
four times more likely to have a secure attachment than an insecure attachment; among parents 
with weak RF, children had roughly even odds of having a secure attachment or an insecure 
attachment. This predictive power was beyond that of the parent’s state of mind with respect to 
attachment (i.e., the overall classification of secure, dismissing, preoccupied, or 




variance in attachment security that van IJzendoorn (1995) reported. Additionally, Fonagy, 
Steele, Steele, Higgitt, and Target (1994) found that, in cases in which a mother had a history of 
substantial adversity, her RF was an almost perfect indicator of whether or not her child would 
be rated secure at one year of age. As such, they concluded that high RF enabled parents to break 
intergenerational cycles of attachment insecurity and impart secure attachment to their children. 
More recent evidence adds further support to the notion that a caregiver’s mentalization has an 
important role in sensitive caregiving and in facilitating the deactivation of a child’s attachment 
system (i.e., emotional arousal and attachment-seeking behaviors) in a timely way when threats 
are not imminent or have passed (Grienenberger, Kelly, and Slade 2005; Slade et al., 2005; 
Stacks et al., 2014). These studies are discussed in the section below, which focuses specifically 
on caregiving. 
The theory and research above suggest that mentalization plays an important role in early 
childhood attachments and, more broadly, the functioning of the attachment system interacts 
with the capacity for mentalization. Additionally, it should be reiterated that, in early childhood 
attachments, parenting behaviors that are intrusive, unpredictable, dissociative, abusive, or 
neglectful—i.e., those that are associated with disorganized attachment—instill epistemic 
mistrust in a child; this adversely affects the child’s propensity to mentalize, and the level at 
which they do so, in future interactions (Gergely & Unoka, 2008). However, while the 
importance of early childhood attachments in the maturation of the capacity for mentalization 
has not been contested, it should be noted that authors on mentalization have recently attributed 
greater weight to the broader caregiving environment and to the society and culture into which a 
child is born. Evidence suggests that humans have a hard-wired capacity for mind reading and 




influence epistemic trust and mentalization (Gergely & Unoka, 2008). Additionally, it has been 
argued that the extent to which early childhood attachments are influenced by the context in 
which they occur has been underappreciated (e.g., Fonagy et al., 2017a; Fonagy et al., 2017b). 
Fonagy et al. (2017b) stated that a child’s attachment relationship with a primary caregiver does 
not occur in a vacuum; rather, it is impinged upon by features of the social environment, and 
“attachment styles are themselves one piece of social communication that the familial context is 
promoting about the most effective way to function in the prevailing culture” (p. 4). They also 
argued that, in certain environments—e.g., those in which unpredictability and aggression 
predominate—styles of relating to the world consistent with low mentalization and insecure 
attachment might be viewed as adaptive (Fonagy et al., 2017b). They said the following: 
Low levels of interpersonal understanding, or even frank attacks on the self-awareness of 
individual family members, may be biologically successful, evolutionarily selected 
strategies. A stance of dismissing attachment and non-mentalizing is not experienced as a 
deficit by the person adopting this stance, but rather as the most appropriate strategy to 
ensure their survival (Fonagy et al., 2017b, p. 4). 
Overall, recent authors have argued that early childhood attachments contribute to the initial 
starting point and direction of the development of mentalization and social competence, but, in 
most cases, these skills have a trajectory that is somewhat independent from an individual’s 
attachments (e.g., Fonagy et al., 2017a; Fonagy et al., 2017b). 
 
Section summary 
Early-childhood attachments are the first theater in which mentalization is either 




information-processing rules, and metacognition; it affects thinking—and thinking about 
thinking. As such, it overlaps with mentalization in important ways. The following section builds 
on the theory and research reported here by outlining attachment-related factors might have 
bearing on a caregiver’s state of mind with respect to their role as caregiver—and on their 
mentalization in that role. Both influence the mentalization of the recipient of their caregiving. 
However, it also should be noted that the link between attachment relationships and the 
capacity for mentalization might be indirect in certain ways—e.g., through the development of 
epistemic trust. And it is likely that the broader cultural milieu in which a person is located also 
plays a role in the quality of mentalization that an individual learns. Early childhood attachments 
do not exist in a vacuum, and they transmit information from the larger social environment. 
Additionally, as a child’s social world expands, relationships beyond those with primary 
caregivers might have an effect on their capacity for mentalization. This being the case, it is still 
likely that close relationships—particularly those with attachment figures—have a proportionally 
greater influence on this capacity. According to Holmes and Slade (2018), poor mentalization 
can be redressed later in life in relationships (e.g., with a therapist) that could be considered adult 
attachments. They argue that such relationships, if epistemic trust is established, open a 
“sensitive period” in which one’s capacity for mentalization as well as one’s state of mind with 
respect to attachments might be altered for the better. This, too, is discussed in greater detail later 
in this chapter. 
 
Mentalization and the caregiving system 
The extent to which an individual is able to mentalize within and about an attachment 




about that relationship. Bowlby (1969/1982, 1988) suggested that, similar to a child’s role in an 
attachment relationship, a parent’s role in such a relationship is shaped by a system of mental 
representations and behaviors, and he referred to this system as the caregiving system. Following 
Bowlby’s work, Solomon and George (1996) wrote that internal working models within the 
caregiving system would feature the self in the role of caregiver rather than that of attachment 
(i.e., security) seeker. They proposed that, similar to the internal working models that underly the 
attachment system, these mental representations have two parts: first, specific postulates about 
“self” and “other” in the context of a relationship in which one is a caregiver, and related 
postulates about the nature of that caregiving relationship, and, second, “information-processing 
rules that guide perception and memory” with regard to that relationship (Solomon & George, 
1996, p. 189). In interviews with parents, they observed that parents’ postulates (i.e., the contents 
of their internal working model of themselves as a parent) typically addressed three “questions”: 
“(1) willingness to respond, (2) effectiveness of caregiving strategies, and (3) ability to read and 
understand signals” (George & Solomon, 1996, pp. 200–201). Their data suggested that, over the 
course of an interview, distinct states of mind with respect to caregiving can be identified based 
on parents’ “answers” to these questions, and a given parent’s state of mind with respect to a 
particular child might be predicted on the basis of the security and organization of that child’s 
attachment to them. Specifically, the parent of a child with a secure attachment is likely to have 
positive answers to the questions above; George and Solomon (1996) classified this as a Secure 
Base state of mind with respect to caregiving. The parent of an avoidant child, however, is likely 
to provide a negative answer to the first question (i.e., “willingness to respond”); they classified 
this as a Rejecting state of mind with respect to caregiving. The parent of an ambivalent child, on 




(p. 201)—to all three questions; they classified this as an Uncertain state of mind with respect to 
caregiving (George & Solomon, 1996). Finally, the parent of a disorganized—or unorganized—
child is likely to feel helpless in the face of their child’s bids for care and protection; they 
classified this as a Helpless state of mind with respect to caregiving. 
The states of mind described above would have bearing on a parent’s capacity to 
mentalize in their relationship with their child as each one yields characteristic ways of 
processing information with respect to the relationship (Solomon & George, 1996). These 
specific ways of processing information largely concern which and how much information the 
caregiver defensively excludes from conscious awareness, and the ways in which that 
information is excluded (George & Solomon, 1996). With regard to the states of mind with 
respect to caregiving that George and Solomon (1996) identified, the Secure Base state of mind 
is associated with the least amount of defensive exclusion. Parents with this state of mind are 
generally able to incorporate a wide range of cognitive and emotional information into their 
thinking about the relationship, and, as such, it is associated with a largely unimpaired ability to 
mentalize. Generally speaking, these parents would be open to thinking about whatever thought 
or feeling might be in the child’s mind, even if it is not pleasant. They also would be able to 
adjust their behavior flexibly in the service of meeting the goal of the caregiving system (i.e., the 
child’s continued safety or felt security). The Rejecting state of mind, however, is associated 
with the defensive exclusion from awareness of information pertaining to the effects of their 
“unwillingness” to respond to their child. George and Solomon (1996) argue that this defensive 
strategy is essential to the maintenance of the “unwilling” postulate as it allows a parent to 
remain blind to the effects of it. On the other hand, the Uncertain state of mind, according to 




potential to overwhelm the parent’s ability to care for the child. This splitting off of negative 
affect allows a parent to keep the caregiving system engaged and to continue to act toward its 
goal; however, it also leads to a lack of coherence with regard to how they feel about their child, 
their relationship with that child, and themselves within that relationship. Finally, in the Helpless 
state of mind, there is an isomorphism between the sense of futility the parent feels in the face of 
their caregiving responsibilities and their inability to regulate their negative thoughts and 
emotions regarding the relationship; each reinforces the other (George & Solomon, 1996). The 
Rejecting, Uncertain, and Helpless states of mind are all associated with clear constraints in the 
capacity for mentalization within one’s role as caregiver. 
Though a parent’s caregiving system is heavily informed by their experiences in 
attachment relationships, it is important to note that caregiving relationships are not simply 
regurgitations of the care that a parent has received. Rather, they reflect a parent’s present state 
of mind with regard to those earlier experiences as well as the experience of childbirth, the 
temperament of the child in question, and the degree of support the parent is receiving in their 
role as caregiver (Solomon & George, 1996). In this vein, George and Solomon (1996) referred 
to the caregiving system as “a mature transformation of the attachment system” (p. 213). In their 
view, “the individual begins in adolescence to construct a representation of the self as caregiver 
(i.e., as protector) that is parallel to but distinct from a representation of the self as attached” 
(Solomon & George, 1996, p. 190). This representation continues to develop alongside their 
child’s internal working model of attachment, and in a reciprocal relationship with it. At the time 
of the birth of a parent’s first child, their internal working model of themselves as a caregiver 




As evidence suggests that the therapeutic relationship can be an attachment relationship 
(Holmes & Slade, 2018; Parish & Eagle, 2003), similar considerations should apply to therapists’ 
relationships with their patients. For example, a therapist’s internal working model with respect 
to their caregiving for a particular patient should be distinct from their internal working models 
with respect to any children they might have. And, as is the case with parents who have multiple 
children, a therapist should have somewhat different internal working models for the caregiving 
relationships they have with different patients (Slade, 2008). This, along with reasons a therapist 
might feel greater or lesser security with regard to their role as therapist within a particular 
therapeutic relationship, is discussed later in this chapter. 
As stated above, a parent’s felt security in a caregiving role would be expected to 
influence the mentalizing they are able to do in that role—and by extension influence the degree 
to which they are able to facilitate a secure attachment with and facilitate mentalization in the 
child. In this vein, Slade et al. (2005) sought to obtain empirical evidence for the relation 
between a mother’s mentalizing with specific respect to her relationship with a child of hers and 
that child’s attachment status. As in many studies of attachment-related phenomena, Strange 
Situations were administered to the mothers and children in the study. Notably, however, Slade 
et al. administered the Parent Developmental Interview (PDI; Aber et al., 1985) to the 40 
mothers in the study. The PDI is based on the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI; George, 
Kaplan, & Main, 1984, 1988, 1996) and yields information about a parent’s caregiving 
relationship with a particular child. They used this approach as Fonagy and colleagues (1998) 
have suggested that one’s RF, similar to one’s state of mind with respect to attachment, might be 
higher or lower in different relationships (Fonagy et al., 1998). Additionally, as mentioned 




attachment system, so when determining a mother’s RF with respect to her child, it would make 
sense to ask her to speak about that relationship rather than her early childhood attachment 
relationships, which is what occurs in AAIs. From these PDIs, Slade et al. obtained Maternal RF 
scores. They found a significant relationship between Maternal RF and children’s attachment 
status, with high Maternal RF associated with increased likelihood of secure attachment. They 
also found that Maternal RF within the caregiving relationship mediated the relationship between 
mothers’ state of mind with respect to attachment, which had been assessed via the AAI, and 
children’s attachment security. Building on prior research by Fonagy and colleagues (e.g., 
Fonagy et al., 1994; Fonagy et al., 1991), Slade at al. (2005) stated that Maternal RF might be 
responsible for much of the variance in children’s attachment status that was still unaccounted-
for after van IJzendoorn (1995), in his meta-analysis, controlled for the effect of mothers’ and 
fathers’ overt caregiving behaviors. Additionally, studies by Grienenberger, Kelly, and Slade 
(2005) and Stacks et al. (2014) have found evidence suggesting that Maternal RF assessed via 
the PDI is positively associated with the sensitivity of mothers’ caregiving behaviors for a child 
of theirs and inversely associated with their hostility in their interactions with that child. These 
findings dovetail those by Ensink et al. (2017), mentioned above, that suggested a negative 
relationship between a mothers’ RF and their intrusive and aggressive behaviors with their 
children, though Ensink et al. measured mothers’ RF more generally, through the AAI, rather 
than with regard to their role as caregiver for a specific child. Finally, and most pertinently for 
the current study, recent research has found associations between parents’ RF for a specific child 
of theirs and the level of mentalization of that child (Benbassat & Priel, 2012; Ensink, Bégin, 
Normandin & Fonagy, 2016; Ensink et al., 2015; Rosso, Viterbori, & Scopesi, 2015). Notably, 




(i.e., French Canadian, Israeli, and Italian) and with children at different ages (i.e., 
preadolescence and adolescence). It provides direct evidence for a relationship between the 




 Attachment theory suggests that a parent’s mentalization for a specific child will be 
informed by what and how they think about that child within the specific demands of their role 
as parent. Additionally, empirical research has shown that mothers’ level of mentalization for a 
young child of theirs is related to the security of that child’s attachment to them—a well as the 
sensitivity of their caregiving behaviors for that child, and the relative absence of negativity and 
hostility in those caregiving behaviors. Further, research has linked both parents’ level of 
mentalization for a child of theirs with the level of mentalization exhibited by that child.  
As will be discussed in subsequent sections, the developmental theory and research 
outlined above could have implications for the patient-therapist relationship. The following 
section introduces the importance of mentalization for clinical work, and it presents clinical 
findings for mentalization (operationalized as RF)—including outcomes of select prevalence 
studies and psychotherapy trials. The subsequent section describes potential determinants of a 
therapist’s mentalization (RF) in a treatment relationship, and how therapist and patient 
mentalization might operate in such a relationship. 
 
 




Impaired mentalization, operationalized via low scores on the RF Scale, has been linked 
with a number of different types of psychopathology—for example, panic disorder (Rudden, 
Milrod, Target, Ackerman, & Graf, 2006), depression (Ekeblad, Falkenström, & Holmqvist, 
2016), and drug abuse (Stover & Kiselica, 2014). However, it most frequently has been 
associated with personality pathology (e.g., De Meulemeester, Vansteelandt, Luyten, & Lowyck, 
2018; Fonagy et al., 1996; Levy et al., 2006b). In psychotherapy outcome trials, increases in RF 
over the course of a treatment have been associated with a variety of improvements in symptoms 
related to personality pathology (e.g., attachment insecurity, irritability, and verbal assault); as 
such, increased RF has been considered an indicator of good treatment outcome (Clarkin, Levy, 
Lenzenweger, & Kernberg, 2007; De Meulemeester et al., 2018; Levy et al., 2006b). 
In addition to being a marker of clinical improvement for patients with personality 
pathology, increased RF is also purported to be a mechanism of change in specific treatments. In 
this regard, Bateman and Fonagy (2006) developed a psychoanalytically oriented therapy—
Mentalization-Based Treatment (MBT)—for the treatment of borderline personality disorder. 
MBT takes the augmentation of patient mentalization as its primary goal. Research has shown 
MBT, in both individual and group modalities, to be associated with large reductions in patient 
symptoms (e.g., Bales et al., 2014; Bateman & Fonagy, 2009; Petersen et al., 2010). And there is 
preliminary evidence that the symptom reductions experienced by patients who receive 
mentalization-based treatment might be accounted for by increases in their level of mentalization 
(De Meulemeester et al., 2018). 
It also has been argued that mentalization is a large part of what therapists do in talk-
therapy treatment modalities, regardless of whether it is an explicit focus of treatment (Allen et 




Diamond et al. (2003), discussed in further detail below, has provided preliminary evidence to 
suggest that cases within a particular treatment modality might vary in terms of the sophistication 
of the therapist’s mentalizing. They also found evidence to suggest that a therapist might 
mentalize at different levels of sophistication for different patients. While certain types of 
treatments appear to be, on average, associated with greater increases in patient mentalization 
than others are (see Levy et al., 2006b), it is uncertain whether potential differences between 
treatments in the average level therapist mentalization are a factor in such differences. Overall, 
there is a paucity of direct evidence pertaining to therapist mentalization and its associations with 
patient outcomes. However, if future evidence suggests that therapist mentalization is indeed 
related to patient outcomes, it would have practical implications. Specifically, there is evidence 
that RF—and a therapist’s RF, in particular—can be increased through the modeling and direct 
instruction of mentalizing abilities (see Ensink et al., 2013; Suchman, DeCoste, Castiglioni, 
Legow, & Mayes, 2008). 
In summary, the extant research suggests that low RF is a marker of various types of 
pathology and that RF, in general, is a construct of importance for treatment outcomes. However, 
the current knowledge base on the role of mentalizing within the patient-therapist relationship is 
still largely theoretical in nature. The following section outlines some current thinking on the 
ways in which mentalization—and, in particular, therapist mentalization—might operate within 
the patient-therapist relationship. 
 
Mentalization (RF) in the therapeutic relationship 
While the therapeutic relationship need not be an attachment relationship for therapist 




the therapeutic relationship often is an attachment relationship (Holmes & Slade, 2018; Parish & 
Eagle, 2003). As Parish and Eagle (2003) have noted, “Certain aspects of the therapy situation 
cater to attachment needs; for example, the therapist provides a secure base from which to 
explore past and present experiences, and the therapist is a person to whom one can turn in times 
of distress” (p. 272). To obtain empirical evidence with respect to the attachment-relationship 
qualities of the therapeutic relationship, Parish and Eagle (2003) conducted a survey of 
individuals in therapy. They found that the relationships these individuals had with their 
therapists exhibited many of the attachment-relationship qualities the authors had identified in 
the attachment literature—e.g., serving as a safe haven in times of distress and as a secure base. 
And, when compared with patients’ primary attachment figures (i.e., the person in each patient’s 
life to whom he or she felt closest), therapists on average were rated higher for the qualities of 
stronger and wiser and available and responsive. The overall strength of the attachment to the 
therapist—as measured by the overall level of endorsement of the nine qualities of attachment 
relationships the authors identified—was related to the working alliance between the patient and 
therapist. This notable as the working alliance, in turn, has been associated with successful 
therapy outcomes (see Horvath & Symonds, 1991). Parish and Eagle (2003) also found that 
different indices of insecure attachment—as assessed via self-report—were negatively related to 
the overall strength of the attachment to the therapist, the working alliance, and the duration of 
the treatment. 
 In cases in which the patient-therapist relationship is indeed an attachment, the therapist’s 
mentalizing might have additional import for the patient. Holmes and Slade (2018) assert that, 
while therapy relationships with adult patients do not take place at naturally occurring “sensitive 




influence and therefore neuroplasticity are most salient” (pp. 58–59)—establishing an attachment 
to a therapist entails the re-opening of “a sensitive period in clients’ lives so that the suffering 
patient is open to the anxiety-modulating presence of a caregiver” (p. 59). A view of the patient-
therapist relationship as an attachment relationship also increases the relevance of Slade et al. 
(2005)’s findings linking Maternal RF and attachment security, as well as the relevance of the 
findings linking Maternal RF to quality of caregiving (Grienenberger, Kelly, & Slade, 2005; 
Stacks et al., 2014) and Maternal RF and Paternal RF to assessments of child mentalization 
(Benbassat & Priel, 2012; Ensink, Bégin, Normandin & Fonagy, 2016; Ensink et al., 2015; 
Rosso, Viterbori, & Scopesi, 2015). Collectively, these findings suggest that, if a therapeutic 
relationship is indeed an attachment relationship, a therapist’s level of RF with respect to his or 
her patient might be an indicator of successful psychotherapeutic processes for the amelioration 
of attachment insecurity and symptoms related to low RF. 
A view of the patient-therapist relationship as an attachment also suggests that  
a therapist’s mentalization within a therapeutic relationship would be informed by their 
caregiving system. However, the caregiving provided by a therapist to a patient of theirs would 
be distinct, in several ways, from the caregiving they would provide to a child of theirs. Holmes 
and Slade (2018), writing about the patient-therapist relationship from the perspective that it can 
be an attachment relationship, mention several important differences in the caregiving provided 
in patient-therapist and parent-child relationships, some of which will be elaborated here. First, 
the recipient of a therapist’s caregiving is typically a person contending with some form of 
psychopathology or maladaptation.3 As such, the caregiving provided by a therapist is generally 
 
3For example, while an insecure state of mind with respect to attachment has been found in only 35–45 
percent of adults in the general population (Magai, 2008), it is likely that a majority of individuals seeking 




tasked with changing the patient’s ways of being in the world. This influences the therapist’s 
caregiving in that the type of mirroring the therapist performs ideally progresses from 
“reasonably exact, albeit marked” to “only partially contingent” (Holmes and Slade, p. 45).4 The 
therapist has a challenging role, which is needed to promote change, and which becomes more 
pronounced over the course of the treatment. Another way in which a therapist’s caregiving 
differs from a parent’s is that the former features “professional” analogues of some of the 
caregiving elements found in parent-child relationships—as well as additional elements not 
typically found in parent-child relationships (e.g., therapists explicitly make use of conceptual 
tools such as countertransference and projective identification that most parents do not have 
access to). In terms of professional analogues of parental caregiving, Holmes and Slade (2018) 
argue that the synchrony (affective, behavioral, and—ultimately—hormonal) that is important in 
parent-child relationships is achieved in somewhat different ways in the patient-therapist 
relationship. They write the following: 
Synchrony—in a more general sense—is built into the parameters of the patient-therapist 
relationship. A “common factor” of most therapies is a warm, calm, quiet, interruption-
free, consistent, predictable, regular, reassuring therapist ambience and therapist persona. 
It is reasonable to speculate that these features reproduce and evoke some of the 
biobehavioral aspects of secure mother–infant relationships, and that therapists provide, 
metaphorically at least, the sensitive “touch” which is often so lacking in their clients’ 
developmental experience (p. 58). 
 
4A therapist’s reasonably exact mirroring in the early stages of a treatment would develop in the patient 
the epistemic trust needed in order for them to take in novel information from the treatment relationship 




To underline this distinction, patient-therapist relationships are mediated by language to a much 
greater degree than parent-child relationships are. Beyond this, a relationship between a therapist 
and an adult patient—i.e., a relationship between two adults—is very different from a 
relationship between a parent and a young child; this difference has profound implications for the 
range of interactions within the scope of the relationship. A final difference mentioned by 
Holmes and Slade (2018) is that the frame of the therapy relationship (e.g., an hour-long session 
once a week) influences the caregiving provided within it. Specifically, a therapist is likely to 
experience “caregiving pressures” at times specific to the therapeutic paradigm. Holmes and 
Slade (2018) write that “especially in the early stages of therapy, and often at the beginning and 
end of sessions, patients will be seeking comfort and security rather than exploration. Therapists 
at these moments will sense a caregiving pressure towards reassurance and soothing” (pp. 30–
31). 
The above highlights some of the ways in which a therapist’s caregiving with respect to a 
patient might differ from a parent’s caregiving with respect to a child. It also should be noted that 
a therapist’s state of mind with respect to the caregiving they provide as a therapist is informed 
by different factors than those that inform a parent’s state of mind. According to Holmes and 
Slade (2018), the security of a therapist’s state of mind has to do with their comfort in their role 
as therapist, specifically. They further argue that it is the therapist’s comfort with a specific 
therapeutic approach, regardless of what that approach might be, that is important. They cite 
research by Miller, Hubble, Chow, and Seidel (2013) that suggests that therapists who are most 
successful have “deep, domain-specific knowledge” (Miller et al., 2013, p. 90) in a particular 
orientation or approach. In other words, it is not what one knows as much as it is knowing 




strategies” postulate identified by Solomon and George (1996), and it likely informs their answer 
to the “willingness to respond” postulate as well. 
A therapist’s state of mind with respect to their caregiving for a particular patient likely 
affects their work with that patient in multiple ways. Most notably for this study, and as outlined 
earlier in this chapter, state of mind with respect to a particular caregiving role is should be 
related to mentalization in that role (see Slade et al., 2005). Of note in this regard, Holmes and 
Slade (2018) cite Dozier, Cue, and Barnett (1994) who found that secure therapists were more 
likely to respond in ways that differed from or counteracted a patient’s insecure attachment style, 
while insecure therapists were more likely to respond “in style” with insecure patients and thus 
reinforce their attachment insecurity. Slade (2008), writing about the therapeutic relationship, 
summarizes Dozier at al. (1994)’s findings in the following way: 
Secure therapists were more able than insecure therapists to hear and respond to the 
dependency needs of their dismissing patients, and were thus less vulnerable to 
countertransference reactions toward them. Secure therapists were also more able to 
manage the overt demands and explicit dependency needs of patients who were 
preoccupied in relation to attachment (p. 768). 
Of course, a sensitive therapist would not respond entirely “out of style” with a patient—the 
patient would experience such an approach as largely noncontingent. Along these lines, Holmes 
and Slade (2018) stated that therapists ideally respond flexibly: “in style” at certain times and 
“out of style” at others. In this vein, they cite work by Daly and Mallinckrodt (2008) that states 
that one of the prevailing qualities of experienced clinicians is the ability to be flexible in their 




relational patterns that a patient anticipates and engenders—and to work within such patterns at 
times and outside of them at others. 
As a brief summary of the above, evidence suggests that the patient-therapist relationship 
possesses many of the qualities of attachment relationships, and that therapists can be attachment 
figures for adult patients. However, the caregiving provided by therapists differs in many 
important ways from the caregiving provided by parents (particularly parents of young children). 
Additionally, the determinants of an individual’s felt security within the therapist role should 
differ from the determinants of their felt security within the parent role, and, by extension, 
mentalizing within each role should be influenced by different factors. For these reasons, caution 
should be exercised when extrapolating theory and findings regarding the parent-child 
relationship to the patient-therapist relationship. This study tentatively extends the 
developmental literature to generate its hypotheses because there is limited empirical data 
regarding mentalization within the therapy relationship. (This study’s hypotheses and the specific 
rationale for each one are discussed below.) However, a notable study that directly assessed the 
mentalizing of patients and therapists—and the functioning of the attachment and caregiving 
systems of each—was conducted by Diamond, Stovall-McClough, Clarkin, & Levy (2003). 
Diamond and colleagues developed the Patient-Therapist Adult Attachment Interview (PT-AAI; 
Diamond et al., 1999; George, Kaplan, & Main, 1984, 1988, 1996), an interview that follows the 
same schedule of questions as the AAI does, with minor changes in wording to fit the context of 
the patient-therapist relationship. Additional questions specifically designed to explore patients’ 
and therapists’ experiences and representations of the therapeutic relationship appear after the 
questions adapted from the AAI. Separate forms—one with the questions worded from the 




are included. Each form can be used to assess the interviewee’s state of mind with respect to the 
therapeutic relationship, which, for the patient, might activate the attachment system, and, for the 
therapist, might activate the caregiving system. The PT-AAI also can be used to obtain Therapist 
RF and Patient RF with regard to the therapeutic relationship. The specificity of this RF is 
notable because RF is expected to vary across different relationships and contexts (Fonagy et al., 
1998). Stated another way, each member of a therapeutic dyad might have higher or lower RF in 
other contexts (e.g., with other patients or with other therapists). 
Diamond, Stovall-McClough, Clarkin, and Levy (2003) applied the PT-AAI in a 
preliminary study of patient and therapist mentalization in Transference Focused Psychotherapy 
(TFP; Yeomans et al., 2015), a manualized psychodynamic treatment designed for patients with 
personality disorders. They administered the PT-AAI to both patients and therapists after one 
year of treatment, yielding Patient RF and Therapist RF scores. They also administered the AAI 
to patients after four months and one year of treatment, yielding attachment classifications and a 
general RF score with respect to attachment relationships. Their findings provided preliminary 
evidence to suggest that, in therapeutic dyads with favorable outcomes in terms of change in AAI 
attachment classification, Therapist RF after one year of treatment was moderately ahead of 
Patient RF—i.e., not mirroring Patient RF nor too far ahead of it. As the authors note, this is 
suggestive of Vygotsky’s zone of proximal development (Vygotsky, 1978), in which the learner 
has capabilities beyond their own scaffolded by the teacher. 
Diamond and colleagues’ (2003) preliminary results suggest that the relationship between 
Therapist RF and Patient RF might ideally be a dynamic one, with the former based on the 
latter’s stage of development. This would parallel the importance of a therapist’s ability to 




to it (Holmes & Slade, 2018). It also lends support to a view in which Therapist RF is influenced 
by intersubjective factors (see Holmes & Slade, 2018; Kantrowitz, 2016; Slade, 2008). Diamond 
et al. (2003) hypothesized that “the capacity of patients and therapists to represent each other’s 
internal worlds in mental state terms may in some sense be dependent on the dynamics of the 
therapeutic dyad” (p. 229). However, more data is needed on how Therapist RF operates and 
relates to outcomes in a patient-therapist relationship. Therapist RF is likely dynamic within in a 
session; however, assessed via an interview such as the PT-AAI—as opposed to an observational 
assessment of in-session interventions—it might have a linear relationship with patient outcome. 
In the Slade et al. (2005) study described in detail above, Maternal RF, as assessed via the PDI, 
had a linear relationship with children’s attachment security. It is also possible that high 
Therapist RF becomes more important in the context of low RF in patients—this possibility is 
described in greater detail below. However, an accumulation of research suggests Therapist RF 
should be related to patient outcomes—at least for certain symptoms and in certain therapy 
cases. The patient outcomes that Therapist RF is expected to be related to, and the circumstances 
in which it is expected to relate to those outcomes, are the topics of the final section of this 
chapter. 
 
Prospective outcomes for Therapist RF 
 
The present study employed a longitudinal observation of psychotherapy cases—
described in detail in Chapter III—to obtain empirical evidence regarding two primary questions. 
The first question was whether Therapist RF (i.e., a therapist’s ability to mentalize about a 
particular patient) would be related to patient outcomes. Pursuant to the theory and clinical data 




symptoms that have been associated with low mentalization (RF) in patients. The symptoms 
examined in this study, along with specific evidence for each one’s expected relationship with 
Therapist RF, are listed below.5 These symptoms were assessed at the start of treatment and 
again after 12 months of treatment; 12 months was expected to be a reasonable timeframe to 
observe change in these symptoms among individuals in treatment (see Clarkin et al., 2007; 
Steele, Steele, & Murphy, 2009). 
The second question for which the present study sought evidence was whether the 
expected relation between Therapist RF and patient outcomes would be equally relevant for all 
of the patients in this study. More specifically, the present study asked whether the expected 
relation between Therapist RF and patient outcomes would be present among patients with 
higher symptom levels but not patients with lower symptom levels. Theory and empirical 
evidence with relevance for this question is presented later in this section, after the discussion of 
each of the patient symptom measures included in this study. 
 
Emotion dysregulation 
In recent research, low mentalization has been associated with emotion dysregulation 
(Innamorati et al., 2017; Schultheis, Mayes, & Rutherford, 2019) as well as alexithymia—a 
component of emotion dysregulation (Rothschild-Yakar et al., 2019). Beyond these findings, 
several writers have posited links between low levels of mentalization and emotion 
dysregulation, asserting that mentalizing enhances the sophistication of one’s emotion regulation 
 
5Across these symptoms, it was expected that an important pathway through which Therapist RF would 
be related to patient improvement would be increased mentalization in patients. However, the focus of the 
present study was Therapist RF, and a direct assessment of patient mentalization (RF) was not included. 
Increased patient mentalization as a mediator of symptom improvements explained by Therapist RF 




techniques (e.g., Jurist, 2018; Lecours et al., 2013) as well as suggesting that high levels of 
emotion dysregulation impair one’s ability to mentalize (e.g., Fonagy et al., 2017a). Overall, 
theory and empirical research suggest a relationship between emotion dysregulation and lower 
levels of mentalizing. In this context, Therapist RF would be related to improvements in patients’ 
emotion dysregulation if it were associated with improvements in patients’ mentalizing, which 
was proposed earlier in this chapter. 
Also of note, developmental theory and research suggest that a caregiver’s mentalization 
has implications for the emotion regulation of their child. Esbjørn et al. (2013) found that 
mothers’ RF, assessed via the AAI, was negatively associated with the self-reported anxiety of 
their 7- to 12-year-old children. And a study by Heron-Delaney et al. (2016) found that Maternal 
RF, assessed via the PDI, was positively associated with the number of self-soothing behaviors 
(e.g., sucking thumb, playing with clothing) that mothers’ six-month-old infants displayed when 
distressed. In a similar vein, authors cited earlier in this chapter have asserted that caregiver 
mentalization can facilitate a child’s emotion regulation in a direct way, by increasing the 
efficacy of caregiving behaviors meant to soothe and contain the child’s distress (e.g., Fonagy et 
al., 1995; Slade et al., 2005), as well as by spurring the development of the child’s own 
mentalization and self-regulation abilities (Benbassat & Priel, 2012; Ensink et al., 2015, 2016; 
Gergely & Unoka, 2008; Rosso et al, 2015; Scopesi et al., 2015). Extending these findings to the 
patient-therapist relationship, Therapist RF might directly enhance patients’ emotion regulation 
as well as develop a patient’s own capacity to mentalize and self-regulate.  
A separate but related consideration is that Therapist RF might be related to a therapist’s 
adeptness at regulating him- or herself in the context a patient’s dysregulation. Grienenberger et 




negative ways with her young child. This finding was subsequently corroborated by Ensink et al. 
(2017). As the intrusiveness and negativity that mothers displayed in these studies was often in 
response to behaviors of their children that had caused them distress, RF was seen as a factor that 
prevented mothers from giving that affect back to a child of theirs in an unmodulated form. 
These findings from the developmental literature might have bearing on the therapeutic 
relationship. Specifically, Therapist RF might serve a regulating function for the therapist—and 
help them to act in ways that ameliorate a patient’s dysregulation rather than exacerbate it. 
Following the thinking outlined above, Therapist RF was expected to be associated with 
reductions in patients’ emotion dysregulation symptoms. In this study, patients’ emotion 




The current literature includes both empirical (e.g., De Meulemeester et al., 2018; Fonagy 
et al., 1996; Levy et al., 2006b) and theoretical (e.g., Fonagy et al., 2017b; Lecours et al., 2013) 
links between personality pathology and low levels of mentalization (RF). In accordance with 
Kernberg’s (1975) conceptualization of personality pathology, it was expected that if patients 
experience improved emotion regulation and improved mentalization via their therapist’s 
mentalization about the therapy relationship, they would rely less on drastic mental maneuvers 
(i.e., primitive defenses) for the regulation of their negative affect. Additionally, they would have 
a more cohesive sense of self. Both of these changes would be reflected in major dimensions of 
the Inventory of Personality Organization (IPO; Lenzenweger et al., 2001)—specifically, the 




expected to be associated with reductions in personality pathology as assessed via these 
dimensions of the IPO. 
 
Externalizing symptoms 
Recent studies have investigated the prevalence of externalizing symptoms among 
persons with low or impaired mentalization (RF). Such research has linked difficulties in 
mentalization with aggression and rule breaking (Morosan et al., 2019), drug use (Stover & 
Kiscelica, 2014), and non-suicidal self-injury (Badoud et al., 2015). Research also has linked 
deficits in a related construct—theory of mind—with hostility, suspicion, and paranoia 
(Scherzer, Leveillé, Achim, Boisseau, & Stip, 2012; Versmissen et al., 2008). Overall, the extant 
research suggests a link between low levels of mentalization and externalizing symptoms. As 
such, Therapist RF should be associated with decreases in externalizing symptoms to the extent 
that it is associated with improvements in patients’ mentalizing. 
Empirical research also has demonstrated an inverse relation between caregivers’ 
mentalizing and externalizing symptoms in their children, whether child behaviors are assessed 
at 20 months (Smaling, Huijbregts, van der Heijden, van Goozena, & Swaab, 2016) or 7–12 
years of age (Ensink et al., 2016). Additionally, a mentalization-based intervention for parents of 
children with behavioral and emotional problems was associated with reductions in externalizing 
symptoms in children 1–7 years of age (Huber, McMahon, & Sweller, 2015). These findings, if 
extended to the patient-therapist relationship, suggest that Therapist RF might be related to 
improvements in patients’ externalizing symptoms. As such, in this study, it was expected that 
patients would see greater improvements in externalizing symptoms in the context of higher 




(2016) procedure, in which the hostility and paranoid ideation subscales of the Brief Symptom 
Inventory (BSI; Boulet & Boss, 1991) are averaged.  
 
Attachment insecurity  
The recent proliferation of research on mentalization began with a study that 
demonstrated an association between mentalization (RF) and the security of attachment-related 
states of mind (Fonagy et al., 1991). This association has since been replicated (e.g., Bizzi et al., 
2009; Bouchard et al., 2008). Even more pertinent with respect to the current study is Slade et 
al.’s (2005) finding that Maternal RF—i.e., a mother’s ability to mentalize about her child—was 
associated with the security of that child’s attachment to her. Extending this finding to the 
clinical realm, there is reason to think that Therapist RF might be related to the security of a 
patient’s attachment to their therapist. What is more uncertain is the relationship between 
Therapist RF and the security of the patient’s other attachment relationships. In this study, the 
relation between Therapist RF and changes in patients’ attachment security was assessed through 
the Relationship Structures questionnaire of the Experiences in Close Relationships—Revised 
(ECR-RS; Fraley, Heffernan, Vicary, & Brumbaugh, 2011). The ECR-RS is a self-report 
measure of an adult’s state of mind with respect to attachment and, as such, it is a method of 
assessing attachment that is less labor intensive than administering, transcribing, and scoring the 
AAI—a process that requires specialized training at each step (Main, Hesse, & Goldwyn, 2003). 
While the ECR-RS has been used far less extensively as a measure of attachment than the AAI 
has, its scores are reliable and associated with expected outcomes (Fraley et al., 2011). Also of 
note, a single administration of the ECR-RS can be used to assess attachment in different 




study, this allows one to assess whether observed changes in attachment security are 
generalizable across relationships. Of note in this regard, Parish and Eagle (2003) found a 
correlation between the intensity of patients’ attachment to their therapist and the intensity of 
their attachment to their primary attachment figure, which suggests that features of attachments 
generalize among therapeutic and non-therapeutic relationships.6 That being said, Parish and 
Eagle (2003) did not establish causality in the relationship above—or even explicitly measure 
attachment security. However, given that attachment-related states of mind include information-
processing rules and metacognitive elements (Main, 1991), both of which would be affected by 
increases in an individual’s overall capacity for mentalization, changes in attachment security 
associated with Therapist RF should generalize across different relationships. 
Another notable feature of the ECR-RS is that it is a dimensional assessment of 
attachment security with two distinct scales: attachment avoidance and attachment anxiety. This 
is pertinent as evidence suggests that attachment states of mind in adults are not strictly 
categorical (for a review, see Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000). The ECR-RS’s avoidance and 
anxiety scales are logical extensions of the two major types of insecurity documented by Main et 
al. (1985)—dismissing and preoccupied, respectively. The ECR-RS offers the possibility that the 
individual might score high in both dimensions, score high in one but not the other, or score low 
in both. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, both the dismissing and preoccupied states of mind 
with respect to attachment imply impaired mentalizing and, as such, both should be influenced 
by Therapist RF. Overall, it was expected that patients would see greater improvements in 
attachment insecurity (i.e., both avoidance and anxiety on the ECR-RS) in the context of higher 
 
6Note that Parish and Eagle did not assess the security of patients’ attachments to their therapist or their 
primary attachment figure but rather the degree to which patients endorsed the qualities of an attachment 





levels of Therapist RF, and it was expected that these benefits would generalize across the 
relationships assessed by the ECR-RS. 
 
Moderating effect of symptom level 
 The second research question mentioned above concerns the patients for whom Therapist 
RF might be most beneficial. In formulating a hypothesis with regard to this question, it should 
be noted that low levels of mentalization (RF) have been most clearly associated with high 
symptom severity (e.g., Fischer-Kern et al., 2013); relatedly, some higher functioning outpatient 
samples have been comparable to healthy controls in terms of levels of mentalization (e.g., 
Taubner, Kessler, Buchheim, Kachele, & Staun, 2011). If a major pathway through which 
Therapist RF is expected to be associated with beneficial patient outcomes is increased patient 
mentalization, then Therapist RF might be less relevant for patients with lower symptom levels. 
Also of note, developmental theory and research suggest that a caregiver’s mentalization 
would be most crucial when a child experiences heightened distress—i.e., it would be at such 
moments that a caregiver’s mentalization, and the emotion regulation it brings, would be most 
consequential for the development of a child’s mentalization abilities (Fonagy et al., 1995) and 
possibly the caregiver’s own self-regulation (e.g., Ensink et al., 2017; Grienenberger et al., 
2005). In a similar vein, Fonagy et al. (1994) found that a mother’s RF had increased predictive 
value for her child’s attachment security when she had experienced—or was currently 
experiencing—substantial adversity. While this finding concerns the adversity experienced by a 
caregiver rather than a recipient of caregiving, it supports the idea that a caregiver’s RF might 
assume increased importance in the context of increased adversity or distress. Extrapolating the 




RF is more consequential for patient improvements in cases in which the patient brings a high 
amount of distress to the treatment. 
The psychotherapy literature also offers an intriguing finding with relevance for this 
research question. Specifically, Schauenburg et al. (2010) found that a therapist’s attachment 
security was associated with better outcomes in the areas of symptom distress and interpersonal 
difficulties among patients with high baseline levels of those problems; however, it was not 
related to outcomes for patients with low levels of baseline pathology. Notably, these findings 
concern therapists’ attachment security rather than their RF. However, as outlined earlier in this 
chapter, attachment security and RF are related constructs. As such, this finding provides indirect 
evidence suggesting that patients’ baseline symptom levels might be a moderator of the relation 
between Therapist RF and patient improvements, and that it might be high-distress cases where 
this relation is observed. Based on the various findings summarized in this subsection—as well 
as the expected concordance of the symptoms discussed above—it was expected that Therapist 
RF would be of greater benefit to patients with higher symptom levels at baseline. 
 
Research questions and hypotheses 
As a culmination of the above, the following is a formal statement of this study’s research 
questions and hypotheses. The first research question was whether Therapist RF would be 
associated with patient improvement in the areas of externalizing symptoms, emotion 
dysregulation, personality pathology, and attachment insecurity from baseline to 12 months. It 
was hypothesized that patients whose therapists have high levels of Therapist RF would 
experience decreases in these symptom measures that would be on average larger in magnitude 




The second research question was whether the relation between Therapist RF and patient 
outcomes in the areas of externalizing symptoms, emotion dysregulation, personality pathology, 
and attachment insecurity would be moderated by the symptom level at baseline. It was 
hypothesized that, among patients with high levels of a symptom at baseline, those whose 
therapists have high levels of Therapist RF would have lower 12-month scores for that symptom 
on average than patients whose therapists have low levels of Therapist RF. However, average 12-
month scores of patients with low levels of the symptom at baseline would not differ between 
those whose therapists have high levels of Therapist RF and those whose therapists have low 




CHAPTER THREE: Method 
Setting and overview 
This study was conducted at The Psychological Center, an outpatient mental health clinic 
in an urban setting in the northeastern United States. The Psychological Center serves a 
population composed primarily of persons living in the surrounding community. Therapists are 
students of the clinical psychology doctoral program at The City College of New York (CCNY) 
who receive an hour of individual supervision weekly for each patient with whom they work. 
Supervisors cover different modalities of psychodynamic and other types of therapy. The 
treatment offered at The Psychological Center typically includes a combination of expressive and 
supportive elements tailored to the patient (see Dewald, 1994 for a review of supportive and 
expressive elements of therapy). 
 The protocol for the present study was embedded within The Psychological Center’s 
larger programmatic evaluation study, which has been approved by CCNY’s Institutional 
Review Board (IRB). All adult patients at The Psychological Center complete self-report 
measures at the start of treatment as part of the standard-of-care intake process. Also at intake, all 
adult patients are administered informed consent to allow their deidentified data to be used for 
future research purposes. Patients who decline to provide consent are not penalized in any way 
(i.e., they receive the same mental health services as those who provide consent). All patients 
who move from intake to treatment, and their respective therapist, complete additional self-report 
measures with regard to the treatment every four months thereafter. Therapists also complete 
self-report measures at the time they begin clinical work at The Psychological Center and every 




 The protocol for the present study was approved by the CCNY IRB via an amendment to 
the larger programmatic evaluation study. It entailed an interview, the Patient-Therapist Adult 
Attachment Interview—Revised (PT-AAI-R; Diamond et al., 2016; George at al., 1984, 1988, 
1996), with the therapist of each patient-therapist dyad included in this study. The PT-AAI-Rs 
were conducted four months into the treatments, in conjunction with the first round of follow-up 
measures mentioned above. The patient outcome measures used in this study were administered 
at baseline (i.e., during the intake process mentioned above) and 12 months into the treatments as 
part of The Psychological Center’s programmatic evaluation study. 
 
Inclusion criteria and recruitment protocol 
Therapists at the Psychological Center were initially introduced to the study and its 
general purpose (i.e., “to examine the patient-therapist relationship, and how it relates to 
therapeutic processes and outcomes”) via presentations made by the author at weekly group 
supervision meetings. Following these presentations, the author sent an email to The 
Psychological Center’s listserv with the information included in the presentations. The author 
also presented the study and its general purpose at an annual event devoted to research by the 
students of the clinical psychology doctoral program at CCNY. 
 Potential participants were therapists currently providing psychotherapy to an adult 
patient who at intake had given consent to have their deidentified data used in future research. 
The recruitment process was limited to new therapy cases for two reasons. The first was to have 
the PT-AAI-R administered at the same timepoint in each treatment. This was deemed important 
to control for any effect that the duration of the therapeutic relationship might have on Therapist 




the relation between Therapist RF scores and subsequent patient outcomes, rather than Therapist 
RF and concurrent patient outcomes. In conjunction with the lead author of the PT-AAI-R, it was 
decided that PT-AAI-Rs would be administered four months into each treatment so that the 
patient and therapist would be familiar with each other at the time it was administered. An 
additional inclusion criterion was that each patient had to have the potential to be in treatment for 
a year or more (e.g., was not planning to relocate within the year), which was necessary for all 
measures to be collected. Finally, therapists who were in the same research group as the author 
of the study were not considered candidates for inclusion due to their knowledge of the primary 
variable of interest in the present study, Therapist RF. 
Working in conjunction with the associate director of The Psychological Center, 43 cases 
that met the above criteria were identified over the 18 months during which PT-AAI-Rs were 
administered. Therapists of these cases were contacted directly by the author. In all in-person and 
electronic communications, potential participants were reminded of the general purpose of the 
study but were not informed of the variable of interest. They were informed that participation 
would entail an interview, about 60–90 minutes long, about their work with a particular patient. 
They were told that the interview would be an opportunity “to have an in-depth discussion about 
[their] work with a particular patient” as well as an opportunity “to learn more about [their] work 
as a therapist.” No other incentives for participation were offered. 
In 19 of the 43 potential cases initially identified, the therapist ultimately did not 
complete a PT-AAI-R. In seven of these cases, the patient ended the treatment prior to the 4-
month timepoint. In six, the therapist declined to complete the PT-AAI-R. In three, the author 
and the therapist were ultimately unable to schedule the PT-AAI-R. And, in three more, the lead 




treatment. In 24 cases, the therapist agreed to participate and was administered the PT-AAI-R. 
Of these cases, 17 continued for a full year and were included in the study’s analyses. The final 
sample consisted of 17 different patients and 15 different therapists; two therapists each 
completed two different PT-AAI-Rs—one each for two different patients. For these two 
therapists, the amount of time between PT-AAI-Rs was approximately seven months for the first 
therapist and approximately three months for the second therapist. The re-administration of the 
PT-AAI-R within a limited timeframe was considered appropriate as interviews based on the 
AAI—such as the PT-AAI-R—are designed to access unconscious, procedural information about 
the attachment and caregiving systems (Main, 1995). As described in Chapter II, scoring 
procedures for these interviews concern how an interviewee responds, not just what they say; as 
such, it is difficult for the interviewee to alter their performance in order to achieve a specific 
result—even with foreknowledge of the questions or the purpose of the interview. Given this, the 
PT-AAI-R should not be greatly influenced by carryover effects from previous administrations 
of the interview (see Minke, 1997 for a review of carryover effects). 
 
Measures 
Patient-Therapist Adult Attachment Interview—Revised (PT-AAI-R; Diamond et al., 
2016; George at al., 1984, 1988, 1996). The PT-AAI-R is a semi-structured interview that elicits 
descriptions of the other in the therapeutic dyad and of the therapeutic relationship. It follows the 
same schedule of questions as does the AAI (George, Kaplan, & Main, 1996), with minor 
changes in wording to fit the context of the patient-therapist relationship. Additional questions 
designed to explore patients’ and therapists’ experiences and representations of the therapeutic 




questions worded from the patient’s point of view, and one with the questions worded from the 
therapist’s point of view—are included. The full interview appears in the Appendix. In this 
study, only the form for therapists was used. 
The original PT-AAI (Diamond et al, 1999; George at al., 1984, 1988, 1996) was revised 
for this study by the author and the lead author of the original PT-AAI; the outcome of that 
revision was the PT-AAI-R. The revisions were intended to elicit additional data with regard to a 
therapist’s caregiving system. The PT-AAI-R includes 37 questions. Examples of questions are 
“Why do you think your patient behaves the way he or she does as a patient,” “How effective, do 
you think, are the therapeutic techniques that you are using to help your patient,” and “How do 
you think that your patient feels about you?” All interviews were conducted by the author, who 
completed a training program in AAI administration and then received additional instruction in 
administering the PT-AAI-R from the lead author of the interview. Interviews were audio 
recorded and then transcribed and de-identified by research assistants in accordance with the 
transcription guidelines established for the AAI. As is the case with the AAI, the PT-AAI-R 
administrations varied in length considerably; some were less than an hour while others were 
over two hours in duration. However, most of the interviews were longer than anticipated—i.e., 
over 90 minutes. To avoid a cumbersome procedure—and to increase this study’s chances of 
being replicated—it was decided that only a portion of the responses from each PT-AAI-R 
transcript would be scored and used in arriving at an overall Therapist RF score (see below for 
information on RF scoring). There is precedent for using a shortened interview for the 
assessment of RF; for example, Rudden, Milrod, and Target (2005) created the Brief Reflective 
Function Interview (BRFI), an adaptation of AAI that can be in administered in approximately 




related experiences and devotes a proportionally greater amount of time to prompting 
participants to demonstrate their capacity for RF. Rutimann and Meehan (2012) found that the 
BRFI yielded RF scores that were reliable and comparable to those derived from the AAI (r = 
.71) when the two interviews were administered to the same set of participants in the same year 
(on average, 6 months apart). While the full PT-AAI-R was administered to the participants in 
the present study, only the questions that might be asked in a shortened interview were coded. 
These questions were the following (each one’s placement in the sequence of questions on the 
PT-AAI-R is indicated): 
4. How close do you feel to this patient? How does this compare to the way you feel 
about other patients? 
9. Have you felt rejected by your patient? How have you managed those feelings at such 
times? Are there any particular instances that stand out in your mind? Why do you think 
your patient did those things? Do you think he/she realized he/she was rejecting? 
13. In general, how do you think your overall experiences with this patient have affected 
your personality/who you are now? (Probe: Are there any aspects to this relationship that 
you feel have been a setback for your development?)  
15. Why do you think your patient behaves the way he/she does as a patient?  
16. Have there been many changes in your relationship with your patient since you have 
begun treatment? (Probe: Have your feelings for your patient changed over the course of 
the treatment?)  
17. Is there any particular thing which you feel you learned above all from this therapy 





De-identified PT-AAI-R transcripts including only the questions above were scored for 
RF according to the Reflective-Functioning Manual (Fonagy et al., 1998). RF is a narrative-
based measure of an individual’s level of mentalization. A higher RF score is derived from 
statements that communicate either explicitly or implicitly any of the qualities of mentalization 
mentioned in Chapter II. Fonagy et al.’s (1998) rating system yields an RF score from -1 
(negative reflective function) to 9 (exceptional reflective function). A score of five is considered 
to denote ordinary reflective function. The odd numbers of the RF score serve as anchor points 
(see Table 2). Additionally, the convention is to accept scores half-way between two points 
(scores such as 3.5 and 4.5); this study adhered to that convention. When scoring an interview 
transcript for RF, individual responses are scored before the rater arrives at an overall score for 
the narrative. Descriptions of the anchor points of the RF scale are in Table 2. Notably, RF 
assessed from PT-AAI-Rs with therapists is referred to as Therapist RF as it is specific to the 
therapeutic relationship. 
To maintain the integrity of the Therapist RF ratings in this study, PT-AAI-Rs were 
scored by two graduate students at a different institution. The two raters had completed a training 
program in scoring RF from AAI transcripts and passed a subsequent reliability test. Initially, for 
this study, the two raters scored the PT-AAI-Rs of three cases that had terminated prior to the 12-
month timepoint and were therefore ineligible to be included in the study’s data analyses. This 
was done to allow the raters the opportunity to become familiar with the PT-AAI-R, to 
troubleshoot any challenges in scoring Therapist RF from the PT-AAI-R (as opposed to scoring 








Table 2. RF Scale Anchor Points 
-1: Negative RF 
This type of narrative is very rare in a normal sample. Either the speaker actively rejects the 
task of reflecting on mental states or their attempts to do so produce results that are 
inexplicable or bizarre. 
1: Lacking in RF 
A narrative that is either devoid or nearly devoid of reflective functioning. When prompted to 
consider mental states, the speaker might either bypass the opportunity or else describe mental 
states that appear so biased that the speaker cannot be given credit for genuine reflective 
functioning. 
3: Low or Questionable RF 
A narrative in which the speaker generally does not explicitly consider the mental states of self 
or other, though mental states might be frequently referenced in passing. More explicit 
reflective functioning efforts are typically unconvincing or off topic. Some clear indicators of 
reflective functioning might be present, but only sporadically so. 
5: Ordinary RF 
The most common type of narrative in a normal, high functioning sample. Either reflective 
functioning is consistently present in an ordinary manner (e.g., prompts to take a reflective 
stance consistently include one or two types of indicators of reflective functioning) or it is 
complex in certain areas (e.g., with multiple types of indicators of reflective functioning) but 
questionable in others. Overall, reflective functioning is somewhat attenuated—either in the 
limited variety of indicators present throughout the narrative, or in the speaker’s inability to 
take a more elaborate reflective stance on particular relationships, or on particular aspects of a 
single relationship. 
7: Marked RF 
A narrative that consistently features multiple types of indicators of reflective functioning. 
There is detail on how mental states influence each other and influence observable behavior. 
The result is a coherent and well-elaborated model of the speaker’s mind and of the minds of 
important others in their life. 
9: Exceptional RF 
This type of narrative is rare. It features many responses that are highly sophisticated in their 
reflective functioning. The speaker regularly goes “above and beyond” the prompt by 
spontaneously considering how the mental states of all involved in a situation affect each 
other, and by spontaneously considering the etiology of current mental states (e.g., how they 
evolved over time in relationships with important others). Rather than being predictable, a 
narrative with this score is often surprising in convincing ways. 
 
 
To demonstrate the reliability of the RF scores for the 17 cases in the data analyses, 
approximately one-third (6) of the PT-AAI-Rs were scored by both raters, which is in line with 
the convention in the literature (see Bouchard et al., 2008; Cordes et al., 2017; Levy et al., 




intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) of .95, which is considered excellent interrater agreement. 
For the six PT-AAIs that were scored by both raters, the second rater’s scores were used in the 
data analyses as they were the more senior rater. However, none of the pairs of scores differed by 
more than 0.5 points. 
Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI; Boulet & Boss, 1991). The BSI is a self-report measure 
designed to assess levels of various forms of psychopathology. It has 53 items, each of which 
asks the respondent to rate, on a 5-point scale, the extent to which he or she has experienced a 
particular problem or complaint. The BSI measures symptoms on nine dimensions: somatization, 
obsessive-compulsive, interpersonal sensitivity, depression, anxiety, hostility, phobic anxiety, 
paranoid ideation, and psychoticism. In validity studies for the BSI, test-retest reliability scores 
for the nine dimensions have ranged from .68 for somatization to .91 for phobic anxiety; 
Cronbach’s alpha estimates have ranged from .71 for psychoticism to .85 for depression (Boulet 
& Boss, 1991; Derogatis & Melisaratos, 1983). 
Following the protocol of Benbassat and Shulman (2016), the 11 hostility and paranoid 
ideation items on the BSI were averaged to create a measure of externalizing symptoms, the 
BSI—Externalizing (BSI-EXT). In their study of Israeli adolescents and young adults, Benbassat 
and Shulman (2016) obtained a Cronbach’s alpha estimate of .83 for these items. In the present 
study, missing data were addressed via multiple imputation (MI; see van Buren, 2010), and this 
produced multiple imputed datasets. (More information on the missing data methods used in this 
study is provided later in this chapter.) Initially, across imputed data sets, Cronbach’s alpha 
estimates for the BSI-EXT items at baseline were all .76 with no variation due to no missing 
BSI-EXT data at baseline. At the 12-month timepoint, Cronbach’s alpha estimates across 




acceptable at baseline but below the threshold for acceptable reliability at 12 months, item-total 
correlations were examined to determine which items were less strongly related with the others. 
Based on this examination, three BSI items (4, 10, and 40) were removed from the BSI-EXT at 
both baseline and 12 months, leaving a total of eight items—four each from the hostility and 
paranoid ideation subscales. Following this, Cronbach’s alpha estimates for the BSI-EXT items 
at baseline were all .77—as before, there was no variation across imputed datasets due to no 
missing data. For the 12-month timepoint, Cronbach’s alpha estimates across imputed data sets 
ranged from .67 to .69. Therefore, the internal consistency of the measure remained acceptable at 
baseline, and it improved but was just below a threshold of .70 at 12 months. For hypothesis 
tests, results for the BSI-EXT were obtained both with and without the three items mentioned 
above omitted; in each case, the results were comparable—reinstating the three items above did 
not change the outcome of any test. 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004). The DERS is a 
36-item self-report measure designed to assesses multiple components of emotion dysregulation. 
It has six factors: nonacceptance of emotional responses, difficulties in engaging in goal-directed 
behavior in the context of negative emotions, impulse control difficulties, lack of emotional 
awareness, limited access to emotion-regulation strategies, and lack of emotional clarity. The 
respondent rates, on a 5-point scale, the extent to which they agree with each item from (1) 
“almost never” to (5) “almost always.” Gratz and Roemer (2004), in their validation study for the 
DERS, obtained a Cronbach’s alpha estimate of .93 for the full 36-item measure. In this study, 
the DERS global score, the sum of all 36 items, was used as a measure of emotion dysregulation. 
Of note, two cases did not receive the DERS at 12 months due to an administration error; one 




However, per The Psychological Center’s programmatic evaluation study, patients had also 
completed the DERS at 8 months into the treatment. For these three cases, the Last Observation 
Carried Forward (LOCF; National Research Council, 2010) approach was employed and the 8-
month data, which did not have any missing items for any of the three cases, was used in place of 
the 12-month data. As the LOCF approach resulted in a shorter time frame for the DERS change 
scores for these the patients, it yielded a more conservative assessment of patient change in this 
area. (Note: in subsequent reporting the final DERS score is referred to as the 12-month score for 
all cases.) The remainder of missing DERS data were addressed through multiple imputation. 
Across imputed data sets, Cronbach’s alpha estimates for the DERS at baseline were all .95 after 
rounding to two decimal places; Cronbach’s alpha estimates for the DERS at 12 months were all 
.96 due to no missing data at this timepoint. 
Inventory of Personality Organization (IPO; Lenzenweger et al., 2001). The IPO is a self-
report measure based on an object-relations conceptualization of personality pathology (see 
Kernberg, 1975). The version used in the present study is the 57-item version designed to assess 
the respondent’s level of personality pathology along three dimensions: primitive defenses, 
identity diffusion, and poor reality testing. For each item, the respondent rates, on a 5-point scale, 
the extent to which the item applies to them. Across studies, Cronbach’s alpha estimates have 
been .80–.87 for primitive defenses, .84–.90 for identity diffusion, and .85–.87 for reality testing. 
Test-retest reliability has been .81 for primitive defenses, .83 for identity diffusion, and .80 for 
reality testing (Lenzenweger et al., 2001). Lenzenweger et al. (2001) found the primitive 
defenses and identity diffusion subscales to be highly correlated (r = .97). As these two subscales 
were hypothesized to be more closely related to Therapist RF than reality testing was, the 37 




pathology, the IPO—Personality Pathology (IPO-PER). In the present study, across imputed data 
sets, Cronbach’s alpha estimates for the IPO-PER at baseline were all .96 after rounding to two 
decimal places, and Cronbach’s alpha estimates for the IPO-PER at 12 months were all .94 after 
rounding to two decimal places.  
Experiences in Close Relationships—Relationship Structures (ECR-RS; Fraley et al., 
2011). The ECR-RS is a self-report measure that assesses the interviewee’s attachment anxiety 
and attachment avoidance in specific relationships. A researcher using the ECR-RS chooses the 
relationships for which they would like to assess respondents’ attachment. In the present study, 
participants completed the ECR-RS for the following relationships: mother, father, romantic 
partner, best friend, and therapist. In each instance, the patient was instructed to think about the 
target relationship while rating, on a 7-point scale, the degree to which they agreed or disagreed 
with different statements for the relationship in question.7 Each form contains the same 9 items, 
and in this study respondents saw 45 items total. 
Typically, the ECR-RS is used to obtain two separate measures of attachment insecurity 
for each relationship: avoidance, which is an average of the first six items, and anxiety, which is 
an average of the last three items. Cronbach’s alpha estimates for the avoidance items for 
different relationships, and for the anxiety items for different relationships, have ranged from .87 
to .92 (Fraley et al., 2011). However, in the present study, therapist mentalization was not 
hypothesized to have different effects for attachment avoidance and attachment anxiety. As such, 
Fraley’s (2012) procedure for the creation of an overall score (i.e., an average of the avoidance 
score and the anxiety score) was used to create a measure of general attachment insecurity, the 
 
7The ECR-RS instructions promote the completion of items in situations in which the respondent does not 
have the target relationship by, for example, instructing the respondent to answer the questions about “a 




ECR—Insecurity (ECR-INS). Additionally, Fraley’s (n.d.) protocol for averaging across 
relationships was used to obtain a measure of attachment that was general rather than specific to 
a particular relationship. This was done to test the hypothesis that Therapist RF would be 
associated with changes in patients’ states of mind with respect to attachment across the 
relationships assessed. Fraley et al. (2011), in their validity study for the ECR-RS, obtained 
Cronbach’s alpha estimates of .88 for global (i.e., across-relationship) avoidance and .85 for 
global (i.e., across-relationship) anxiety. However, in Fraley and colleagues’ research with the 
ECR-RS (e.g., Fraley et al., 2015; Fraley et al., 2011), they required respondents to answer all 
items for all relationships. As The Psychological Center’s programmatic evaluation study did not 
require patients to complete any item in any measure, patients in this study could skip any ECR-
RS items—or all of the items for any relationship (i.e., mother, father, partner, friend, or 
therapist). To limit bias in standard errors, which increases as the amount of imputed data 
increases (Eekhout et al., 2014), the ECR-INS score for a given relationship for a particular 
participant was considered missing if less than 50 percent of the items for that relationship had 
been completed at one or both timepoints. With this criterion, most patients had insufficient data 
to produce an ECR-INS score for one or more of the five relationships assessed. Following 
Leenders, Buunk, and Henkens’s (2018) protocol for missing ECR-RS data, each participant’s 
final ECR-INS score at baseline and at 12 months was an average of the relationships that had 
sufficient data to yield an ECR-INS score at both timepoints. Five patients had enough data to 
yield scores for all five relationships, and their final ECR-INS score at each timepoint was an 
average of their data for all five relationships. Five patients had enough data to yield scores for 
four relationships; three patients had enough data for three relationships; one patient had enough 




not have enough data for any relationships—this case was excluded from the ECR-INS analyses. 
As, for each relationship type, multiple patients had insufficient data, ECR-INS data for 
individual relationships were not used in this study’s data analyses. Additionally, because the 
final ECR-INS scores were combinations of different relationships for different patients, it was 
not possible to obtain internal consistency information at each timepoint. 
 
Missing data 
Across measures, no more than 12 percent of participants were missing data for any item 
with the exception of certain ECR-INS items, for which up to 47 percent of participants were 
missing data. A possible explanation for the large amount of missing data for these ECR-INS 
items is that patients skipped items in cases in which they did not have a particular relationship. 
While the measure’s instructions did not require patients to currently have the exact relationship 
indicated (as stated above, patients were instructed to complete the mother items with regard to 
“a mother or mother-like figure,” the partner items with regard to “a current or former romantic 
partner,” etc.), the large amount of data missing for the ECR-INS, when compared with the 
amount missing for the other measures, suggests that patients considered many of these items to 
be not applicable to them. 
A Little’s MCAR test (Little, 1988) conducted on the entire dataset indicated that the data 
could not be assumed to be missing completely at random, χ2 (3,357) = 128,938.32, p < .001. 
Without access to the data that are missing, it is not possible to determine conclusively whether 
the data are missing at random (MAR) or missing not at random (MNAR) (van Buuren, 2012). In 
light of this, multiple imputation (20 data sets) was selected to impute missing data as it is known 




17) by controlling for variables related to missing-data mechanisms (van Buuren, 2012). 
Variables in the data for this study were inspected to determine which ones correlated with 
missingness. A number of variables were identified and incorporated into the MI model, and 
missing data were multiply imputed. Following the work of Eekhout et al. (2014), a measure was 
excluded from the data analyses for a particular participant if that participant failed to complete 
at least 50 percent of that measure’s items at one or both timepoints; this was done to limit bias 
in standard errors, which increases as the amount of imputed data increases. Notably, this 
procedure only affected the ECR-INS data—no other measure had over 50 percent of items 
missing for any participant at either timepoint. Results of all subsequent tests were pooled across 
the multiply imputed datasets. 
To test whether results before and after MI differed, the hypothesis tests described below 
were also run with cases with missing data excluded. A few relations were significant in the 
complete-case analyses that were not significant in the analyses with MI data. However, all 
relations that were significant with the MI data were also significant in the complete-case 
analyses. As such, these results appear robust to the procedure used for missing data. 
 
Analytical strategy 
Hypothesis 1 stated that Therapist RF would be related to patient improvement, from 
baseline to 12 months, in each of the four outcome variables described above: BSI-EXT, DERS, 
IPO-PER, and ECR-INS. To test this hypothesis, generalized estimating equations (GEE; Liang 
& Zeger, 1986) were used—one for each of the four outcome measures. GEE is an analytic 
method that accounts for correlations among repeated measures. Unlike other approaches to 




and can accommodate missing data (Ballinger, 2004; Ma, Mazumdar, & Memtsoudis, 2012). 
Additionally, GEE is robust to a misspecified correlation structure for repeated observations 
(Ghisletta & Spini, 2004; Zorn, 2001); however, picking the correct structure increases the 
efficiency of parameter estimates (Wang & Carey, 2003). For the analysis for each of the 
outcome measures, the standard errors, the Quasi Likelihood under Independence Model 
Criterion (QIC), and the parameter estimates were nearly identical across different working 
correlation structures, indicating that none of the structures performed better than the others. 
Thus an exchangeable correlation structure, which assumes that all pairs of observations in a 
series of timepoints are equally correlated with each other, was specified. Beyond the 
requirement of a working correlation structure, GEE assumes at least 10 clusters (or cases) and at 
least two timepoints (Norton et al., 1996; Ghisletta & Spini, 2004); both assumptions were met 
for these analyses. 
Two therapists in this study each completed two PT-AAI-Rs and had two different 
Therapist RF scores in the analyses. As Therapist RF is expected to vary across a given 
therapist’s therapeutic relationships (Diamond et al., 2003; Fonagy et al., 1998), the Durbin-
Watson statistic was used for each analysis to determine whether the data indicated that errors 
could be treated as independent. Field (2017) suggests that Durbin-Watson values below 1 and 
above 3 are definite cause for concern regarding the assumption of independent errors. Given the 
exploratory nature of this study, Field’s benchmark was deemed acceptable. It was met for all 
tests, so the data were not clustered by therapist. 
In each GEE used to test Hypothesis 1, the symptom measure (i.e., BSI-EXT, DERS, 
IPO-PER, or ECR-INS) was the dependent variable. The data were entered in repeated-measures 




score. A two-level Time variable (baseline vs. 12 months) was entered into the model as a 
predictor along with Therapist RF, which was mean centered, and the interaction between Time 
and mean-centered Therapist RF. The significance of the interaction was regarded as an indicator 
of whether change in the outcome measure varied by levels of Therapist RF. 
Hypothesis 2 proposed that, for each of the four symptom measures described above (i.e., 
the BSI-EXT, DERS, IPO-PER, and ECR-INS), symptom level at baseline would moderate the 
relation between Therapist RF and the outcome for that symptom. Several different models for 
testing this hypothesis were considered, and each entailed certain benefits as well as certain 
drawbacks. Repeated-measures ANOVAs would account for the within-subject correlation 
between the baseline and 12-month scores. However, it was discovered that using a repeated-
measures model to test Hypothesis 2, which regards the baseline score as a putative moderator, 
would place the baseline score on both sides of the equation—i.e., as an outcome as well as a 
predictor. In such a scenario, the baseline score would effectively cancel itself out. Additionally, 
several authors (Dimitrov & Rumrill, 2003; Dugard & Todman, 1995; Huck & McLean, 1975; 
Knapp & Schafer, 2009) have noted problems with repeated-measures approaches to measuring 
change; for example, baseline scores are in most cases correlated with change scores, so 
repeated-measures models do not adequately control for the baseline score in determining the 
effect of the treatment variable on outcome. One option for circumventing the issues above 
would be an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression predicting 12-month scores as a function 
of baseline scores, thus predicting change. Using fabricated data, Dugard and Todman (1995) 
illustrated the use of such a model to test whether a baseline score moderates the effect of a 
treatment variable on a post-test score. In the present study, testing moderation in this way would 




and the interaction between the baseline score and Therapist RF as predictors of the 12-month 
score. In this model, the baseline score and Therapist RF are both mean centered, and the 
interaction is between these two mean-centered variables. However, OLS regression assumes 
independence of observations; as such, the use of a baseline score as a predictor of a 12-month 
score might lead to biased standard errors. To assess the severity of this bias, the decision was 
made to test Hypothesis 2 with two different models. First, the hierarchical linear regression 
model described above was used. In these tests, significant interactions between the baseline 
score and Therapist RF that resulted in significant increments in the variance explained by the 
model were probed further by calculating estimates of the relationship between Therapist RF and 
the 12-month score at specific values of the baseline score (i.e., one SD above the mean and one 
SD below the mean) and then performing simple slopes analyses. These follow-up probes 
determined the significance and the nature of the interaction. Second, the data were entered in 
long (i.e., repeated-measures) format, which resulted in the addition of a Time variable as well as 
that variable’s interactions with Therapist RF and the baseline score. As in the first model, the 
baseline score and Therapist RF were mean centered. The three-way interaction was between 
Time and these two mean-centered variables. GEE was used to test the significance of the three-
way interaction between Time, the baseline score, and Therapist RF to determine whether the 
significance of the interaction term in the first model held after accounting for dependence 
among repeated observations. 
 The underlying assumptions of the regression analysis described above are the 
following: multivariate normality, a linear relation between each predictor and the outcome, 
homoscedasticity of residuals, and independence of observations. The assumptions of normality, 




independence between cases was assessed via Durbin-Watson tests as described above. 
Additionally, a global test provided by the gvlma package in R was used as a more formal means 
of testing the assumptions of regression. Individual tests performed for each assumption do not 
consider the impact of violations of the other assumptions; also, performing multiple tests 
increases the chance of incorrectly concluding that one of the assumptions has been violated (see 
Peña & Slate, 2006). This global test provided a single p-value that indicated that all of the 
assumptions of regression were met. Further, the Bonferroni outlier test was used to determine 
that no cases had large absolute studentized residuals with Bonferroni-corrected p-values of < 
.05. However, it was noted that the BSI-EXT data included two cases with large Cook’s 
distances, with average values of 1.07 and 2.82 across imputed datasets; this indicated that each 
of these cases had a large influence on the analyses. As such, the hierarchical regression 
described above was re-run with these influential cases removed, and results both with and 
without these cases included are reported in Chapter IV.  
 
Significance level and power 
A significance level of .10 was used for the hypothesis tests described above. Notably, 
when compared to a significance level of .05, a significance level of .10 increases the probability 
of a Type I error—i.e., concluding that the hypothesized relationship exists when it does not. 
However, it reduces the risk of a Type II error—i.e., concluding that the hypothesized 
relationship does not exist when it does. As this is a preliminary study for a construct that, to 
date, has not been adequately studied in the field, and replication will be needed for any 
significant findings, increasing the risk of Type I error was deemed acceptable in order to reduce 




constrains on the sample size due to a limited number of student therapists at The Psychological 
Center—and, by extension, a limited number of new cases starting. The statistical power of the 
present study is discussed in further detail below. 
To determine the number of cases that would be needed to test the GEE analyses in 
Hypothesis 1 with adequate power, relevant effect sizes in developmental and clinical research 
were examined. First, Fonagy et al. (1991) found that, among (N = 100) first-time mothers, a 
mother’s RF, assessed via the AAI prior to her child’s birth, had a large association (r = .51) with 
her child’s security classification assessed via the Strange Situation at one year. Additionally, 
Slade et al. (2005) found that, in a sample of (N = 40) first-time mothers, a mother’s RF 
specifically with regard to her relationship with her child, assessed via the PDI at 10 months, 
had a large association (Cohen’s d = 0.81) with her child’s attachment security assessed via the 
Strange Situation at 14 months. While these findings of Fonagy et al. (1991) and Slade et al. 
(2005) concern the mother-child relationship, which generally differs from the patient-therapist 
relationship in scope and importance, they suggest that a caregiver’s RF can have a large effect 
on the attachment security of the individual receiving care. In the area of clinical research, De 
Meulemeester, Vansteelandt, Luyten, and Lowyck (2018) found that, in a sample of (N = 175) 
patients with BPD receiving hospital-based treatment, changes in patients’ RF were strongly 
correlated (r = .89) with improvements in their symptomatic distress, as assessed via the Dutch 
version of BSI. This finding concerns patient RF rather than therapist RF, but it speaks to the 
importance of RF as a potential mediator of the amelioration of distress in the context of 
personality pathology. As such, it has relevance for the present study, which views changes in 




 Based on the above research, which demonstrated large effect sizes but did not pertain 
directly to Therapist RF, it was assumed that Therapist RF would have a medium-to-large effect 
on the symptoms assessed, each of which has been linked to low RF in clinical samples. To 
approximate the sample size needed to test Hypothesis 1 with adequate power, G-Power 3.1.9.2 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) was employed. In G-Power, the closest model to the 
analyses used to test Hypothesis 1 is a repeated-measures design in which the interaction 
between the time variable and a dichotomous variable is used to predict outcomes. G-Power 
indicated that, for a design with two timepoints, a significance level of .10, and an effect size 
half-way between a medium effect (Cohen’s f = .25) and a large effect (Cohen’s f = .40), a 
sample of 18 cases would be required to obtain a power of at least .80 (the generally accepted 
criterion for power in the field). The Hypothesis 1 analyses in this study, which included 17 
cases for the BSI-EXT, the DERS, and the IPO-PER, and 16 cases for the ECR-INS, did not 
meet this criterion and, as such, might be underpowered. However, the G-Power analysis above 
does not reflect that the analyses in the present study had a continuous predictor variable (i.e., 
Therapist RF) or that they used a GEE model. So, following the above tests, research on the 
power of GEE analyses was sought. Ma et al. (2012) investigated the power of GEE when 
compared with other models and found that GEE performs better, in terms of power, than the 
model assumed in the G-Power analysis (i.e., repeated-measures ANOVA). Therefore, while the 
exact power of the GEE analyses for Hypothesis 1 are uncertain, the available information 
suggests that they may be adequately powered or, if not, slightly underpowered. 
 With regard to the regression analyses for Hypothesis 2, relevant effect sizes were 
sought. Research suggests that moderating effects, in general, are small (Aguinis, Beaty, Boik, & 




examined in this study, by and large, did not offer guidance regarding the size of the moderating 
effects that might be expected for the tests for Hypothesis 2. An exception was a study by 
Schauenburg et al. (2010) who, in a sample of N = 31 therapists treating N = 1,381 patients, 
assessed therapists’ state of mind with respect to attachment as a continuous variable, from 
secure to insecure. They found that therapist security was associated with better outcomes in the 
areas of symptom distress and interpersonal difficulties among patients with high baseline levels 
of those problems. The size of the effect of the interaction between patients’ baseline symptom 
distress and therapists’ attachment security on patients’ post-test symptom distress was medium-
to-large, r = -.40. And the size of the effect of the interaction between patients’ baseline 
interpersonal difficulties and therapists’ attachment security on patients’ post-test interpersonal 
difficulties was medium, r = -.31. Notably, these findings were for the therapists’ attachment 
security rather than their RF, though, as demonstrated in Chapter II, these constructs are 
significantly related. 
Further indirect evidence regarding the size of a potential moderating effect for baseline 
symptom level can be found in the developmental literature. As noted above, Fonagy et al. 
(1994) found that, among mother-child dyads in which the mother had experienced substantial 
adversity, her RF was an almost perfect indicator of whether or not her child was rated as 
securely attached at one year of age. In a sample of 27 such dyads, the child was rated as secure 
in 100 percent (10 of 10) of the cases in which the mother had high RF but only 6 percent (1 of 
17) of the cases in which the mother had low RF. For dyads in which the mothers did not have a 
history of substantial adversity, RF was a less powerful predictor. In a group of 70 such dyads, 
the child was rated as secure in 79 percent (31 of 39) of the cases in which the mother had high 




interaction between mothers’ history of adversity and mothers’ RF was medium (Cramer’s V = 
0.33). While this effect size concerns the parent-child relationship—and adversity experienced 
by a caregiver rather than a recipient of caregiving—it nevertheless illustrates the increased 
importance a caregiver’s RF might assume in the context of increased distress. 
Overall, in the literature, there is a limited amount of evidence with implications for the 
size of the moderating effects under consideration in Hypothesis 2. The published data that do 
have implications for this hypothesis suggest medium to medium-to-large effect sizes. However, 
given the evidence that moderating effects are generally small, and the indirect nature of the 
evidence cited above, it was considered prudent to estimate an effect size on the smaller end of 
what the research above would suggest. As such, a medium effect size was hypothesized for 
these tests. Subsequently, G-Power 3.1.9.2 was used to approximate the sample size needed to 
test Hypothesis 2 with adequate power. It indicated that, for a linear regression with three 
predictors (one tested predictor), a significance level of .10, and a medium effect size (f2 = .15), a 
sample of 43 cases would be required to obtain a power of at least .80. As such, the analyses for 
Hypothesis 2 are underpowered. The low power of these tests presents an inflated risk of 
reaching an incorrect conclusion in each test. However, given the exploratory nature of this 
study, it was decided to include these tests, as significant findings would have the potential to 
stimulate attempts at replication that are more adequately powered. At the same time, these 




CHAPTER FOUR: Results 
Sample characteristics 
Of the 17 patients included in the data analyses, 13 (76.5%) were female and 4 (23.5%) 
were male. They had a mean age of 32.2 years (SD = 9.80). Eight (47.1%) were White, three 
(17.6%) were Black, one (5.9%) was mixed race, and five (29.4%) identified ethnically and not 
racially; of the five who identified ethnically, four identified as Latino/Hispanic and one 
identified as ethnically mixed. Twelve (70.6%) had at least a bachelor’s degree and nine (52.9%) 
were employed full time. 
The 17 patients included in the data analyses were compared with the 7 who terminated 
prior to 12 months of treatment in terms of demographics. An independent-samples t-test 
indicated that these groups did not differ in terms of age, t(22) = -1.14, p = .27, and chi-square 
tests indicated that they did not differ in terms of gender (male vs. female, X 2(1) = 0.90, p = .37), 
race (White vs. non-White, X 2(1) = 0.70, p = .65), education (bachelor’s degree vs. less, X 2(1) = 
0.40, p = .65), or employment (full-time job vs. less, X 2(1) = 1.19, p = .39). These two groups 
were also compared on their baseline scores for the symptom measures in this study. Between-
samples t-tests with cases with complete data indicated that these groups did not significantly 
differ in their baseline scores for the BSI-EXT (t(22) = 0.93, p = .36), the DERS (t(18) = 1.07, p 
= .30), the IPO-PER (t(21) = -.45, p = .65), or the ECR-INS (t(20) = .82, p = .42). 
Of the 15 therapists, 10 (66.7%) were female and 5 (33.3%) were male. They had a mean 
age of 33.80 years (SD = 7.10). Eleven (73.3%) were White, two (13.3%) were Black, one 
(6.7%) was South/Southeast Asian, and one (6.7%) was mixed race. 
 




Therapist RF scores ranged from 3.5 to 7.0. (M = 5.35, SD = 1.13). A score of 3.5 is 
closest to the “3” anchor point of the RF scale, which is low (or questionable) RF. A score of 7.0 
aligns with the “7” anchor point of the RF scale, which is marked RF.  
In this study, some (N = 10) cases had a once-a-week session frequency and others (N = 
7) had a twice-a-week session frequency at the time of their PT-AAI-R administration. However, 
a t-test indicated that Therapist RF was not significantly related to session frequency, t(15) =       
-1.33, p = .20. In a similar vein, the correlation between Therapist RF and the cumulative number 
of sessions the patient-therapist dyad had completed prior to the PT-AAI-R was not significant, r 
= .04, p = .89, and neither was the correlation between Therapist RF and the length of time (in 
days) that had elapsed since the first session, r = .01, p = .97. Additionally, correlations between 
Therapist RF and the baseline score of the BSI-EXT (r = .33, p = .20), the DERS (r = -.05, p = 
.86), the IPO-PER (r = .40, p = .12), and the ECR-INS (r = .20, p = .47) revealed no statistically 
significant relationships. However, Therapist RF did have a medium positive correlation with the 
IPO-PER at baseline as well as with the BSI-EXT at baseline, such that higher Therapist RF 
scores were associated with higher IPO-PER scores at baseline as well as higher BSI-EXT scores 
at baseline. 
 
Descriptive data for outcome measures 
Mean scores for the measures of patient symptoms (i.e., the BSI-EXT, DERS, IPO-PER, 
and ECR-INS) at baseline and 12 months, as well as t-scores for the within-subjects changes, can 
be found in Table 3. Dependent-samples t-tests indicated that, for the BSI-EXT and IPO-PER 
scores, the reduction in patients’ scores from baseline to 12 months was significant, and the size 








Table 3               
               
Mean Outcome Scores‡                       
               
Outcome  Baseline   12 months   Dependent-samples t-test 
  M SD  M SD  t  df  p      d 
                             
BSI-EXT    0.64 0.45        0.42   0.30  2.84  16  .005  0.63 
               
DERS  86.65 25.22  84.71 25.40  0.42  16  .67  0.08 
               
IPO-PER  78.36 27.60  68.04 18.20  2.87  16  .004  0.45 
               
ECR-INS    2.84 1.06        2.69 0.93    1.03  15  .30  0.16 
                              





Relations among symptom measures 
Relations among the symptom measures at baseline and 12 months can be found in Table 
4. Notably, the BSI-EXT, DERS, and IPO-PER were more strongly correlated with each other 
than they were with the ECR-INS. Also of note, the correlations between the IPO-PER and two 
of the other symptom measures were significantly weaker at 12 months than they were at 
baseline. Specifically, the correlation between the IPO-PER and the BSI-EXT at 12-months (r = 
.41), was below the 90 percent CI [.47, .88] of the correlation at baseline (r = .74). Similarly, the 
correlation between the IPO-PER and the DERS at 12-months (r = .40), was below the 90 






Table 4          
          
Relationships Among Outcome Measures‡         
          
Outcome    BSI-EXT      DERS      IPO-PER      ECR-INS    
          
BSI-EXT        .69
**     .44
†       .41       -.10        
            
DERS        .70
**         .72**   .40         .04        
              
IPO-PER       .74
***         .75***        .87***   .27       
                
ECR-INS   -.01            .26         .31              .83
*** 
                    
‡Data in table pooled from multiple datasets. All values Pearson's r. Correlations below the diagonal are 
correlations between measures at baseline. Correlations on the diagonal are between the measure at 
baseline and the measure at 12 months. Correlations above the diagonal are between measures at 12  
months. N = 17 except N = 16 for correlations including ECR-INS. †p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, and  




Relations between Therapist RF and change in symptom measures over time 
It was hypothesized that patients whose therapists had high levels of Therapist RF would 
experience decreases in the BSI-EXT, DERS, IPO-PER, and ECR-INS that were on average 
larger in magnitude than would patients whose therapists had low levels of Therapist RF. To test 
this hypothesis, generalized estimating equations (GEE; Liang & Zeger, 1986) were used—one 
for each of the four outcome measures. The results of these analyses appear in Table 5. 
As expected based on the results of the dependent-samples t-tests reported above, the 
time effect was significant for BSI-EXT and IPO-PER scores. Specifically, holding Therapist RF 
constant, Time was associated with significant decreases in the BSI-EXT as well as with 
significant decreases in the IPO-PER. Additionally, holding Time constant, Therapist RF 
positively predicted IPO-PER. This indicated that, regardless of timepoint, higher Therapist RF 
scores were associated with higher IPO-PER scores. However, the interaction between Time and 




that the relation between Time and each of the symptom measures did not vary by levels of 
Therapist RF. As such, these tests did not support the hypothesis that patients whose therapists 
had high levels of Therapist RF would experience symptom decreases that were on average 
larger in magnitude than would patients whose therapists had low levels of Therapist RF. 
 
Table 5       
         
GEE Estimates for Outcome Variables‡ 
         
Outcome Variable   
  Predictor Variables  b SE Wald χ
2     p 
         
BSI-EXT       
 Time    -0.23 0.08 8.92  .003 
 Therapist RF     0.13 0.11 1.56  .21 
 Time x Therapist RF    -0.05 0.08 0.48  .51 
         
DERS       
 Time    -1.94 4.37 0.20  .66 
 Therapist RF    -1.04 6.47 0.03  .87 
 Time x Therapist RF    -3.63 4.10 0.79  .38 
         
IPO-PER       
 Time  -10.32    3.45 8.94  .003 
 Therapist RF     9.66 5.67 2.90  .09 
 Time x Therapist RF    -1.86 3.32 0.32  .58 
         
ECR-INS       
 Time    -0.15 0.15 1.01  .32 
 Therapist RF     0.19 0.26 0.54  .47 
 Time x Therapist RF     0.09  0.16 0.37  .57 
                  
‡Data in table pooled from multiple datasets. N = 17 for BSI-EXT, DERS, and IPO-PER; N = 16 for  
 ECR-INS. 
     
 
Baseline symptom level as a moderator of Therapist RF 
 It was hypothesized that, among patients with high baseline levels of a symptom, those 




symptom on average than patients whose therapists had low levels of Therapist RF. Additionally, 
average 12-month scores of patients with low baseline levels of the symptom would not differ 
between those whose therapists had high levels of Therapist RF and those whose therapists had 
low levels of Therapist RF. This hypothesis was tested for each symptom measure with two 
different models. First, a hierarchical regression with the baseline score, Therapist RF, and the 
interaction between the baseline score and Therapist RF as predictors of the 12-month score. 
This model holds baseline scores constant, thus predicting change. The results of this model are 
reported in Table 6. Second, the data were entered in long format, with one row for the baseline 
timepoint and a second row for the 12-month timepoint for each case; this resulted in the 
addition of a Time variable as well as that variable’s interactions with Therapist RF and the 
baseline score. In this second model, GEE was used to test the significance of the three-way 
interaction between Time, the baseline score, and Therapist RF to determine whether the 
significance of the interaction term in the first model held after accounting for dependence 
among repeated observations. 
As mentioned in Chapter III, when running the regression analyses for the first model, it 
was noted that the BSI-EXT data included two cases with large Cook’s distances (average values 
of 1.07 and 2.82 across imputed datasets), which indicated that these cases had a large influence 
on the analyses. As such, the first model’s analyses were re-run with these cases removed, and 
the results for both BSI-EXT analyses appear in Table 6. 
The results in Table 6 show that, for the regression on 12-month BSI-EXT scores, the 
only result that differed depending on whether all cases were included was the relation between 
the baseline score and the 12-month score. The baseline score significantly predicted the 12-




cases with large Cook’s distances were excluded (p > .1). In neither analysis was the test of 
interest, the interaction between Therapist RF and baseline BSI-EXT, significant (both ps > .1). 
 
Table 6         
           
Multiple Regressions on 12-Month Outcome Scores‡   
           
Outcome Variable   
    Predictor Variables  b  SE   t   p R
2 ΔF 
           
BSI-EXT—all cases included      
 Step 1            .47  
  Baseline score   0.44 0.15 3.02   .002   
  Therapist RF   0.02 0.06 0.38 .70   
 Step 2           .47 0.001 
  Baseline x Therapist RF     0.004 0.12 0.04 .97   
           
BSI-EXT—cases removed        
 Step 1           .37  
  Baseline score    0.30 0.24 1.29 .20   
  Therapist RF   -0.01 0.06 0.24 .81   
 Step 2           .39 0.24 
  Baseline x Therapist RF  -0.09 0.18 0.49 .63   
           
DERS         
 Step 1           .55  
  Baseline score   0.69 0.15 4.65  <.001  
  Therapist RF  -4.08 3.33 -1.23 .22   
 Step 2           .72 7.91
** 
  Baseline x Therapist RF -0.32 0.11 -2.81   .005   
           
IPO-PER         
 Step 1           .78  
  Baseline score   0.54 0.10 5.45  <.001  
  Therapist RF   2.64 2.31 1.14 .25   
 Step 2           .78 0.02 
  Baseline x Therapist RF -0.01 0.08 -0.16 .87   
           
ECR-INS         
 Step 1           .70  
  Baseline score   0.73 0.14 5.07  <.001  
  Therapist RF   0.15 0.13 1.17 .24   
 Step 2           .72 0.80 
  Baseline x Therapist RF -0.09 0.12 -0.74 .46   
                      
‡Data in table pooled from multiple datasets. N = 17 for BSI-EXT, DERS, and IPO-PER; N = 16 for  




With regard to the results with implications for the hypothesis stated above, the 
interaction terms for the first model appear in Table 6. For the regression on 12-month DERS 
scores, the interaction between Therapist RF and baseline DERS was a significant predictor (b = 
-0.32, p = .005), and it significantly added to the amount of variance explained by the model, ΔF 
= 7.91, p = .005. To determine the significance and nature of this interaction, estimates of the 
relationship between Therapist RF and 12-month DERS at specific values of baseline DERS 
(i.e., one SD above the mean and one SD below the mean) were calculated. These estimates are 
depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
             Figure 1. Interaction between baseline DERS scores and Therapist RF. 
 
Simple slopes analyses probing the interaction between baseline DERS and Therapist RF 
showed that, when baseline DERS was high (1 SD above the mean), the difference in outcome 
between dyads with low Therapist RF (1 SD below mean) and those with high Therapist RF (1 




month DERS scores, b = -12.10, t = -2.74, p = .01. This result is represented by the slope of the 
black line in Figure 1, which is significantly less than zero. However, when baseline DERS was 
low (1 SD below the mean), the difference in outcome between dyads with low Therapist RF and 
those with high Therapist RF was not significant, b = 3.95, t = 0.91, p = .36. This result is 
represented by the slope of the gray line in Figure 1, which is not significantly different from 
zero. Also, when Therapist RF was low, patients with high baseline DERS had significantly 
higher 12-month DERS scores than did those with low baseline DERS, b = 1.05, t = 5.49, p < 
.001. This result is represented by the difference between the gray and black lines on the left side 
of the graph in Figure 1. However, when Therapist RF was high, the difference in outcome 
between patients with high baseline DERS and those with low baseline DERS was only 
marginally significant, b = 0.33, t = 1.66, p = .10. This result is represented by the difference 
between the gray and black lines on the right side of the graph in Figure 1. In order to determine 
whether this result held after correcting for autocorrelation, the results of the second model 
described above were consulted. The second model indicated that the result held: the three-way 
interaction between Time, baseline DERS, and Therapist RF remained significant and was of 
comparable magnitude, b = -0.32, SE = 0.05, Wald χ2 = 34.77, p < .001. These results support 
Hypothesis 2 with regard to the DERS. 
As shown in Table 6, none of the interaction terms for the other outcome measures (i.e., 
the BSI-EXT, IPO-PER, and ECR-INS) were significant (all ps > .1). These results were 
confirmed by the three-way interaction terms for the BSI-EXT (b = 0.004, SE = 0.12, Wald χ2 = 
0.02, p = .97), the IPO-PER (b = -0.01, SE = 0.05, Wald χ2 = 0.06, p = .81), and the ECR-INS (b 
= -0.09, SE = 0.07, Wald χ2 = 1.60, p = .21) in the second model. This indicates that the data did 





Post-hoc qualitative comparison: Therapists who completed two PT-AAI-Rs 
After the data were collected and the PT-AAI-Rs were scored, it was noted that, among 
the two therapists who each completed two interviews, one had relatively consistent Therapist 
RF scores for their two PT-AAI-Rs (6.0 for the first interview, 5.5 for the second), while the 
second had rather different scores (6.5 for the first interview, 3.5 for the second). Each of these 
observations conveys an important characteristic of Therapist RF. The first therapist’s two 
interviews, which had relatively similar Therapist RF scores, demonstrate that a therapist might 
achieve a relatively similar level of RF in somewhat different ways for different patients. (Note: 
while Fonagy et al. (1998) did not propose categorically different types of “good” RF in their 
scoring manual, there are nevertheless different ways in which ordinary-or-better-RF scores 
might be obtained in a particular narrative.) The second therapist’s two interviews demonstrate 
that a therapist might have a substantially higher level of RF for one patient than for another. The 
discrepancy in this pair of interviews also reinforces the notion that Therapist RF is an attribute 
of the therapy relationship—i.e., that it is not a product of just therapist attributes or just patient 
attributes but rather is influenced by both parties in the therapeutic dyad. This assumption is 
based on work by Diamond et al. (2003) who found evidence to suggest that therapists’ capacity 
for RF may differ with respect to different patients. It is also based on the research and writing of 
Fonagy and colleagues (e.g., Fonagy et al., 2017b; Fonagy et al., 1998) who suggest that RF, in 
general, is influenced by the history and characteristics of a dyad in which it occurs. Notably, 
this idea informs the present study’s hypotheses, which are based on the notion that the relation 





The characteristics of Therapist RF mentioned above can be further illustrated by looking 
at the responses given to the same PT-AAI-R prompt in each of these four interviews—i.e., in 
both interviews completed by each therapist. Below are excerpts from each therapist’s responses 
to the question, “Why do you think this patient behaves the way he/she does as a patient?” (Note: 
the excerpts below were edited to preserve confidentiality.) 
 
Therapist 1, PT-AAI-R for Patient 1 
In response to the prompt above, the first therapist, in the first PT-AAI-R they completed, 
produced a response that was scored a 5 (ordinary RF). It included the following: 
My general experience of her is that she’s a very compliant patient. She comes in 
relatively ready to do the thing—do what therapy is for. Which I think is you know 
figuring, using it as a space to explore her emotions, trying to understand how she reacts 
to people and to events. Um, and, I think part of that is like her motivation to figure out 
what’s going with her. Um, because she does have sort of a dearth of close relationships. 
And I think part of that um, obviously has to do with like her upbringing and her 
relationships with her parents, but I, I don’t know, it’s a hard question to answer. It seems 
really multifactorial. Um and also I think that I’m sure there’s a lot about me that 
impacts, how she behaves in session. Yeah . . . I do, I do notice that there’s a give and 
take between like how I am in the session and how she is in the session, yeah. 
This response demonstrated an “ordinary” level of RF in a couple of different ways. First, the 
therapist made explicit references to intentional mental states that they believed the patient had 
held at various points in the treatment—e.g., “using it as a space to explore her emotions” and 




certain statements (e.g., “it’s a hard question to answer” and “it seems really multifactorial”), 
indicated that their thoughts with regard to the patient’s mental states were not facts but 
hypotheses and, thus, open to new information and possible revision. As fixed ideas about 
another person are indicative of a lower level of RF, the therapist’s uncertainty about their 
hypotheses indicates higher RF. 
Another notable passage was the one in which the therapist reported a belief that their 
own behavior had influenced the patient’s behavior. However, the therapist did not speak to 
potential mental states intervening in the connections between their own and the patient’s 
behavior, so this statement did not increase the RF score for this passage. Similarly, the therapist 
took an intergenerational perspective (i.e., “she does have sort of a dearth of close relationships. 
And I think part of that um, obviously has to do with like her upbringing and her relationships 
with her parents”), which is often a marker of higher RF. However, in this case, the statement is 
not developed with references to specific mental states, so it does not increase the level of RF in 
the response. It is important to note that the instances in which the therapist did not explicitly 
reference mental states do not necessarily indicate that the therapist was not capable of 
considering mental states with regard to a particular topic. However, theory regarding RF (see 
Fonagy et al., 1998) contends that spontaneous elaborations with regard to mental states are 
indicative of higher levels of RF as they imply that the speaker is regularly taking a mentalizing 
stance and implicitly understands the importance of doing so. 
 
Therapist 1, PT-AAI-R for Patient 2 
In the PT-AAI-R the first therapist completed with regard to their second patient, they 




I think . . . that [patient’s name] is really trying to figure out who she is. And I think that, 
um, I think she’s enacting a lot of dynamics from her childhood that she hasn’t yet 
understood. And like maybe doesn’t even realize that she’s doing. I think that . . . she has 
a lot of expectations. I mean it’s very hard for her when her expectations are not met, 
either by herself or by other people . . . And so she gets, she’s upset easily. But then she 
has another part of her personality which is that she doesn’t really feel she should ever be 
upset. {{subject laughs a beat}} ’Cause she feels like she should be happy all the time. 
So um, so she’s a little bit between a rock and a hard place, I mean I think that she, I 
think that her, I think she doesn’t allow herself a lot. I think she doesn’t allow herself 
very much.  [Interviewer: Very much?] Uh, anything. But particularly emotionally. I 
think she just doesn’t allow herself to feel that much . . . and so when she does feel a lot 
it’s very, very hard for her . . . I think [she is] feeling like she is so unhappy and she like 
can’t really stand it anymore. Um, she’s really, she’s really like become aware of how 
fake she feels, and how much she doesn’t want to feel that way, how much it’s getting in 
the way, of her having any sense of like fulfillment or satisfaction, from her relationships 
with other people in particular. 
This response demonstrated an “ordinary-to-marked” level of RF in a few different ways. Similar 
to the response above, it contained multiple references to specific mental states in the patient—
e.g., “it’s very hard for her when her expectations are not met, either by herself or by other 
people,” and “she doesn’t really feel she should ever be upset . . . she feels like she should be 
happy all the time.” However, this response included mental states that were in conflict with 
each other (for example, the two just mentioned)—as well as an awareness of the distress that 




interactions of mental states within a single mind—is indicative of higher RF. Additionally, this 
response, similar to the one above, included a statement that communicated a recognition that 
one frequently has limited insight into mental states; however, in this response, the limitation the 
therapist mentioned was with regard to the patient’s insight into one of her own mental states 
(i.e., “maybe doesn’t even realize that she’s doing that”). In a similar vein, and also indicating 
RF, the response in this interview included statements that conveyed a sense that the patient 
might work to disguise some of her mental states, from others or even herself—e.g., “she just 
doesn’t allow herself to feel that much . . . and so when she does feel a lot it’s very, very hard for 
her” as well as “she’s really like become aware of how fake she feels, and how much she doesn’t 
want to feel that way.” The latter of these two statements also references a change in mental 
states over time, which is another indicator of RF. 
Similar to the response this therapist provided on their first PT-AAI-R, in this response 
there is a statement that takes an intergenerational perspective (i.e., “I think she’s enacting a lot 
of dynamics from her childhood”). But, as in the first response, this statement is not elaborated 
(e.g., with regard to what the dynamics were, and how they influenced the patient’s thoughts and 
feelings), so the therapist was not given credit for RF for this statement. Overall, this response 
has several references to mental states that could have been more elaborated (e.g., “she has a lot 
of expectations,” “she just doesn’t allow herself to feel that much”). However, once again, these 
less-developed statements do not necessarily indicate that this therapist was not capable of 
considering mental states in a more elaborate way. The therapist might or might not have had 
more to say; however, in either case, they opted not to mentalize further. 
 




Overall, these responses were comparable in terms of their level of RF, with the second 
response demonstrating a level of RF one scale point above the first. (Note: despite the second 
response having a higher score, the therapist’s first PT-AAI-R actually had a slightly higher 
overall score—6.0 versus 5.5 for the second interview.) The ways in which RF was constrained 
were similar across the two responses—most notably, the therapist often referenced mental states 
without elaborating on them, or they alluded to interpersonal dynamics without speaking about 
the mental states involved. Additionally, the two responses had some of the same types of 
moderate-to-high-RF indicators—e.g., references to intentional mental states in the patient, and 
statements recognizing the limitations on insight into mental states. However, there were also 
some differences in the indicators of RF seen in the two responses. In the first response, the 
therapist indicated that there were limitations on their insight into the patient’s mental states. In 
the second response, the therapist indicated that the patient’s insight into her own mental states 
might be limited. The second response also contained markers of RF not found in the first 
response, which yielded a higher score for this response. These markers included references to: 
interactions between mental states within a single mind, the intentional disguising of mental 
states, and changes in mental states over time. 
 
Therapist 2, PT-AAI-R for Patient 1 
In response to the prompt above, the second therapist, in the first PT-AAI-R they 
completed, produced a response that was scored a 7 (marked RF). It included the following: 
I’m seeing this dropping, you know, dropping these important things to talk about and 
then not coming back to them. And I think a good part of what’s going on is this desire to 




patient. And then the not being able to ask for help is a theme that I’m seeing now more 
than I did a few weeks ago. And I’m beginning to think it’s happening in the treatment 
too. You know, she comes, she’s reluctant to specifically ask for what she wants to talk 
about . . . But even this business of going, running to her mom and telling her about every 
treatment session, there’s something about it that is, um, she’s working so hard to reveal 
herself to be seen . . . to please but not to ask for help. 
This response demonstrated a “marked” level of RF in a few different ways. There are references 
to specific, intentional mental states in the patient (e.g., “desire to please,” “afraid of not being 
the good patient,” “reluctant to specifically ask for what she wants to talk about”). Also, there are 
references to an evolution in the therapist’s thinking (e.g., “I’m beginning to think” and “I’m 
seeing now more than I did a few weeks ago”); this indicates an awareness of an important 
attribute of mental states—specifically, that they can evolve over time. It also indicates that the 
therapist’s thoughts have been open to revision. This last point is reinforced by some of the 
language the therapist used when discussing the patient’s mental states: phrases such as “I think 
a good part of what’s going on” and “I’m beginning to think,” which indicate that the therapist’s 
thoughts about the patient are hypotheses rather than certainties—and thus open to new 
information. Another indicator of RF can be found in the therapist’s idea that the patient’s 
feelings about the treatment might have differed from observable aspects of her behavior within 
the treatment. Imagining that individuals have depth beyond their observable behavior is an 
important aspect of RF. 
However, the “marked” level of RF in this response is not due solely to the presence of 
multiple types of indications of RF. It is also due to the degree to which the patient’s 




a coherent and nuanced picture of the patient’s mind emerges. In this response, the therapist 
reported a belief that the patient wanted to do what she felt the therapist was asking of her—i.e., 
she wanted to keep the therapist happy. The therapist also stated that the patient did not stick 
with topics that she might have wanted to discuss further. They linked that observation to the 
patient’s relationship with her mother, to whom the patient was reporting the events of each of 
her therapy sessions. The therapist then extrapolated from the available information to formulate 
a hypothesis that the patient wanted both her therapist and mother to see what she needed—and, 
presumably, give it to her—but was not directly asking for help from either one. This multi-
layered conceptualization of the patient’s behavior in the early stages of this treatment is an 
important part of how this response demonstrated “marked” RF. 
 
Therapist 2, PT-AAI-R for Patient 2 
In the PT-AAI-R the second therapist completed regarding their second patient, they 
produced a response that was scored a 3 (low RF). It included the following: 
Um, well I would say that, the way he behaves as patient, the things that are salient, is 
that he is very respectful of the frame, and he is um, he is really eager for help. Um, I 
think he is respectful of the frame because, a big part of his self-image is that he is um, 
you know a decent, upstanding, good person. Um, and so, you know, and he had two 
years of therapy in advance so he’s been trained on the frame. Um, and I think the reason 
he is, uh so invested in therapy, is because, um, his life is more settled now than it has 
been. Um, he’s, he has a really good job. His relationship is, um, a healthy relationship. 




time to do it. Um he’s not fighting any battles externally right now. You know, he has 
someone to care for him. Um, and he’s really unhappy. 
As mentioned above, this response received a score of 3.0 (“low” RF). It did contain references 
to mental states in the patient; to account for the patient’s behavior in the treatment, the therapist 
said that the patient was “very respectful of the frame” and “really eager for help.” Each 
statement indicated some RF in that the therapist was considering the patient’s mind—if in 
simple terms. The therapist’s subsequent elaborations of these mental states referenced static 
qualities in the patient or external factors in his life. Specifically, with regard to “respectful of the 
frame,” the therapist first stated that the patient had a “self-image” as “a decent, upstanding, 
good person.” As this explanation referred to a static factor—akin to personality—rather than 
specific mental states, it did not indicate a high level of RF. The therapist then supposed that the 
patient “had two years of therapy in advance so he’s been trained on the frame.” As this 
explanation attributed behavior to past experience without reference to intervening mental states, 
it did not employ RF. Similarly, with regard to the “eager for help” mental state (which the 
therapist later termed “invested in therapy”), the therapist explained this by stating that the 
patient was “really unhappy” despite his life being “more settled now”—and then pointed to 
external factors (e.g., the patient’s job and relationship) to support the “settled” aspect of the 
patient’s life. As such, the therapist’s conclusion—“he feels like if he’s gonna get his head in 
order, you know this is the, the time to do it”—appears to be derived from a consideration of the 
patient’s life circumstances. While considering normative responses to life circumstances can be 
an indicator of RF, on the whole this response is simple in terms of its consideration of mental 





Summary for Therapist 2’s responses 
Overall, the second therapist’s responses were divergent in terms of their level of RF, 
with the first response demonstrating a level of RF four scale points above the first. While both 
of these responses included references to mental states in the patient being discussed, only in the 
therapist’s first response did they acknowledge the possibility that the patient’s thoughts and 
feelings might have been divergent from observable aspects of their behavior. Additionally, only 
in the therapist’s first response did they reference the patient’s relationship with them as well as 
reference their own mental states—i.e., the evolution of their thinking with regard to the patient. 
In the therapist’s second response, the patient’s mental states were generally attributed to static 
qualities in the patient or external factors in his life. There was also an instance in which the 
therapist attributed the patient’s behavior to past experiences without referencing intervening 
mental states. Overall, the differences in the level of RF seen in the two responses might be 
viewed as differences in sophistication—only in the first response did a nuanced picture of the 
patient’s mind emerge. The greater sophistication of the first response is notable as these two 
responses were given by the same therapist in response to the same question—the only 
difference was the particular therapeutic relationship under discussion. 
 
Further illustration of Therapist 2’s PT-AAI-Rs 
To illustrate further the ways in which Therapist RF might be expressed or constrained in 
a PT-AAI-R, this section provides additional descriptive information on the two interviews 
conducted by the second therapist mentioned above. As stated earlier, this therapist obtained 
divergent Therapist RF scores on their two PT-AAI-Rs (6.5 on the first interview and 3.5 on the 




therapist’s cases. Some implications of these findings are discussed in Chapter V. (Note: quoted 
responses were edited to preserve confidentiality.) 
 
First interview, overall Therapist RF score of 6.5 
In this interview—which overall had a level of RF just below the “marked” anchor point 
of the RF Scale—the therapist frequently considered the patient’s mental states and the impact of 
those mental states on the patient’s behaviors. Additionally, their language often contained 
acknowledgements that insight into mental states is imperfect. For example, when attributing 
mental states to the patient, the therapist often used phrases such as “I think” and “I sense” in 
ways that denoted some measure of uncertainty. However, despite this uncertainty, the therapist 
still strove to make reasonable hypotheses about the patient’s mental states, implicitly 
communicating that they saw value in the endeavor. They also considered that thoughts and 
feelings regarding a given situation might diverge from observable aspects of that situation. (One 
instance in which this quality was demonstrated is the response from this interview discussed in 
the sections above, for the question of why this patient behaved the way she did as a patient.) 
The therapist also communicated an understanding that mental states are potentially subject to 
disguise. Additionally, they considered interactions between mental states. This marker of RF 
can take different forms; in this interview it was manifest in the therapist’s consideration of the 
intersubjective field between them and the patient—and how their own mental states might have 
affected the patient’s. The therapist also communicated a high level of investment in the 
treatment. While this last quality is not in itself an indicator of RF, it did, in this case, accompany 




interview included a variety of indicators of RF, many of which were well elaborated, and this 
resulted in nuanced and credible depictions of mental states within the therapeutic relationship. 
In one response that included several of the above qualities, the therapist spoke about an 
event in the therapy that caused them to feel, momentarily, some uncertainty regarding whether 
the patient would continue in the treatment. They stated, “When [the patient] left me a voicemail 
saying that her flights had been changed, and she wasn’t going to come in for therapy, I 
remember feeling this little like jolt of, you know, ‘I wonder what that means, I wonder,’ you 
know?” The therapist followed this by saying that there was not any obvious reason for them to 
have had that feeling. The interviewer then asked them if they thought the patient had been 
aware of the possibility that they (the therapist) might have had a reaction like that to the 
cancellation. Their response was the following: 
What an interesting question. I think she was because she, um, spent the first 15 or 20 
minutes of our time meeting after that, telling me how dreadful her flights were and how, 
you know, kind of how out of control the whole thing was and I sense that some of that 
was, um, as a way of, um, making clear to me that this wasn’t something she did on 
purpose. [Interviewer: And what was it like for you to hear her give all that information 
about the dreadful quality of the flights?] I sat there debating whether or not to, say 
something about, um, you know, by asking, “are there, are you concerned that somehow I 
felt, you know, that you were not as engaged in therapy or something?” But it just, it just 
didn’t feel right in the moment so I just kind of listened to her tale. 
This response is particularly notable for its consideration of the ways in which each member of 
the dyad’s mental states might have interacted with the other’s. Specifically, the therapist 




doubt about the future of the treatment even though, in their reasoning, there was not an obvious 
reason for them to have felt that way. Then, in response to a prompt from the interviewer, the 
therapist stated that the patient probably had wondered if the cancellation had upset them, and 
they supported this supposition by reporting that, at the start of the next session, the patient had 
seemed to be working to mitigate what she imagined was the therapist’s upset. This response, 
while incorporating plausible readings of observable behavior, allowed for the possibility that 
each member of the dyad’s thoughts and feelings might have diverged from the more observable 
features of the situation (e.g., the therapist, in their reporting of the situation, had no clear reason 
to doubt that the treatment would continue, yet they reported that they momentarily had such a 
thought). It also reinforced the notion that mental states are susceptible to disguise (e.g., the 
therapist was uncertain about the exact nature of patient’s mental state and whether the 
interpretation they had in mind would have been productive; additionally, they did not reveal to 
the patient that they had indeed felt some doubt about the treatment). Also of note, the 
mentalizing here, particularly at the start of the excerpt above, seemed to be actively happening 
during the interview; it did not seem to be a reiteration of an understanding previously obtained, 
which is important as recapitulations of ideas about mental states do not necessarily denote RF, 
especially if they were shared with the individual by someone else. While there are other factors 
that the therapist potentially could have considered in this response, and this response in isolation 
does not necessarily indicate an effective treatment, it is a multi-layered description of the mental 
states underlying certain events transpiring in the therapy. This was also true of the response 





Also of note, several of the therapist’s responses in this interview spoke to changes in 
mental states between past and present. For example, the therapist stated that their feelings for 
the patient had deepened, and that a frustration that they (the therapist) had felt toward the 
patient earlier in the treatment perhaps “spoke to my level of care for her.” They also spoke 
about the opportunity the therapy relationship had provided for experimenting with how much 
they should intervene as a therapist, and the way their thoughts about this had changed: “I was 
concerned early on that I would feel this need to interject and I don’t. It’s not that hard.” As 
mentioned above, an awareness of the evolution of mental states over time is a marker of high 
RF. 
A final aspect of the interview that should be mentioned is the therapist appeared 
relatively comfortable in their role as a therapist for this patient. This quality is discussed further 
in a qualitative analysis in Chapter V. 
 
Second interview, overall Therapist RF score of 3.5 
In this interview, the patient’s mental states were usually described with broad strokes 
rather than with specifics. Examples of this can be seen in the response from this PT-AAI-R 
discussed in the sections above—i.e., the response to the question of why this patient behaved 
the way he did as a patient. For example, in that response, the therapist said that the patient was 
“respectful of the frame” because: a) he had been in therapy before, so he had been “trained on 
the frame,” and b) “a big part of his self-image is that he is a decent, upstanding, good person.” 
Responses such as these did not describe situation-specific mental states in the patient. In this 
vein, the therapist, in this interview, seemed to keep some distance from the mind of the patient. 




experience of working with the patient—the therapist responded that it was “professionally” a 
“really interesting case” because “my other adult patient does not have a kind of personality 
disorder . .  . I’m not sure that he [i.e., this patient] officially meets all the narcissism criteria, but 
he’s pretty close.” The therapist, in this response, employed technical terminology—e.g., 
“narcissism criteria”—instead of considering specific mental states in themselves or the patient. 
While this does not mean that the therapist would have been unable to speak about specific 
mental states here—i.e., those that made this “a really interesting case”—they did not 
spontaneously do so. Another moment in which the therapist seemed to maintain some mental 
distance from the patient occurred later in the interview: when asked how the therapy 
relationship had affected their personality, the therapist initially dismissed the idea with some 
humor. The follow-up prompt, a more general “how has it affected who you are now?” question, 
which eschewed the implication that the interviewee’s personality had been affected by the 
therapy relationship, led to the following response: 
I think the most important way, but the same is true of my second adult patient, is that I 
am affirmed in my choice of this as my profession . . . I love working with my 
supervisors to try and make sense of what’s going on. I, um, it’s, I wish I knew a bit 
more, like what I was doing. I’m grateful that my supervisors are there to help me. But I 
really enjoy building these relationships. I really enjoy the time in the room. And so in 
that way it has been actually very important, to who I am as a person because it affirms 
my choice. 
In this response, the therapist spoke of their own mental states but only tangentially referenced 
the patient being discussed, and they spoke of their two adult patients as a pair. In a different 




uncertainty with regard to their abilities and did not seem as comfortable in the therapist role as 
they did in their first PT-AAI-R. This is discussed further the qualitative analysis in Chapter V. 
An additional point with regard to the low-RF aspects of this interview, one that is 
perhaps related to the somewhat impersonal nature of the responses described above, is that 
descriptions of the relationship were often unintegrated with each other or not supported by 
descriptions of events from the treatment. For example, in one response, the therapist initially 
referred to the patient as “really very empty in many ways” before saying that they “admired” 
him without elaborating on either assessment. This is notable from an RF standpoint as one 
aspect of RF is the linking of higher-order representations for a given object into a coherent 
whole, even if some of those representations are odds with each other. 
A final note with regard to this interview is that a higher level of RF emerged in one of 
the therapist’s responses. This underscores the notion that RF can fluctuate, and that it can do so 
within a single relationship as well as across different relationships (Fonagy et al., 1998). It also 
suggests that the therapist’s characteristic level of RF with respect to this relationship might be 





CHAPTER FIVE: Discussion 
The tests described in Chapter IV yielded two significant findings. First, there was an 
interaction between Therapist RF and patients’ emotion dysregulation at baseline such that 
Therapist RF was significantly related to reductions in emotion dysregulation for patients with 
high levels of the symptom at baseline but not for those with low levels of it. Second, higher 
Therapist RF was associated with higher personality pathology across timepoints. The hypothesis 
that Therapist RF would be positively related with reductions in patients’ externalizing 
symptoms, emotion dysregulation, personality pathology, and attachment insecurity was not 
supported. In addition, the hypothesis that a patient’s symptom level at baseline would moderate 
the effect of Therapist RF was supported for only one outcome measure—emotion dysregulation. 
However, all of the findings for this hypothesis—both the null and non-null findings—were 
underpowered and should be regarded with caution. 
Outside of the tests of this study’s hypotheses, the PT-AAI-Rs of the therapists who each 
completed two interviews were examined. One of these therapists had relatively consistent 
Therapist RF scores for their two PT-AAI-Rs (6.0 for the first interview, 5.5 for the second), 
while the second therapist had rather different scores on their two PT-AAI-Rs (6.5 for the first 
interview, 3.5 for the second). The variability of these Therapist RF scores, particularly the 
second therapist’s scores, corroborates prior research suggesting that RF generally—and 
Therapist RF, specifically—depends on the characteristics of the dyad in which it occurs 
(Diamond et al., 2003; Fonagy et al., 1998).  
Each of the topics above is discussed in greater detail this chapter, which is divided into 
the following sections: 




• The interaction between patients’ emotion dysregulation at baseline and Therapist RF. 
• The positive relation between patients’ personality pathology and Therapist RF. 
• Nonsignificant findings. 
• Intersubjective factors: Therapist RF as case dependent. 
• Qualitative analysis of two PT-AAI-Rs. 
• Clinical implications of the present study. 
• Limitations of the present study and directions for future research. 
 
Insufficient statistical power in analyses 
The tests for this study’s second hypothesis—i.e., that baseline symptom level would 
moderate the effect of Therapist RF—yielded one significant finding and three nonsignificant 
findings. However, as mentioned in Chapter III, these tests were underpowered—a sample of 43 
cases would have been necessary to test this hypothesis with adequate power. Stated another 
way, 43 cases would have been necessary to obtain an 80 percent chance of correctly concluding 
that the hypothesized relationship exists. As such, there is an elevated possibility that each of 
these tests yielded an incorrect conclusion with regard to the second hypothesis. Here it should 
be reiterated that the present study was intended to be a preliminary study of Therapist RF and 
generate hypotheses for future research. For this reason, it was decided to include the tests of the 
second hypothesis. However, the results of these tests should be regarded with caution. While the 
tests for the first hypothesis—i.e., that patient change would vary by levels of Therapist RF—
were more adequately powered than the tests for the second hypothesis, it should be noted that 




should be regarded with some caution. The sections below summarize these results and some of 
their possible implications. 
 
Interaction between patients’ emotion dysregulation at baseline and Therapist RF 
It was hypothesized that high levels of Therapist RF would be more beneficial for 
patients who were more symptomatic, at baseline, in the symptom areas assessed in this study. 
The results suggest that this might be the case for patients’ emotion dysregulation symptoms. For 
patients with high emotion dysregulation scores at baseline, Therapist RF was associated with 
better outcomes in this area. For patients with low levels of emotion dysregulation at baseline, 
outcomes in this area did not vary by levels of Therapist RF. This is in line with the literature 
that identifies the amelioration of episodes of emotion dysregulation as one of the primary 
functions of a caregiver’s RF (e.g., Fonagy et al., 2002; Fonagy et al., 1995). Indeed, it has been 
hypothesized that emotion regulation precedes the development of mentalization in an individual 
being cared for (e.g., a child or patient)—and makes possible the development of further 
mentalizing capabilities in that individual (e.g., Bateman & Fonagy, 2013). Therapist RF would 
be associated with a patient’s emotion regulation because emotion regulating interventions 
require mentalization on the part of the therapist in order to be successful. As mentioned in 
Chapter II, Fonagy et al. (1995) provided examples of interventions that a caregiver can use to 
contain a child’s intense affect. These examples, which can be adapted for the patient-therapist 
relationship, include interventions in which a therapist communicates: 
• that they understand the patient’s feeling, the cause of it, and how difficult it is; 




• that they see intentionality in the patient’s gestures and communications to them, and that 
the patient sees intentionality in the therapist’s gestures and communications. 
Notably, in this formulation, Therapist RF has a direct effect on a patient’s emotion 
dysregulation; the development of the patient’s capacity for mentalization is not a mediator of 
this effect. However, a patient who is more regulated has an opportunity to develop a higher 
capacity for mentalization (see Fonagy et al., 2017a), which subsequently transforms the 
methods for emotion regulation at their disposal. And, notably, that capacity is modeled by a 
therapist in exchanges such as the one described above. 
Additionally, Therapist RF likely plays an important role in the emotional and behavioral 
regulation of a therapist who works with a patient who has a high level of emotion dysregulation. 
It can be dysregulating for a therapist to encounter dysregulation in a patient. A dysregulated 
patient can bring into the therapy relationship hostile or otherwise upsetting behaviors. Therapist 
RF, in these cases, might help a therapist to regulate themselves so that they refrain from 
maladaptive behavior in response to hostile or upsetting behaviors from a dysregulated patient. 
This would parallel the findings of Ensink et al. (2017), who found that mothers’ RF was 
associated with fewer intrusive and aggressive behaviors in their interactions with their 
children—and that most of those behaviors, when they did occur, did so in response to a child 
doing something that produced distress in their mother. As a caregiver “returning” intense affect 
in an unmodulated form—even subtly—would be counterproductive to the regulation of that 
affect (Fonagy et al., 2002), a therapist’s self-regulation becomes an important aspect of the 
therapy relationship for patients with high levels of emotion dysregulation. 
Indeed, for the symptom of emotion dysregulation, Therapist RF might be crucial. As a 




dysregulation symptoms. But high Therapist RF predicted better outcomes in those with high 
levels of emotion dysregulation at baseline. Here it is worth reiterating that the cases in this 
sample predominantly were not manualized treatments, and mentalization was not an explicit 
focus of therapists across the cases. This suggests that the relevance of Therapist RF is not 
limited to treatments in which mentalization is viewed as a mechanism of change. It also 
supports Allen, Bateman, and Fonagy’s (2008) assertion that mentalization is a common factor in 
the efficacy of psychotherapy, regardless of the orientation of treatment. 
 
Positive association between patients’ personality pathology and Therapist RF 
It was hypothesized that Therapist RF would be related to patients’ symptom reductions 
in the area of personality pathology. However, in the tests for this hypothesis, it was found that, 
holding the Time variable constant, there was a positive relationship between Therapist RF and 
personality pathology. In other words, high Therapist RF scores were associated with high 
personality pathology scores. While this was unexpected, it can be connected with an important 
finding from the developmental literature. As mentioned above, Fonagy et al. (1994) asked a 
sample of new mothers about adverse events that they had experienced during their own 
upbringing. These events included a life-threatening illness in either parent, mental illness in 
either parent, and criminal behavior in either parent. As these experiences have been associated 
with poor outcomes—for the person experiencing them as well as their offspring (see Fonagy et 
al., 1995 for additional information)—mothers who had experienced more than two of these 
events were considered “at risk.” Among the “at risk” mothers, 10 had high RF—in all 10 cases, 
their child was securely attached to them. However, 17 highly stressed mothers had low RF, and 




importance of a caregiver’s RF in the context of adversity. In this vein, it is possible that a 
therapist might mentalize at higher levels when working with patients who have high levels of 
certain types of symptoms; the therapist might experience these symptoms as a form of adversity 
for the dyad. Sitting across from a patient with a high level of personality pathology, for 
example, a therapist might feel a strong pull to mentalize with and about the patient with the goal 
of ameliorating the patient’s suffering, which would be closely tied to the patient’s reduced 
capacity for mentalization. The therapist might share with the patient a perspective in which the 
patient’s dysfunctional response patterns are not immutable aspects of who they are. Or they 
might share with the patient a perspective in which their life stressors are not personal insults or 
manifestations of something personally wrong with them. In either case, the therapist would be 
adopting a stance in which events might be viewed from multiple perspectives (notably including 
the perspective that the patient brought into the session), which has the potential to reduce the 
patient’s negative affectivity. And the therapist might feel a broader pull to introduce their 
mentalizing capacity into the relationship so that the patient might identify with it and, 
subsequently, think in similar ways without the therapist’s assistance. Of note, such interventions 
might be employed by a therapist who is not explicitly considering mentalization as a construct. 
Another possibility is that a therapist might increase their level of RF with a patient who 
has a higher level of personality pathology in order to keep themselves emotionally regulated and 
to maintain perspective on the relationship. In the context of the primitive defenses and identity 
diffusion characteristic of personality pathology, these would be salient concerns. As mentioned 
in Chapter II, individuals with impaired mentalization and personality pathology often 
experience emotional contagion in social situations, which can prompt them to “be rigid and 




al., 2017a, p. 7). Therapist RF can be seen as a way for a therapist to counteract potential 
dysregulation as well as maintain a sense of agency in the context of a patient’s controlling 
behaviors. 
Overall, for a sensitive therapist, a patient with personality pathology might present an 
implicit “pull” for greater RF. In the present study, the correlation between Therapist RF, which 
was assessed four months into the treatments, and patients’ personality pathology at baseline was 
medium-sized (r = .40). While it was not quite statistically significant (p = .12), it was the largest 
of the correlations between Therapist RF and each of the symptom measures at baseline. As 
such, it is possible that higher personality pathology levels at baseline served a goad to higher 
Therapist RF at four months of treatment. 
That being said, in the present study, Therapist RF was not associated with changes in 
personality pathology over time, even among patients with high levels of the symptom. This is 
particularly notable, as, in the full sample, there was a significant, medium-sized reduction in 
patients’ personality pathology scores on the IPO-PER (Cohen’s d = 0.45). The nonsignificant 
relationship between Therapist RF and those reductions is discussed in greater detail in the 
subsequent section. It also should be noted that Therapist RF was assessed at 4 months of 
treatment and personality pathology was assessed at baseline and 12 months. As such, there is 
temporal uncertainty in the relations between Therapist RF and the assessments of personality 
pathology. The interpretation offered above is that high personality pathology was a pull for 
greater Therapist RF (i.e., Therapist RF increased as a response to patients’ personality 
pathology scores); however, this is not the only possible interpretation of the data. While it 




increased as a response to high Therapist RF. The lack of clarity associated with the timing and 
limited number of the assessments in this study is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
 
Nonsignificant findings 
As mentioned above, Therapist RF was positively associated with patients’ personality 
pathology scores, but its relationship with changes in those scores was nonsignificant. However, 
personality pathology was not the only symptom measure in this study for which change was not 
dependent on Therapist RF. None of the symptom measures changed from baseline to 12 months 
in ways that would have been predicted by Therapist RF. And for only one symptom measure, 
emotion dysregulation, was there a relation between Therapist RF and outcome that was 
moderated by the baseline level of the symptom. There are several potential reasons for the little 
support obtained for this study’s hypotheses. These include the following: patient symptom 
levels that were lower than those that have been reported for other clinical samples, a limited 
range of Therapist RF scores, a lack of support for this study’s hypotheses in the general 
population, a lack of temporal clarity in the relations between Therapist RF and the symptom 
measures, and psychometric problems with the measure of attachment insecurity used. Each of 
these will be discussed below. 
 
Relatively low patient symptom levels in the present sample 
In order to obtain information on the severity of the present sample’s symptom levels, 
one-sample t-tests were used to compare each symptom measure’s mean score at baseline with 




BSI-EXT. Derogatis and Melisaratos’s (1983) validity study for the BSI included a 
stratified random sample of non-patients (N = 685) as well as a sample of psychiatric outpatients 
(N = 1,002). The BSI-EXT scores for Derogatis and Melisaratos’s non-patient sample (M = 0.34) 
were significantly lower than the baseline BSI-EXT scores of the sample in the present study, 
t(16) = 2.52, p = .02. However, the BSI-EXT scores for the psychiatric outpatient sample (M = 
1.15) were significantly higher than the baseline BSI-EXT scores of the sample in the present 
study, t(16) = -4.29, p < .001. More recently, Benbassat and Shulman (2016) reported the BSI-
EXT data for a non-treatment-seeking sample of Israeli young adults (N = 65). The BSI-EXT 
scores for Benbassat and Shulman’s sample (M = 1.02) were significantly higher than the 
baseline BSI-EXT scores of the sample in the present study, t(16) = -3.20, p = .005. Overall, 
while BSI-EXT scores appear to vary substantially across samples and be sensitive to age and 
cultural differences, evidence suggests that the present sample is less symptomatic than other 
outpatient samples in the area of externalizing symptoms. 
DERS. Gratz and Roemer’s (2004) validity study for the DERS used a non-clinical 
sample of college undergraduates (N = 357). The DERS scores for Gratz and Roemer’s sample 
(M = 78.65) were not significantly different from the baseline DERS scores of the sample in the 
present study, t(16) = 1.31, p = .21. DERS scores for a treatment-seeking sample can be found in 
Mennin, Fresco, Ritter, and Heimberg (2015), who reported DERS data for individuals in 
outpatient treatment with a principal diagnosis of GAD (N = 21). The baseline DERS scores for 
Mennin et al.’s sample (M = 91.79) were not significantly different from the baseline DERS 
scores of the sample in the present study, t(16) = -0.84, p = .41. A sample with higher levels of 
emotion dysregulation can be found in Haynos, Roberto, Martinez, Attia, and Fruzetti (2014), 




= 51) inpatient admission for weight restoration. The DERS scores of Haynos et al.’s pre-
admission sample (M = 111.24) were significantly higher than the DERS scores of the sample in 
the present study, t(16) = -4.02, p < .001. The same was true of the DERS scores of Haynos et 
al.’s post-admission sample (M = 101.57), t(16) = -2.44, p = .03. Overall, the sample in the 
present study appears to be comparable to non-inpatient samples in the area of emotion 
dysregulation. 
IPO-PER. Lenzenweger, Clarkin, Kernberg, and Foelsch’s (2001) validity study for the 
IPO used a non-clinical sample of college undergraduates (N = 249). The IPO-PER scores for 
Lenzenweger et al.’s sample (M = 87.93) were not significantly different from the baseline IPO-
PER scores of the sample in the present study, t(16) = -1.43, p = .17. A more clinical sample can 
be found in Spitzer et al. (2006), who drew a sample of high dissociators (N = 51) from non-
clinical, outpatient, and inpatient populations at a German university. The IPO-PER scores for 
this sample (M = 102.9) were significantly higher than the baseline IPO-PER scores of the 
sample in the present study, t(16) = -3.67, p = .002. Relatively few published studies have 
reported descriptive statistics for the individual subscales of the version of the IPO developed by 
Lenzenweger et al. (2001). However, the data that are available for the IPO subscales upon 
which the IPO-PER is based (i.e., the Primitive Defenses and Identity Diffusion subscales) 
suggest that the present sample has a level of personality pathology that is comparable to a non-
clinical sample. 
ECR-INS. Fraley, Hudson, Heffernan, and Segal (2015) provided descriptive data on the 
ECR-RS from two large web-based samples (N = 2,399 for the first sample and N = 2,300 for the 
second). Averaging across the four ECR-RS forms that were administered by Fraley et al. (2015) 




scores of those samples were 3.12 and 3.02, respectively. The first sample did not significantly 
differ from the sample in the present study in terms of attachment insecurity, t(15) = -1.08, p = 
.30. The same was true of the second sample, t(15) = -0.69, p = .50. However, caution should be 
used in comparing the ECR-INS scores in the present study to the averages in the Fraley et al. 
(2015) sample given that, in the present study, patients were able to choose the ECR-RS forms 
they completed, and different patients chose to complete the ECR-RS for different sets of 
individuals. Additionally, patients in the present study had the option of completing an ECR-RS 
for their therapist. That being said, the ECR-INS scores in the present study suggest a level of 
attachment insecurity that is comparable to that found in a general, non-clinical population. 
The present sample’s relatively low levels of the symptoms assessed are notable as there 
is evidence that patients’ RF scores are negatively related to the number and severity of their 
symptoms. For example, in the area of depression, RF has been negatively related to Beck 
Depression Inventory scores for patients with major depressive disorder (MDD; Ekeblad et al., 
2016); additionally, psychiatric inpatients with MDD (Fischer-Kern et al., 2013) have had 
significantly lower RF scores than outpatients with chronic depression (Taubner, Kessler, 
Buchheim, Kachele, & Staun, 2011). Also, RF has been negatively associated with frequency of 
drug use (Stover & Kiselica, 2014), and, for borderline personality disorder, negatively 
associated with patients’ likelihood of receiving the diagnosis (Fonagy et al., 1996) as well as the 
symptom-related distress of those who have it (De Meulemeester et al., 2018). Taken together, 
the above findings suggest that low symptom levels—such as those found in present sample—
should correlate with higher RF. If the patients in the present sample were relatively unimpaired 
in terms of RF, this would be notable as a major pathway through which Therapist RF is 




would be less relevant for individuals with unimpaired RF. It also should be noted that, among 
the four symptom measures examined in this study, the one that Therapist RF would be theorized 
to ameliorate most directly would be emotion dysregulation.8 Therapist RF would be expected to 
affect the three other symptoms largely by increasing patient RF, which, as stated above, might 
not be impaired in the present sample. Further exploration of this study’s hypotheses among 
patients with higher levels of psychopathology is warranted. 
 
Limited range of Therapist RF scores 
It should be noted that a relatively limited range of Therapist RF scores (3.5 to 7.0) was 
obtained from the PT-AAI-Rs in this study. These scores (M = 5.35, SD = 1.13) were 
predominantly rated as “ordinary” (i.e., scale point 5.0) or better, with only 5 of the 17 PT-AAI-
Rs receiving a lower score. In this vein, Diamond et al. (2003) reported Therapist RF scores for a 
sample of 10 cases with experienced therapists (M = 5.75, SD = 1.53), and, notably, they 
obtained only a slightly wider range of scores (3.0 to 8.0) than were found in the present study. It 
is possible that the developmental studies that have produced some of the most compelling 
findings for the importance of a caregiver’s RF have obtained wider ranges of RF scores, but 
those studies have not reported ranges so this unknown. If that is the case, however, a sample 
with a wider range of Therapist RF scores might be needed to observe significant relations 
between Therapist RF and expected outcomes. That being said, it might not be feasible to obtain 
a sample of patient-therapist dyads with a full range of Therapist RF scores; it is unlikely for a 
therapist to score at the lower end of the RF scale—i.e., to have “absent” or “negative” RF for a 
 
8Higher levels of patient RF would be expected to increase the efficacy of a patient’s emotion regulation 
strategies; however, Therapist RF is also expected to improve a patient’s emotion regulation directly, 





patient. It is possible that the relations hypothesized in this study might remain stronger in theory 
than they are in empirical research. 
 
A lack of support for this study’s hypotheses in the general population 
 As mentioned above, there was a positive association between patients’ personality 
pathology (IPO-PER) scores at baseline and Therapist RF at four months, though the significant 
reductions in personality pathology scores between baseline and 12 months were not 
significantly related to Therapist RF. An explanation for these findings, one that differs from this 
study’s hypothesis that Therapist RF would be beneficial for patients with personality pathology, 
is that Therapist RF was a response to high personality pathology because it helped therapists, or 
certain therapists, in the context of patients’ personality pathology. (The potential benefits of 
Therapist RF, for a therapist, when working with patients who have personality pathology are 
described above.) However, in this alternative explanation, Therapist RF would primarily help 
therapists and would not directly benefit patients with personality pathology. A similar 
explanation could be given for patients’ externalizing symptoms (BSI-EXT) scores in this study. 
Like patients’ personality pathology scores, patients’ externalizing symptoms scores decreased 
from baseline to 12 months, but this change was not related to Therapist RF. And while there 
was not a significant relation between Therapist RF and externalizing symptoms (while holding 
the Time variable constant) in the tests for Hypothesis 1, there was a medium-sized correlation 
between externalizing symptoms at baseline and Therapist RF at four months, though this 
correlation was nonsignificant, r = .33, p = .20. Similar to the way Therapist RF at four months 
seems to have been elevated in the context of elevated personality pathology at baseline, it might 




because it was beneficial for therapists in that context. However, factors other than Therapist RF 
would better explain patient changes in that symptom. It also should be noted, as it was above, 
that the timing and limited number of the assessments in this study yields some uncertainty with 
regard to the relations between Therapist RF and the various outcome measures. As such, the 
explanation just given for the relation between Therapist RF and externalizing symptoms is not 
the only possible interpretation of the data. This is discussed in greater detail below. 
Emotion dysregulation (DERS) and attachment insecurity (ECR-INS) were more 
treatment-resistant symptoms in this sample. Neither symptom significantly changed in the full 
sample, and Therapist RF was not associated with the baseline score of either one. However, as 
mentioned above, emotion dysregulation scores at baseline had a moderating effect: for patients 
with high baseline scores, these scores improved more in the context of high Therapist RF than 
they did in the context of low Therapist RF, but, for patients with low baseline scores, outcomes 
did not depend on Therapist RF. In this way, the data appear to support this study’s second 
hypothesis with regard to the relationship between Therapist RF and emotion dysregulation. 
With regard to the nonsignificant results for attachment insecurity, one potential explanation 
concerns the measure that was used to assess it in this study. This is described in greater detail 
later in this chapter. 
The paragraphs above offer some explanations for the null findings presented in Chapter 
IV. A more global explanation for why, across symptoms, Therapist RF was not related to 
patient improvements can be found in Fonagy et al. (2017a), who argue that the larger social 
systems in which an individual operates are crucial in determining the ways of thinking and 
acting that are adaptive for that individual. An implication of this is that, if an individual’s larger 




is possible in cases in which an individual possesses a generally low capacity for mentalization—
the individual’s ways of navigating that environment might remain static even if a therapeutic 
relationship attempts to facilitate different ways of thinking and acting. In this vein, a single 
relationship (e.g., the therapy relationship), even if it is an attachment relationship, might be 
insufficient to influence an individual’s capacity for mentalization across various contexts if that 
capacity is being suppressed by the social systems in which the individual is embedded. In such a 
scenario, the purported mechanism of change for Therapist RF—i.e., improvements in patient 
mentalization—would break down. It is possible that the patients in the present study, in their 
day to day lives, faced substantial resistance to changing their particular ways of thinking and 
behaving. In terms of why two symptoms (i.e., externalizing symptoms and personality 
pathology) did improve in the overall sample—just not in ways related to Therapist RF—it is 
possible that nascent improvements in these areas were received positively by patients’ social 
environments and reinforced, and that this was less the case for any nascent changes in the other 
symptoms assessed (i.e., emotion dysregulation and attachment insecurity), which did not 
significantly improve in the overall sample. However, this is a tentative hypothesis. Future 
studies of Therapist RF ideally would obtain evidence with regard to the conditions in patients’ 
lives that could suppress the quality of their mentalization (e.g., chronic interpersonal conflict, 
exposure to violence, scarcity of needed resources). Such studies also should include multiple 
assessments of patient mentalization (RF) in order to assess how it changes in relation to both the 
social conditions mentioned above as well as Therapist RF. 
 




To verify that Therapist RF is indeed not related to changes in the symptom measures in 
this study, it would be important to assess changes in Therapist RF over time, and, more 
specifically, to assess Therapist RF at the same time post-test measures are given to patients. 
However, in this study’s design, the only measurement of Therapist RF was at the four-month 
timepoint. Therapist RF might have changed between 4 and 12 months. As such, the nature of 
the relationship between Therapist RF at 12 months and the symptom measures at that timepoint 
is unknown. It is possible that Therapist RF at 12 months—or the difference between Therapist 
RF at 4 months and 12 months—would be more closely related to patient outcomes than 
Therapist RF assessed at 4 months was. 
It also should be noted that, while the four-month timepoint was chosen for PT-AAI-R 
administration in order to study Therapist RF’s relation to subsequent changes in patients’ 
symptom levels, Therapist RF at four months is not a predictor in a strict sense of the term. It 
was measured after treatment had begun and four months after the baseline measures had been 
administered. At that timepoint, Therapist RF already would have been affected by certain 
aspects of the relationship. However, Therapist RF assessed at the very start of a treatment (e.g., 
at pre-treatment or the first treatment session) would not have been valid as the PT-AAI-R 
requires the interviewee to have an accretion of experiences within the therapeutic relationship in 
order to answer its questions.  
Overall, the timing of the assessments in this study introduces some temporal uncertainty 
into the findings, and this makes their interpretation difficult. Additionally, the reliance on just a 
single measure of Therapist RF means it is unknown how changes in Therapist RF might have 
related to changes in each of the symptoms. Specifically, based on the current data, it is unknown 




of Therapist RF. Similarly, it is unknown whether changes in Therapist RF might have followed 
increases or decreases in the level of a symptom. While Therapist RF cannot be manipulated 
directly—and thus a true experimental design with Therapist RF is not possible—future studies 
ideally would include multiple assessments of Therapist RF, as well as assessments of Therapist 
RF that are contemporaneous with symptom assessments; such a design has the potential to 
increase understanding of the relations between these constructs. 
 
Psychometric problems with measurement of attachment insecurity used 
As mentioned above, attachment security did not significantly change from baseline to 12 
months for the patients in this study as a whole. Additionally, Therapist RF was not related to the 
changes that did occur in this symptom. However, there were methodological issues with the 
measurement of attachment insecurity in this study that might have contributed to the 
nonsignificant findings with regard to this measure. The instrument available for the assessment 
of attachment insecurity within The Psychological Center’s programmatic evaluation study was 
the ECR-RS, which is designed to measure attachment insecurity on two separate scales (i.e., 
avoidance and anxiety) and measure it for specific relationships rather than generally. While the 
lead author of the ECR-RS has outlined protocols both for averaging the ECR-RS’s scales and 
for averaging items across relationships (Fraley, 2012, n.d.), neither protocol has been subject to 
thorough validation procedures; additionally, the literature does not contain an example of 
researchers using both protocols on the same data. It is possible that these protocols, each of 
which was used in the creation of the present study’s measure of attachment insecurity (the ECR-
INS), introduced additional measurement error, and that this error obscured the relations between 




a large amount of missing ECR-RS data, which might have been a result of respondents 
considering items for certain relationships to be “not applicable” to them if they did not have a 
particular type of relationship at the time they completed the measure. Ultimately, the large 
amount of missing data led to different relationships being dropped from the study’s analyses for 
different patients—and ECR-INS scores that were combinations of different relationships for 
different patients. This was another potential source of measurement error. Additionally, the 
missing data prevented the calculation of internal consistency scores for the ECR-INS as not all 
patients’ scores were derived from the same relationships. Overall, the ECR-INS has some 
notable methodological problems that might have contributed to the nonsignificant results 
obtained with this measure. 
With regard to measures of attachment that might be used in future studies of Therapist 
RF, a study by Klohnen, Weller, Luo, and Choe (2005) suggests that internal working models for 
specific attachment relationships predict outcomes for those relationships, but more general 
internal working models do not. However, evidence also suggests that an individual’s 
relationship-specific internal working models are nested within their more global model of 
attachment relationships, which explains the commonalities typically found across an 
individual’s relationship-specific models (Collins, Guichard, Ford, & Feeney, 2004; Overall, 
Fletcher, & Friesen, 2003). In light of this, improvements in an individual’s global model of 
attachment—rather than changes in particular relationship-specific models—could be a more 
impactful target of psychotherapeutic interventions. 
In terms of the best way to assess an individual’s global model of attachment, different 
self-report measures take somewhat different approaches. Mikulincer, Shaver, & Pereg (2003) 




avoidance and attachment anxiety describe separate dimensions of attachment insecurity, and the 
absence of both describes attachment security. In this vein, a measure that assesses attachment 
along these dimensions—the Experiences in Close Relationships Scale (ECR; Brennan, Clark, & 
Shaver, 1998; Fraley et al., 2000)—has been a particularly popular self-report measure for 
attachment researchers (Cameron, Finnegan, & Morry, 2012).9 
However, other authors have presented evidence that suggests a somewhat different 
model. Cameron et al. (2012), in a meta-analysis of (N = 32) studies with the revised ECR, found 
a medium-to-large (r = .41) correlation between the attachment avoidance and attachment 
anxiety dimensions. In this vein, Mannarini and Boffo (2014) found that much of the variance in 
global models of attachment mapped onto a single latent dimension, and items pertaining to 
attachment security were most prominent in describing this dimension. This finding dovetails 
with an understanding that attachment security has unique benefits, and the construct of 
attachment is not simply concerned with the absence of various type of insecurity—e.g., 
avoidance or anxiety (Lopez, 2019). As such, the ideal measure of an individual’s global model 
of attachment should directly assess attachment security. One validated self-report measure that 
does so is the Relationship Questionnaire (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991). Additionally, the 
AAI might be utilized in future studies of Therapist RF to obtain a measure of patient RF; if so, 
measures of attachment could be derived from AAI transcripts. (Of note, even if measures of 
attachment security are obtained from AAI transcripts, it still would be prudent to assess 
attachment via a second instrument to see if any significant relations between patient RF and 
attachment security still hold when these constructs are assessed via different measures.) AAI 
 
9Note that the ECR and ECR-R obtain assessments of global attachment avoidance and global attachment 





scoring procedures yield categorical assessments of attachment security as well as multiple 
scales that have been associated with attachment security (see Main, Hesse, & Goldwyn, 2008 
for a review). 
 
Intersubjective factors: Therapist RF as case dependent 
The preceding sections in this chapter offer explanations, based on this study’s findings, 
for how Therapist RF might operate across therapeutic dyads. However, those explanations are 
based on aggregate data and concern groups of dyads rather than individual dyads. In addition to 
group-level explanations, it is likely that the interplay of factors within a specific dyad 
contributes to the therapist’s level of RF for that relationship. As such, this section concerns 
intersubjective reasons why Therapist RF might be higher or lower for a particular dyad. The 
idea that the expression and effect of RF—and Therapist RF, specifically—might be dependent 
on the dyad in which it occurs has been raised by Fonagy and colleagues (e.g., Fonagy et al., 
1998) and by Diamond et al. (2003). This idea informs the present study’s hypotheses, which are 
based on the notion that the effect of Therapist RF should depend on the patient in the room with 
the therapist. 
In their pilot study of the original PT-AAI (Diamond et al., 1999; George, Kaplan, & 
Main, 1984, 1988, 1996), Diamond et al. (2003) found evidence suggesting that Therapist RF 
might be influenced by specific attributes of the dyad in which it occurs. And, as was the case in 
the present study, Diamond et al. found that some of the therapists who completed multiple PT-
AAIs in their study had divergent Therapist RF scores for their different cases. They also found 




complementary; specifically, the therapist had a level of RF on the PT-AAI that was a couple of 
scale points above the patient’s level on the interview.  
The outcome of present study also has an implication with regard to the ideal level of 
Therapist RF for a dyad—albeit a different implication. Specifically, the present study suggests 
that patients who have high levels of emotion dysregulation have greater need for Therapist RF. 
While this study and the one by Diamond et al. (2003) have different designs (Diamond et al. 
assessed Therapist RF at 12 months rather than at 4 months; they also included a measure of 
Patient RF whereas this study did not), both studies suggest that a patient’s presentation might 
have bearing on the ideal level of Therapist RF for a dyad. 
However, while therapists might have reason to adjust their level of Therapist RF for a 
particular patient, factors related to the dyad might limit the level of RF a therapist is able to 
obtain. For example, patients who are highly symptomatic in areas that reflect poor RF (e.g., 
emotion dysregulation) might pose special problems for some therapists in maintaining their 
level of RF with regard to the therapeutic relationship. Additionally, Therapist RF might be 
adversely influenced by countertransferential processes happening outside a therapist’s 
awareness—or by other challenges brought by the pairing of a specific patient with a specific 
therapist. For example, if the events unfolding in the patient’s life are unresolved aspects of the 
therapist’s own life, therapy sessions might be prone to dysregulate the therapist or otherwise 
constrict the therapist’s ability to have mental perspective on the therapy relationship. 
 The interplay between the attachment styles—or the defensive patterns—of the patient 
and therapist might also have bearing on Therapist RF. Tyrrell, Dozier, Teague, and Fallot 
(1999) administered AAIs to patients and therapists and rated those transcripts, via the Q-sort 




preoccupied/hyperactivating at the other. They found that complementarity (i.e., difference) 
between a patient and their therapist along this dimension was associated with better working 
alliance and better patient functioning than was concordance (i.e., sameness) along this 
dimension. It is possible that, in the context of greater concordance between a therapist and 
patient in attachment style or defensive structure, the therapist would have had less perspective 
on the patient’s difficulties, and that a path for therapeutic change would be less visible to them. 
This might contribute to a therapist feeling less efficacious and experiencing greater doubt 
regarding the prospects of the treatment, which would influence their state of mind with respect 
to their role as caregiver. One way to describe the relation between concordance, 
complementarity, and RF would be that, when dyads are complementary rather than concordant 
with respect to attachment, the therapist is less inclined to take the patient’s behavior “at face 
value,” and more inclined to wonder about specific, intentional mental states behind the patient’s 
behavior. In other words, the therapist is more likely to employ RF. However, it also should be 
noted that excessive difference between the members of a therapeutic dyad poses its own 
problems for a treatment (see Kantrowitz et al., 2016). Kantrowitz (2002) argues that poor 
therapy matches are those in which the patient and therapist are either too similar or too 
discrepant in areas such as personality and defensive patterns. The following section seeks to 
further illustrate intersubjective factors such as these via a discussion of two PT-AAI-Rs 
completed by the same therapist. 
 
Qualitative analysis of two PT-AAI-Rs 
The two PT-AAI-Rs that were completed by the same therapist but yielded discrepant 




capacity for RF might be restricted or facilitated within a particular therapeutic relationship. In 
the first interview, this therapist had a relatively high Therapist RF score (6.5). They explicitly 
considered the mental states underlying the patient’s behavior, and their responses included 
many different indicators of RF (e.g., an awareness that mental states are susceptible to disguise). 
Aside from this therapist having an underlying capacity for high RF, one explanation as to why 
Therapist RF was relatively high for this case follows on the notion, described above, that 
different patients pose different “needs” for Therapist RF. In this case, the patient had 
particularly high levels of emotion dysregulation at baseline; her DERS score was 110, which is 
nearly a full standard deviation above the mean of the present sample. (Note: the patient’s 12-
month score was 105; this is not a large improvement, but it is notable given that the average 
DERS improvement in the sample was only 1.94 points.) Additionally, the therapist seemed to 
have positive answers to all three of the caregiving postulates described by George and Solomon 
(1996): “(1) willingness to respond, (2) effectiveness of caregiving strategies, and (3) ability to 
read and understand [the patient’s] signals” (pp. 200–201). Specifically, they communicated a 
strong desire to help the patient, a confidence that they could help the patient, and, overall, a 
confidence in their ability to “read” the patient—as evidenced by their willingness to make 
hypotheses about specific mental states in the patient. As such, it is likely that, for this patient, 
the therapist had a Secure Base state of mind with respect to caregiving (George & Solomon, 
1996). Chapter II includes evidence suggesting that the therapy relationship can have many of 
the qualities of an attachment relationship, and, as such, the attachment and caregiving systems 
are important ways of understanding what happens in a therapeutic dyad. A Secure Base state of 
mind with respect to caregiving would be notable as, among the states of mind outlined by 




exclusion of information. As such, it would suggest high RF, and it is one way of understanding 
the relatively high Therapist RF score in this interview. In a similar vein, neither the nature of 
this patient’s symptoms nor the content of the sessions with her appeared to pose special 
difficulty for the therapist by being too concordant with—or too divergent from—their own 
psychic difficulties or life circumstances (see Kantrowitz, 2016); this, too, is a boon to the 
therapist’s mental flexibility and facilitative of high RF. 
In the second interview, the therapist had a relatively low level of Therapist RF (3.5), 
though their response to one question demonstrated higher RF. In this interview, the therapist 
was relatively avoidant of the mind of the patient. One possible explanation for this is that 
specific factors related to the case might have prompted the therapist to wonder whether major 
improvements in the patient’s mental functioning were beyond the scope of the treatment. This is 
potentially indicated in statements such as “I wish I knew a bit more” and multiple statements 
that the case was a “challenging” one. This, perhaps in conjunction with the therapist’s 
inexperience, could have produced a caregiving strategy that was based on a negative answer to 
the second caregiving postulate mentioned by George and Solomon (1996), “effectiveness of 
caregiving strategies.” That, in turn, could have led to a negative answer to the first postulate, 
“willingness to respond,” and resulted in a Rejecting state of mind for the therapist with respect 
to this caregiving relationship. Notably, a Rejecting state of mind, according to George and 
Solomon (1996), requires a caregiver to defensively exclude from awareness information 
regarding the negative effects of their caregiving strategy. It therefore is a state of mind that 
reduces RF.  
Another explanation for the relatively low level of Therapist RF in the second interview 




attachment have evoked less empathic responses from therapists—with such patients, therapists 
were more likely to respond with more cognitive interpretations and less likely to respond with 
reflections of patients’ emotions; in effect, therapists were likely to intervene in ways that were 
congruent with their patient’s attachment style (Hardy et al., 1999; Rubino, Barker, Roth, & 
Fearon, 2000). A therapist who closely mirrors a patient’s Dismissing state of mind would likely 
minimize or exclude from awareness attachment-related thoughts and feelings; as such, their 
level of RF regarding the relationship would be reduced. Of note in this regard, it was mentioned 
in Chapter II that it is beneficial for therapists to respond increasingly “out of style” (i.e., not in 
line with the patient’s defensive structure or insecure attachment style) over the course of a 
treatment in order to promote change in the patient. However, research suggests that the ability 
to do so is a function of the therapist’s clinical experience and the security of their state of mind 
with respect to the caregiving they provide as a therapist (Daly and Mallinckrodt, 2008; Holmes 
& Slade, 2018; Slade, 2008). Homes and Slade (2018) argue that the latter is related to a 
therapist’s comfort in their role, which stems from “deep, domain-specific knowledge” (Miller, 
Hubble, Chow, & Seidel, 2013, p. 90). An implication of this is that a training therapist working 
on their very first cases should be inconsistent in their ability to think and respond “out of style”; 
as such, they would be expected to experience constraints in RF related to the patient’s defensive 
structure or attachment style, which they would be attempting to mirror in order to provide 
empathic responses. That being said, it should be noted that constraints in Therapist RF are not 
limited to training therapists. In Diamond et al.’s (2003) study of RF within the therapeutic 





Interestingly, from the standpoint of different cases posing a greater or lesser “need” for 
RF, the second case posed a high need—the patient’s emotion dysregulation (DERS) score at 
baseline was 125, which was more than 1.5 standard deviations above the mean. (Note: the 
patient’s 12-month score was 149, so their symptoms in this area actually worsened.) As such, 
this case should have posed a high demand for Therapist RF, though it appears to be the case that 
RF was constrained due to other factors, perhaps those mentioned above. Notably, however, one 
response in the interview featured a high level of Therapist RF. Indeed, the therapist seemed to 
have a high capacity for Therapist RF, as demonstrated in the first PT-AAI-R they completed. 
The high-RF response in this interview might speak to the therapist’s developing confidence in 
their ability to be helpful to this patient. A possible avenue for the future development of this 
case would be one in which the therapist shifts internally to more affirmative answers to the 
“effectiveness of caregiving strategies” and “willingness to respond” postulates outlined by 
George and Solomon (1996). This would result in a Secure Base state of mind with respect to 
their caregiving that would be less likely to result in the defensive exclusion of information 
regarding mental states within the dyad. Furthermore, it would have the potential to result in a 
cyclical pattern of improvements in which the therapist’s increased comfort leads to fewer 
constraints on RF and further effectiveness for this case. 
 
Clinical implications of the present study 
Several of this study’s quantitative and qualitative findings have implications for clinical 
practice. One interesting finding, discussed in a different context above, is that the therapists in 
the present study had a limited range of Therapist RF scores (3.5 to 7.0). This range is similar to 




original PT-AAI (3.0 to 8.0). Notably, the therapists in Diamond et al.’s study conducted a 
manualized treatment, Transference Focused Psychotherapy (TFP; Yeomans et al., 2015). The 
therapists in the present study, on the other hand, generally used a mix of supportive and 
expressive techniques that had been tailored to each patient. However, despite the heterogeneous 
approaches to treatment used in the present study, all of the therapists mentalized to some extent. 
In light of this, it might be considered how a variety of treatment techniques—even techniques 
for which mentalization is not an explicit goal—can spur therapist mentalization. Some core 
techniques of major treatments for borderline personality disorder (BPD) can be used to illustrate 
this point. In Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993), for example, the technique of 
mindfulness entails a close, nonjudgmental attention to reality. When applied to internal stimuli, 
mindfulness involves observing one’s thoughts and feelings in a manner akin to mentalization. 
The therapist regularly demonstrates this skill for the patient, which entails the observation and 
acceptance of one’s thoughts and feelings—and possibly exploring specific reasons for them—
but also suspending action on any impulses related to them. The precipitating event is then 
jointly observed by the therapist and patient, who attempt to view it as objectively as possible 
(i.e., how a judge in a court of law might view it), which frequently provides an alternate 
perspective on the situation to take into consideration when planning action. This relates to 
another core DBT technique—dialectics—which entails holding two conflicting viewpoints in 
mind and simultaneously acknowledging that both contain some truth. While the mindfulness 
and dialectical interventions in DBT were not designed with mentalization in mind, they require 
a therapist’s mentalization in order to be implemented successfully. 
Another approach to treating BPD—one mentioned above—is Transference Focused 




theoretical orientations, TFP is similar to DBT in that it was not designed with mentalization in 
mind. However, a core therapeutic technique of TFP—the interpretation of the object relations 
dyads underlying patients’ thoughts, feelings, and behaviors (see Levy et al., 2006a)—requires a 
high level of therapist mentalization. Specifically, these interpretations require the therapist to a) 
think about what is happening in the “here and now” of the therapy relationship, b) consider the 
“here and now” in light of the patient’s history, c) elucidate the mental representations of “self” 
and “other” that inform what the patient is currently experiencing, and d) think about what is not 
being expressed by the patient—about what, perhaps, they are protecting or defending against—
and explicitly integrate that into the interpretation. As the above illustrates, the process of 
making an interpretation can require a high level of mentalization. In this respect, it is possible 
that interpretations that require greater mentalization on the part of the therapist are more 
effective in increasing patient mentalization—at least for patients with mentalization 
impairments. Along these lines, Levy et al. (2006) found that TFP was more effective than both 
DBT and Supportive Psychotherapy (SPT; Appelbaum, 2005) in increasing mentalization for 
patients with borderline personality disorder. This is a topic worthy of further study. 
As mentalization’s popularity as a clinical construct has increased, therapeutic techniques 
designed with mentalization in mind have become more prevalent (Bateman & Fonagy, 2013). 
Mentioned in Chapter II, Mentalization Based Treatment (MBT; Bateman & Fonagy, 2006) is a 
manualized treatment that was developed for borderline personality disorder. MBT incorporates 
a variety of techniques that explicitly call for the therapist to mentalize and model this capacity 
for the patient. However, as the brief discussions of DBT and TFP above illustrate, treatments 
with different focal points might still require therapist mentalization. Stated another way, 




based on their underlying theories of patient change. As such, different types of therapist training 
programs could be successful in developing therapists’ ability to mentalize. A potentially related 
finding from the present study is that Therapist RF was not related to whether the patient-
therapist dyads had been meeting once or twice a week at the time of the PT-AAI-R, nor was it 
related to the cumulative number of sessions the dyads had completed in the four months prior to 
the interview. One possible interpretation of this is that Therapist RF stabilizes quickly—at least 
early in treatments. If so, this would underscore the notion that there are many different roads to 
therapist mentalization, and these processes are not substantially derailed if one avenue or 
another is not available in a limited number of therapy sessions. 
 However, while different types of therapist training programs could be successful in 
developing therapists’ ability to mentalize, it is also possible that specific forms of therapist 
mentalizing are particularly beneficial for patients—at least for certain outcomes. Fonagy et al. 
(1998), in their manual for the RF Scale, identified many possible indicators of moderate-to-high 
RF. These indicators, several of which are illustrated in the qualitative comparison in Chapter 
IV, speak to somewhat different qualities of RF. Based on the results of this study’s hypothesis 
tests, it is worth looking more closely at the aspects of Therapist RF that might have been 
responsible for the improvements in emotion regulation experienced by patients who had high 
levels of that symptom. These aspects of Therapist RF can be grouped into two broad categories 
according to their general function. 
1. Increased context for, integration of, and specificity of mental states. This category 
includes mentalizing statements that a) link mental states with precipitating events or 
other mental states, b) identify interactions or conflicts between mental states within a 




persons, d) consider the historical context of a mental state—e.g., an individual’s 
personal history or shared history with another person or group of persons, and e) 
elaborate a mental state with new detail or support a mental state with new evidence. 
Collectively, these types of mentalizing statements would serve a few overlapping 
functions. (Note: a therapist might make one of these types of statements him- or herself, 
or they might guide the patient to do so.) First, they would reinforce the patient’s 
(perhaps only nascent) higher-order representation of the mental state through language 
that meaningfully describes it and through linkages with higher-order representations of 
other events and mental states. As outlined in Chapter II, this should contain the affects 
under consideration and make them more amenable to cognitive reappraisal. Second, and 
in a similar vein, mentalizing statements that increase the specificity of a particular 
mental state should make additional aspects of the patient’s episodic memory conscious 
and reduce the anxiety associated with mental content that is outside of awareness. As 
mentioned above, research has suggested that specific memories are associated with less 
arousal than more general ones are (Philippot, Baeyens, & Douilliez, 2006). Finally, the 
mentalizing statements described above should increase the integration of the patient’s 
self-concept and the organization of their internal world. Through linking the mental state 
under consideration with related affects and memories, the patient’s broader 
representations of their life and self-concept should become more understandable and 
meaningful. This would be expected to reduce baseline levels of anxiety and arousal. 
2. Increased perspective on mental states. This category includes statements that a) reflect 
an understanding that insight into mental states—others’ as well as one’s own—is 




feelings about a situation might be divergent from observable aspects of it, c) consider 
the defensive aspect of certain mental states and the possibility of unconscious 
motivations, d) reflect an awareness that mental states are transient—i.e., that a thought 
or feeling can, or already has, changed over time—even if the object of the thought has 
not apparently changed, and e) reflect an awareness that mental states differ from 
concrete reality. Collectively, these types of mentalizing statements from a therapist 
would offer some perspective on mental states by introducing the idea that they are 
fallible as well as the idea that they are not synonymous with reality or with the self. It 
should be noted, however, that this type of perspective on mental states is not the same as 
mental “distance.” (Distance implies avoidance, and it is associated with generality rather 
than specificity.) Viewing particular mental states as not synonymous with the self 
bridges connections between disparate mental states and fosters the integration of the 
patient’s self-concept. Viewing mental states as not synonymous with reality allows the 
patient to tolerate, observe, and think about mental states without fearing that they might 
destroy the self or the other. 
The mentalizing statements in the two categories above can also foster emotion regulation in 
conjunction with each other. For example, mentalizing statements that consider the interactions 
of mental states within a single mind, and mentalizing statements that recognize unconscious 
motivations and limitations on insight into mental states, are both related to the intentional 
stance. If the patient can accept motivations that are complicated, ambiguous, or not apparent at 
the moment, then their understanding of themselves and others is more likely to remain 
cohesive—and they are more likely to maintain ideas of autonomy and responsibility—in the 




patient would be expected to reduce the patient’s baseline levels of anxiety and arousal. This can 
be linked with the developmental literature as Fonagy et al. (1995) have argued that a parent’s 
modeling of the intentional stance is particularly critical in the facilitation of a child’s 
mentalization. 
The sections above delineate some mechanisms through which Therapist RF might 
ameliorate emotion dysregulation for patients with high levels of that symptom. In this context, it 
is worth considering some implications of high emotion dysregulation. Specifically, emotion 
dysregulation is regarded as a hallmark of personality pathology, and it is at the center of several 
different treatments for personality pathology (e.g., Clarkin & Levy, 2006; Lecours et al., 2013). 
While, in the present study, patients’ scores on the measure of personality pathology, the IPO-
PER, were comparable to scores that had been obtained for a non-clinical sample (Lenzenweger 
et al., 2001) and significantly lower than scores that had been obtained for a clinical sample 
(Spitzer et al., 2006), patients’ scores on the measure of emotion dysregulation, the DERS, were 
comparable to scores that had been obtained for an outpatient, treatment-seeking sample 
(Mennin et al., 2015). (Note the DERS was the only symptom measure in the present study for 
which this was the case—the other measures had scores that were significantly lower than those 
that had been obtained for treatment-seeking samples.) As such, the DERS was possibly a more 
sensitive measure to features of personality pathology than the IPO-PER was in the present 
sample. In this vein, it also should be noted that the six subscales of the DERS do not strictly 
concern emotion dysregulation. These subscales are the following: nonacceptance of emotional 
responses, difficulties in engaging in goal-directed behavior in the context of negative emotions, 
impulse control difficulties, lack of emotional awareness, limited access to emotion-regulation 




emotion dysregulation—is viewed as one of the defining features of borderline personality 
disorder; according to Clarkin and Levy (2006),  “impulsivity and negative affectivity/emotional 
dysregulation are the two core personality traits that characterize much of the phenotypic 
variation seen in BPD” (p. 407). Additionally, several of the DERS subscales—e.g., limited 
access to emotion-regulation strategies, lack of emotional clarity—overlap with the criteria 
specified in the Alternative Model for Personality Disorders in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.; DSM–5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013).10 This 
lends further support to the notion that, in the present study, patients’ DERS scores were a proxy 
for modest levels of personality pathology, and DERS decreases were potentially meaningful 
indicators of reductions in personality pathology as well as emotion dysregulation. 
A final point with regard to the relationship between therapist mentalization and emotion 
dysregulation is that there are different forms of emotion dysregulation, and the form being 
experienced by a patient might have bearing on the effectiveness of therapist mentalization at 
that juncture. For example, it has been noted that patients with features of borderline personality 
most often utilize hyperactivation—i.e., attachment-seeking—strategies to manage internal and 
interpersonal stress (Bateman & Fonagy, 2013). Such strategies can result in dysregulated states 
with elevated affects. In such a context, emotion regulation that occurs via therapist 
mentalization should lead to the downregulation of affect for the patient. However, in other 
situations, a patient might use deactivation—i.e., attachment-avoidant—strategies to manage 
internal and interpersonal stress. Such strategies for dysregulation would be associated with the 
suppression of affects, at least initially. The patient might appear untroubled to the therapist; 
 
10The Alternative Model was designed to address the degree to which, in the current taxonomy, some 
individuals receive several personality disorder diagnoses—i.e., the criteria overlap—as well as the 
degree to which many individuals with disordered personality do not meet the criteria for any diagnosis—




alternately, they might seem “off” (e.g., deliver a troubling story in a deadpan way) but be 
subjectively unaware of anything amiss (Bateman & Fonagy, 2013). While it is possible that 
emotion regulation via therapist mentalization might lead to the upregulation of conscious affects 
for this patient, it is often the case that a high level of therapist mentalization would be a less 
appropriate technique in such a scenario. A patient whose affect is absent from the content of 
their speech may be operating in a “pretend mode” in which mental content has been decoupled 
from underlying affects (see Bateman & Fonagy, 2013; Black, 2019). A therapist’s mentalizing 
with a patient who is functioning in pretend mode might promote pseudo-mentalization in the 
patient—e.g., hypermentalization (Fonagy et al., 1998). This would not help the patient to 
mentalize the original source of the dysregulation. In such cases, behavioral activation or a more 
emotion-focused technique might be a more efficacious intervention. 
While it is possible that one aspect of therapist mentalization is knowing when to 
mentalize explicitly with a patient and when to adopt other strategies, there might be times when 
mentalization is simply not the best course action for a therapist—or a patient. The level of 
Therapist RF that would be most efficacious might fluctuate throughout a treatment. This is one 
explanation for why, in the full sample of cases in this study, Therapist RF did not have a linear 
relationship with improvements in any symptom—even emotion dysregulation. However, 
Therapist RF was related to improvements in emotion dysregulation for patients with high levels 
of that symptom at baseline. It is possible that such patients frequently experienced dysregulated 
states with elevated affects, and high levels of Therapist RF were beneficial for those affect 
states. Notably, these patients might have been more likely to endorse DERS items than patients 
who more often used deactivating strategies; the latter group might have been less aware of their 





Limitations of the present study and directions for future research 
The present study was a preliminary study of Therapist RF, a construct that, to date, has 
received relatively little attention. However, there were several limitations to the study, and these 
have bearing on the results and inform directions for future research. These limitations can be 
divided into sample-related limitations and design-related limitations. 
 
Sample-related limitations 
 This study was conducted at a training clinic in which each training therapist carried a 
relatively limited number of patients and patient turnover was limited. Therefore, a higher N was 
sought but ultimately not obtained. This resulted in perhaps the most important limitation of the 
present study—the small sample size. While this study used a significance level of .1 in order to 
reduce the probability of Type II errors, the tests for this study’s second hypothesis (i.e., the tests 
of the moderating effect of baseline symptom level) were clearly underpowered. While all results 
in the present study should be viewed as tentative pending future research, the results of the tests 
for the second hypothesis should be viewed as particularly subject to change.  
The limited pool of potential participants also had another unfortunate consequence. 
Specifically, it prevented the use of inclusion criteria based on baseline symptom levels. As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, low RF has been associated with patients with higher levels of 
pathology. However, the patients in the present study had relatively low symptom levels. They 
were admitted to The Psychological Center as appropriate training cases for student therapists—
many of whom were at the start of their doctoral training—and suitable for a clinic without 24-




linked with RF either empirically or theoretically, not all of the patients in this study were 
symptomatic in these areas. Therapist RF is likely less salient for these patients. Another sample-
size-related consideration is that, while it is possible that studies of Therapist RF will reliably 
yield limited ranges of scores, a larger sample of therapists might have yielded scores closer to 
the endpoints of the RF scale. A wider range of scores might offer a more complete picture of the 
influence of Therapist RF. 
It also should be noted that the therapist sample—i.e., beginner therapists, many of whom 
were treating their first or second adult patient—limits the generalizability of the findings. And 
while one year of treatment has been a reasonable timeframe for the assessment of change in this 
study’s outcome measures (see Clarkin et al., 2007; Steele, Steele, & Murphy, 2009), it might 
not have been a reasonable timeframe for the present sample due to the beginner status of the 
therapists. A further consideration is that the treatments in this study were tailored to each 
patient, and different patients received somewhat different interventions. As a result of this 
heterogeneity, the findings in this study cannot be associated with specific therapeutic 
techniques. While Fonagy and colleagues have argued that mentalizing is a common factor in 
psychotherapy whether or not it is an explicit focus of the therapist (Allen et al., 2008), it is 
possible that a different sample taken from the same population would have yielded cases with 
somewhat different techniques on average—and yielded different results. 
 
Design-related limitations 
This study had a limited timeframe, and it is unknown whether additional significant 
relations between Therapist RF and the outcome measures would have been found after the first 




subsequently changed. Outcome assessments after the first year would have been illuminating. 
Additionally, it would have been beneficial to have included additional measures of both 
Therapist RF and the outcome measures within the first year of treatment to see how the 
relationships between them changed over time. At present, it is unknown how Therapist RF 
might develop over time in response to a patient’s presentation—if it is relatively static or more 
dynamic. While Therapist RF was assessed at four months to assess subsequent changes in 
patients’ symptoms—and, as mentioned above, it was not desirable to assess it sooner—the 
symptom measures were assessed at different timepoints (i.e., baseline and 12 months). As such, 
there is a lack of temporal clarity in the relations between Therapist RF and the symptom 
measures. For example, we do not know how an assessment of Therapist RF at 12 months would 
have related to symptoms assessed at that time. 
A challenge to additional PT-AAI-R administrations would be the length of the 
interview—most administrations were over 90 minutes. In this study, a requirement of additional 
PT-AAI-R administrations would have placed a large burden on the therapists who were 
interviewed as well as the transcribers and RF raters. However, the potential of a shorter 
interview, which this study illustrated, makes multiple administrations more feasible for all 
involved. A caveat to this is it seems it would be beneficial to include some of the questions from 
the second half of the PT-AAI-R—questions that are explicitly designed to assess a therapist’s 
caregiving system. The caregiving system should have been elicited for therapists when they 
answered the PT-AAI-R questions scored for this study; however, it is possible that questions 
specifically designed to activate the caregiving system would have yielded more robust 
information regarding Therapist RF. That being said, the re-instatement of any questions must be 




Another design limitation that should be mentioned is the omission of measures of patient 
RF. It is unclear if patient RF changed during the treatments in this study, and if any such 
changes were related to Therapist RF. In the present study, it would have been beneficial to 
know where the proposed model of change “broke down”—i.e., whether Therapist RF was 
unrelated to change in patient RF, or if it was related to change in patient RF but patient RF was 
unrelated to change in the other symptom measures. Additionally, the general level of RF with 
which the patients began treatment is unknown. If the patients in this study had, on average, 
higher RF scores than the patients in other published studies, they might have presented less of a 
need for high Therapist RF. 
It also should be noted that the present study exclusively used self-report measures to 
assess patient outcomes. Self-report measures offer several advantages, such as ease of 
administration and access to information that only the respondent might have (Stone, Bachrach, 
Jobe, Kurtzman, & Cain, 1999). However, self-report measures are prone to biased responses, 
such as those related to social desirability (van de Mortel, 2008). In this vein, less-desirable 
characteristics may be under reported (Bauhoff, 2011). Additionally, a participant’s frame of 
reference for a particular outcome might change after an intervention (Rosenman, Tennekoon, & 
Hill, 2011). In the present study, the degree to which patients accurately reported symptoms—or 
reported them in the same way across timepoints—is unknown. Ideally, outcomes would have 
been assessed through a combination of clinician-report, patient-report, and structured-interview- 
or lab-based measures. This would have increased the validity of the results. 
 Also of note, it was considered important to include a measure of attachment insecurity 
among the outcome measures in this study as RF has been linked to attachment security. 




study, the ECR-RS, was not designed to measure respondents’ general (i.e., across-relationship) 
attachment insecurity; rather, it was designed to measure attachment avoidance and attachment 
anxiety in specific relationships. The measure of attachment insecurity created for this study, the 
ECR-INS, followed two separate protocols outlined by the authors of the ECR-RS: one for 
combining its avoidance and anxiety subscales, and another for combining scores across the 
relationships assessed (Fraley, 2012, n.d.). However, as mentioned above, neither of these 
protocols was thoroughly validated and it is possible that each introduced additional 
measurement error. Additionally, the large amount of missing ECR-RS data resulted in ECR-INS 
scores that were averages of different relationships for different participants; this too might have 
introduced additional measurement error. As such, there is some uncertainty in this study’s 
findings with regard to the relation between Therapist RF and patients’ attachment insecurity, 
and the use of the ECR-RS to obtain a measure of general attachment insecurity should be 
considered a design-related limitation of this study. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the 
Relationship Questionnaire (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991)—and the AAI’s assessments of 
attachment security (see Main, Hesse, & Goldwyn, 2008 for a review)—would be more 
appropriate measures for the assessment of attachment insecurity in future studies. 
In a similar vein, it should be noted that the measure of externalizing symptoms used in 
the present study, the BSI-EXT, was created by combining the hostility and paranoid ideation 
subscales of the BSI. While there is precedent for this procedure (i.e., Benbassat & Shulman, 
2016), the BSI-EXT has not been validated as a measure of externalizing symptoms. 
Additionally, even after the three BSI-EXT items that had the weakest correlation with the total 
score were removed from the measure, Cronbach’s alpha estimates of the BSI-EXT items at the 




most widely used threshold for acceptable internal consistency is a Cronbach’s alpha estimate of 
.70 (Cho & Kim, 2015; Lance, Butts, & Michels, 2006). While published studies have sometimes 
utilized measures with Cronbach’s alpha estimates below .70 (Peterson, 1994), and acceptable 
internal consistency should reflect factors such as the stage of the research and the number of 
items in the measure (Cho & Kim, 2015; Cortina, 1993), the range of alpha estimates obtained 
for the BSI-EXT at the 12-month timepoint represent less-than-desirable reliability for a measure 
meant to assess a single factor (Cortina, 1993). This calls into question whether the items 
included in the BSI-EXT all assessed the same construct—i.e., externalizing symptoms. It also 
indicates a greater-than-desirable amount of error variance for the measure, and a somewhat 
reduced likelihood that hypothesis tests using this measure would detect relationships between 
externalizing symptoms and other constructs of interest in the data. As such, this study’s use of 
the BSI is another design-related limitation. 
 
Future research 
Future studies of Therapist RF should be adequately powered for the effect sizes found in 
the present study, some of which were in the small to medium range. Additionally, the patient 
sample in future studies should include a proportion of individuals with higher baseline levels of 
the outcomes in this study: externalizing symptoms, emotion dysregulation, personality 
pathology, and attachment insecurity. It also would be beneficial to employ a more 
representative sample of therapists. 
In terms of design, future studies of Therapist RF should include at least one but ideally 
two administrations of the PT-AAI-R or the AAI to patients, for a measure of patient RF, which 




Therapist RF and the outcome measures more frequently to make possible a time series analysis 
of these constructs. The administration of an abridged PT-AAI-R would be more efficient than 
the administration of the full interview. However, when interviewing therapists, it might be 
beneficial to add a small number of the PT-AAI-R questions specifically designed to assess the 
caregiving system. Additionally, multiple methods of assessing patient outcomes should be 
employed to account for the possibility of bias in self-reported outcomes, and to increase the 
validity of results. Further, given the drawbacks of the BSI-EXT and ECR-INS elucidated above, 
these measures are not recommended for use in future studies as assessments of externalizing 
symptoms and general attachment insecurity, respectively. Rather, future studies should use 
measures that have undergone thorough validity tests as assessments of these specific constructs. 
Finally, follow-up assessments after one year of treatment should be administered to obtain data 





PATIENT-THERAPIST ADULT ATTACHMENT INTERVIEW—REVISED (PT-AAI-R)  
(George, Kaplan & Main, 1998; Diamond, Clarkin, Levy, Levine, Kotov, & Palumbo, 2016)  
Introduction: In this interview, I'll be asking you about your relationship with your 
patient/current individual therapist. I ask that you speak freely during the course of this 
interview. The interview should take about 60–90 minutes.  
1a. Patient: Have you been in therapy before, either at The Psychological Center or elsewhere? 
How long did that (those) treatment(s) last? How often did you see that (those) therapist(s)? 
When did you first start seeing your current therapist? How frequently have you seen him/her? 
Has the therapy been continuous? Have there been any other treaters involved?  
1b. Therapist: How long have you been seeing adult patients at The Psychological Center? How 
long have you been seeing child patients? How many adult patients have you seen at The 
Psychological Center? Did you conduct therapy prior to your time at The Psychological Center? 
If so, how long have you been seeing patients overall? Approximately how many patients have 
you seen overall? When did you first start seeing the patient whose treatment we will be 
discussing today? How frequently have you seen him/her? Has the therapy been continuous? 
Have there been any other treaters involved? 
2. I'd like you to try to describe your relationship with your therapist/patient, going back to the 
beginning.  
3. Now I'd like to ask you to choose five adjectives or words that reflect your relationship with 
your therapist/patient. Then afterwards I'll ask you why you chose them. I'll write each one down 
as you give them to me.  
OK, let me go through some questions about your description. You say your relationship with 
him/her is ___________. Are there any memories or incidents that come to mind with respect to 
___________? (If you do not get a vivid incident, reiterate the question and press more firmly 
for a specific example. After two tries, go on to the next word. Continue this for all 5 adjectives. 
Examples of probes are: Well, can you think of a specific memory that would illustrate how your 
relationship is (...)? Well, that's a good general description, but I'm wondering if there was a 
particular time that happened, that made you think about it as (...)? If the subject cannot succeed, 




4a. Patient: How close do you feel to this therapist? How does this compare to the way you feel 
about other therapists you’ve had? 
4b. Therapist: How close do you feel to this patient? How does this compare to the way you feel 
about other patients? 
5a. Patient: When you have been upset emotionally in sessions with your therapist, what have 
you done? Can you think of a specific time that you were upset emotionally in a session? How 
did you manage it? (If subject doesn't spontaneously bring up therapist's reactions, probe: How 
did your therapist respond?) 
5b. Therapist: When your patient been upset emotionally in sessions with you, how has he/she 
expressed it? Can you think of a specific time that he/she was upset emotionally? How did you 
react? 
Have you been upset emotionally while treating this patient? Can you think of a specific time 
that that happened? How did you manage it? How did the patient react? 
6a. Patient: Have you been hurt physically since you’ve been in treatment? Again, do any 
specific incidents come to mind? (If subject doesn't spontaneously bring up therapist's reactions, 
probe: How did your therapist respond?)  
6b. Therapist: Has your patient been hurt physically since he/she has been in treatment? Do any 
specific incidents come to mind? How did you react?  
Have you been hurt physically since beginning treatment with this patient? Can you think of a 
specific time that you were hurt? How did you manage it? How did the patient react? 
7a. Patient: Have you been ill since you’ve been in treatment? Do any specific incidents come to 
mind? Do you remember how your therapist responded?  
7b. Therapist: Has the patient been ill since he/she has been in treatment? Do any specific 
incidents come to mind? How did you respond? 
Have you been ill since beginning treatment with this patient? Can you think of a specific time 
that you were ill? How did you manage it? How did the patient react? 
8. What is the first time you remember being separated from your therapist/patient? (Or, if early 




about separations other than normal breaks between sessions—for example, vacations, holidays, 
and cancellations by you or the therapist/patient. What was the reason for this separation? How 
did you respond? How did the therapist/patient respond? 
Are there other separations that stand out in your mind?  
What are separations from your therapist/patient like for you?  
9. Have you felt rejected by your therapist/patient? How have you managed those feelings at 
such times? Are there any particular instances that stand out in your mind? Why do you think 
your therapist/patient did those things? Do you think he/she realized he/she was rejecting?  
10a. Patient: Have you been unusually frightened or worried since you’ve been in treatment? 
What have you done at such times?  How has your therapist responded to your feelings of fear or 
worry during the course of your treatment? Do any specific incidents come to mind? 
10b. Therapist: Has the patient been unusually frightened or worried since he/she has been in 
treatment? Can you think of a specific time that that happened? How did you react? 
Have you been unusually frightened or worried since beginning treatment with this patient? Can 
you think of a specific time that you were unusually frightened or worried? How did you manage 
it? How did the patient react? 
11. Has your therapist/patient ever been threatening with you in any way, even jokingly? (Probe 
for threats, silent treatment, and abuse.) When did this occur? Did it happen frequently? How did 
you respond? How did the therapist/patient respond? 
12. In the course of the treatment, have you ever worried that your therapist/patient would end 
the treatment?  
13. (If early in the treatment, interviewer can preface the following question by saying, “I realize 
you just started with your therapist patient, but . . .”) In general, how do you think your overall 
experiences with this therapist/patient have affected your personality/who you are now? 
(Possible probe: Are there any aspects to this relationship that you feel have been a setback for 
your development?)  
14a. Patient: Have you experienced the loss of a parent or other close loved one since you’ve 




Have you experienced other difficult experiences that you would regard as potentially traumatic 
since you’ve been in treatment? (Possible clarification: I mean any experience that was 
overwhelmingly and immediately terrifying.) How did your therapist respond? 
14b. Therapist: Has the patient experienced the loss of a parent or other close loved one since 
he/she has been in treatment? How did you react? 
Has the patient experienced other difficult experiences that you would regard as potentially 
traumatic since he/she has been in treatment? How did you react? 
Have you experienced the loss of a parent or other close loved one since beginning treatment 
with this patient? How did you manage it? How did the patient react? 
Have you experienced other difficult experiences that you would regard as potentially traumatic 
since beginning treatment with this patient? How did you manage it? How did the patient react? 
15. Why do you think your therapist/patient behaves the way he/she does as a therapist/patient?  
16. Have there been many changes (or, if early in the treatment, “any changes”) in your 
relationship with your therapist/patient since you have begun treatment? (Probe: Have your 
feelings for your therapist/patient changed over the course of the treatment?)  
17. (If early in the treatment, interviewer can preface the following question by saying, “Again, I 
realize you just started with your therapist/patient, but . . .”) Is there any particular thing, which 
you feel you learned above all from this therapy relationship? I'm thinking here of something you 
feel you may have gained from the experience.  
Optional questions for therapist: 
18. If you had three wishes for your patient several years from now, what would they be? I'm 
thinking partly of the kind of future you would like to see for him/her.  
19. What would you hope your patient might have learned from his/her experiences of being 
treated by you?  
Questions 1-19 are adapted from the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI, George, Kaplan & Main, 
1996).  




 20. Has the therapist/patient been able to tolerate views of him/herself that are very different 
from his/her own views? Could you tell me more about that? (Probe: Could you give a specific 
example of a time when that happened?)  
21. Has the therapist/patient made observations about you that you felt were accurate and that 
you could incorporate into your understanding of the therapist/patient? 
22a. Patient: How effective would you say your therapist is? Could you tell me more about that? 
[Try to ascertain why the patient is assessing the therapist’s effectiveness in the way that he/she 
is.] 
22b. Therapist: How effective would you say you are as a therapist? Could you tell me more 
about that? [Try to ascertain why the therapist is assessing his/her effectiveness in the way that 
he/she is.] 
23a. Patient: How motivated are you to be in this treatment? 
How motivated do you think the therapist is to treat you? 
23b. Therapist: How motivated do you think the patient is to be in this treatment? 
What is your level of motivation to treat this patient? 
24a. Patient: How effective, do you think, are the therapeutic techniques that your therapist is 
using to help you? What techniques have been effective? (Probe, if not addressed in response: 
What makes these techniques effective?) 
24b. Therapist: How effective, do you think, are the therapeutic techniques that you are using to 
help your patient? What techniques have been effective for this patient? (Probe, if not addressed 
in response: What makes these techniques effective?) 
25a. Patient: In what ways do you depend on your therapist to help you? Why these ways and not 
others? To what extent do you see yourself as a person deserving of help? 
25b. Therapist: In what ways does your patient depend on you for help? Why these ways and not 
others? To what extent do you see yourself as someone who can help this patient? 
26a. Patient: Have you ever felt helpless or overwhelmed by this treatment or your therapist? 




26b. Therapist: Have you ever felt helpless or overwhelmed by this treatment or the patient? 
Have you ever imagined terminating? 
27a. Patient: How well does your therapist read or understand you? How attuned is he/she to 
you?  
27b. Therapist: How well do you read or understand your patient? How attuned are you to 
him/her?  
How well do you think your patient reads or understands you? 
28. To what extent has there been an honest meeting of the minds in your relationship with this 
therapist/patient?  
29. Therapists/patients often notice similarities between themselves and their patients/therapists. 
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